Mengensteuerung über das G-DRG-Preissystem
In recent years the German hospital market has experienced a strong increase in the number of cases. This increase appears to be partly caused by financial incentives inherent in the DRG system. Almost ten years after its introduction, the G-DRG system is in need of modification. This chapter discusses a number of instruments to adjust financial incentives for hospitals. Switching to selective contracting is one solution. If, however, a political decision is made to adhere to the current system of collective bargaining, we suggest (i) fixing the total DRG casemix volume, (ii) introducing quotas for inpatient cases hospitals can bill health insurers for, and (iii) establishing a market in which hospitals can trade these rights. These measures would allow the regulatory body to fully control the total casemix volume.
Augurzky, B., S. Felder and J. Wasem (2013), Mengensteuerung über das G-DRG-Preissystem. In Jürgen Klauber, Max Geraedts, Jörg Friedrich and Jürgen Wasem (Hrsg.), Krankenhaus-Report 2013 - Mengendynamik: mehr Menge, mehr Nutzen?. Stuttgart: Schattauer, 175-187.