Minimum Effective Information in Allowance Cancelling
Cancelling European Union Allowances (EUAs) is a viable voluntary climate action for both households and firms. Yet, maximizing abatement requires delay. This fact is widely unknown, difficult to understand, and counter-intuitive. In a large consequential choice experiment with five informational load conditions, we test for the effectiveness of advice on cancellation and timing, narrowing down a minimum amount of information required to induce participants to delay. We find a clear pattern of advice being processed and followed, even if it includes a demanding level of detail. Moreover, a mere assertion is highly effective already. These results are good news for efforts to increase the effectiveness of voluntary climate action.
United States Association for Energy Economics (USAEE)
JEL-Klassifikation: C93, D83, Q54
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4411191