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VOX CEPR Policy Portal

2016

Jochen Andritzky, Lars P. Feld, Christoph M. Schmidt, Isabel Schnabel, Volker Wieland

Creditor participation clauses: Making orderly sovereign debt restructuring feasible in the Eurozone

To make the no-bailout clause credible and to enhance the effectiveness of crisis assistance, private creditors should contribute to crisis resolution in the Eurozone. This column proposes a mechanism to allow for orderly restructuring of sovereign debt as part of ESM programmes. If debt exceeds certain thresholds, the mechanism triggers an immediate maturity extension. In a second stage, a deeper debt restructuring could follow, depending on the solvency of a country. The mechanism could be easily implemented by amending ESM guidelines.

Andritzky, J., L. Feld, C. Schmidt, I. Schnabel und V. Wieland (2016), Creditor participation clauses: Making orderly sovereign debt restructuring feasible in the Eurozone . VOX CEPR Policy Portal, 21.07.2016.

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