Who Benefits from Phased Retirement: Workers, Firms, or Public Pension Systems?
Extending working lives is a central response to population aging, yet older workers prefer to work less and firms are often reluctant to employ them. Phased retirement promises to reconcile these interests. This paper studies how German partial retirement (PR) shapes workers’ careers and how firms use it to adjust their workforces by exploiting that the abolish ment of a subsidy raised the cost of PR for firms. Using a sharp eligibility cutoff by birth date and linked data on the universe of workers and estab lishments, I show that the cost shock reduced lifetime PR take-up by about one-third. Instrumenting PR entry with subsidy eligibility, I find that PR does not delay job exit but reduces lifetime labor supply. The resulting loss in pension contributions falls on workers through lower entitlements rather than on the public pension system. At the firm level, establishments more exposed to the abolishment retained more workers, mostly aged 60 and older, suggesting that subsidized PR served firms as a cheap way to shed older staff. Consistent with a downsizing motive, establishments hit harder by the 2008–09 financial crisis kept a larger share of their PR use once the subsidy ended. Moreover, PR concentrated among high earners, who are more costly to employ. Thus, subsidized PR helped firms to reorganize their workforce rather than to extend workers’ careers.