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## **Split-Incentives in Energy Efficiency Investments? Evidence from Rental Housing**

## Imprint

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Puja Singhal, Stephan Sommer, Kathrin Kaestner, and Michael Pahle<sup>1</sup>

# Split-Incentives in Energy Efficiency Investments? Evidence from Rental Housing

## Abstract

*Rental housing where tenants are responsible for their own energy bills but landlords are responsible for energy retrofits may pose a particular challenge in achieving optimal rates of investments in energy efficiency. In this paper, we investigate the severity of this split-incentive problem in thermal efficiency investments in the German housing market, where the share of renters is among the highest in the European Union and the majority of rented apartments is owned by private individuals. Using data on energy performance scores from Germany's largest online housing market platform between 2019 and 2021, we find economically small differences in the energy efficiency levels between apartments that are offered for sale for own use compared to those that are rented out on the housing market. These findings suggest that there may not be a critical energy efficiency deficit due to the high share of renters in the multi apartment building sector.*

*JEL-Codes: Q41, Q50, Q54*

*Keywords: Energy efficiency; split-incentives; housing market; owner-renter problem*

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# 1 Introduction

Heating and cooling of space – temperature control, more generally – make up the lion’s share of energy needs in the residential sector in the EU and continue to be carbon-intensive energy services (European Commission, 2021). Climate policies heavily promote energy efficiency retrofits in the housing sector (Zhong et al., 2021), such as thermal insulation or a change of the heating system, which simultaneously reduce energy demand, household utility bills, and associated climate damages (Brounen et al., 2012).

A large number of studies has documented that on average there exists a “green premium” for investments in energy efficiency on the housing market (Aydin et al., 2020; Brounen and Kok, 2011; Fuerst et al., 2015; Fuerst and Warren-Myers, 2018) with significantly smaller effects in large cities, compared to other urban and in particular to rural properties (Taruttis and Weber, 2022). Moreover, the literature has established that the introduction of mandatory disclosure of environmental performance certificates (EPC) plays a role in mitigating the information asymmetries that inhibit the full valuation of energy efficiency on the housing market (Frondel et al., 2019; Myers et al., 2020). Nevertheless, private investments in energy efficiency renovations of existing buildings may still fall short of the optimum (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gerarden et al., 2017), resulting in the so-called energy efficiency gap (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). Furthermore, both policy makers and scholars are increasingly concerned about a potentially high energy efficiency gap in rental housing (Krishnamurthy and Kriström, 2015; Myers et al., 2020)<sup>1</sup>.

In this paper, we analyze whether rental properties indeed have lower energy performance standards compared to owner-occupied properties. Over 70% of housing units owned by private individuals in Germany’s multi-apartment buildings are rented out (see Table A2), and tenants are responsible for their own energy bills in a large majority of rental contracts. This housing environment may be particularly problematic if it leads to significant under-investments in energy efficiency by landlords, as opposed to private companies or public institutions. For this

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<sup>1</sup>In order to distribute the incentives to invest in energy efficiency in a targeted manner, in 2021 the German federal government, for instance, brought into force a carbon price for the consumption of heating fuels. The cost increase is split between both parties in private rental contracts: the landlord that owns the property and the renter living in it (Flachsland and Levi, 2021).

reason, we focus our analysis on properties owned by private individuals only. Specifically, we empirically assess the magnitude of the differences in energy efficiency ratings (reported on EPCs) between rental and owner-occupied homes. To this end, we use comprehensive data on advertisements from ImmobilienScout24, the largest German online broker for apartments, spanning the period from 2019 to 2021, controlling for important determinants of energy efficiency such as location, age, size, and time on the housing market (see Breidenbach and Schaffner, 2020, for more information on the data set). This allows us to evaluate whether the mode of tenure (owner versus renter) matters significantly on its own merit.

There are multiple reasons for why we expect buildings with rental units to have suboptimal levels of energy efficiency standards (see, for instance, Gillingham et al., 2012). One crucial reason is that the majority of households are billed directly for their energy consumption in Germany. Thus, tenants pay for their own utility bills and consequently landlords do not reap the energy cost savings from energy efficiency investments.<sup>2</sup> This split-incentive problem (see also Krishnamurthy and Kriström, 2015) may be aggravated by the fact that the vast majority of low-income households (who mostly rent) reside in multi-apartment buildings, that may be further subject to rent control (Breidenbach et al., 2022). Hence, there might be a trade-off between rent control and the landlord's incentives to invest in energy retrofits. It may thus be reasonable to predict a long-term energy efficiency problem in the multi-apartment building stock.

A review of the literature reveals several studies that estimate the size of the split-incentives dilemma (e.g. Cellini, 2021; Gillingham et al., 2012; Melvin, 2018). For instance, using cross-sectional survey data from 11 OECD countries, Krishnamurthy and Kriström (2015) detect that owners are substantially more likely to have access to energy-efficient appliances and to better insulation. Charlier (2015) shows for French households that tenants have higher energy expenditures than homeowners due to energy-inefficient building characteristics.

Furthermore, there is a rich array of studies in different contexts that offer policy solutions

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<sup>2</sup>Note that 60 percent of apartment units are owned by private individuals in Germany (see Table A1). Statistics on the ownership structure at the building level are not available, however. The share of buildings that are fully owner-occupied is an unknown statistic, for example. Nevertheless, even for buildings completely housed by owner-occupiers, there may still be a collective action problem among apartment owners – leading to below-optimal investments in energy efficiency compared to when the entire building is owned by one large owner, e.g. a private company or public institution.

to mitigate the split-incentive problem in the residential sector (e.g. Ástmarsson et al., 2013; Carroll et al., 2016; Lambin et al., 2023). For instance, Charlier (2015) illustrates that tax credits are ineffective in the split-incentives context, recommending mandatory measures, such as minimum standards. Weber and Wolff (2018) compare theoretical heating energy consumption prior to and after a retrofit with actual consumption data. They show that despite a reduction in energy consumption of 70%, more than half of the households experience a cost increase owed to higher rents after retrofit, emphasizing the importance of alternative financing models.

Despite this wide range of studies in the context of the split-incentives dilemma, only few studies have estimated the economic significance of the energy efficiency problem for multi-apartment buildings, where the majority of the renters resides (Broberg and Egüez, 2018; Nie et al., 2020; Petrov and Ryan, 2021). The empirical question for Germany remains unanswered: what is the extent to which renter-occupied homes underperform in terms of energy efficiency compared to owner-occupied homes, *ceteris paribus*? Germany presents itself as an interesting case study with by far one of the largest rental apartment markets in Europe. Almost half of the population rents their residence, and the majority of renters live in multi-apartment buildings (Breidenbach et al., 2022). Thus, this paper is the first to analyze data from a rental market that serves a significant share of the population and covers all geographic regions in Germany.

Our results suggest that on average there is no significant divergence in the energy quality of properties by the mode of tenure in the market of apartments. This is in line with the study by Petrov and Ryan (2021) for the Irish rental sector. However, we do detect that newly constructed apartments and buildings have significantly higher energy performance levels, owing to stricter energy standards in building regulation. Moreover, new apartments inhabited by owner-occupiers are on average more energy-efficient than new apartments for rental use. A reason for this is that buildings with top energy efficiency standards tend to be priced at a significantly higher premium, which may make them economically more suitable for owner-occupation, rather than for rental use. However, we do not detect economically significant differences in the (older) existing multi-apartment buildings on the housing market in which the large majority of the renters resides.

We offer two reasons for why this might be the case. First, existing multi-family buildings



might not be sorted by housing tenure. That is, there is a mix of both renter-occupied and owner-occupied apartments available in existing buildings, which is reflected on the housing market. Since investment decisions are made jointly by groups of apartment owners in multi-unit buildings and owner-occupied apartments tend to be larger, more weight is likely to be given to the investment vote of owner-occupiers over landlords of rental apartments in the same building. Second, the burden of renovation costs is shared by multiple apartment owners in a building, which may allow sufficient financial buffer and thus economic incentives to invest in the energy efficiency of existing multi-apartment buildings.

In the subsequent section, we present a brief overview of the German housing market. Section 3 describes the data set and presents summary statistics, and Section 4 presents the estimation results. The last section summarizes and concludes.

## **2 Background**

Germany aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2045 whereby an important milestone is the reduction of carbon emissions by 65% by 2030 compared to 1990. One crucial sector to achieve these goals is the building sector since it accounts for roughly 15% of Germany's carbon emissions (UBA, 2022). To reduce emissions from buildings, many homes need to be retrofitted. Yet, the rate of renovation in German residential buildings has been as low as 1% in the past (Cischinsky and Diefenbach, 2018) and has not increased despite government subsidy programs for energy-efficient retrofits (Frondel et al., 2022).

There are a number of instruments that aim to increase residential energy efficiency. For starters, Germany introduced a new carbon pricing scheme at the outset of 2021 that raises the price of fossil fuels. By increasing the cost for gas and heating oil, the two most common heating fuels in German buildings (Destatis, 2019), the carbon price aims to induce households to invest in energy-efficient solutions (Flachsland and Levi, 2021). To facilitate energy conservation in the building sector, especially in existing buildings, the new Building Energy Act (GEG) bundles the energy requirements for new and existing buildings (The Federal Government, 2020). The GEG replaces previous regulations that established building codes for energy

efficiency, such as the Energy Conservation Ordinance (for an overview of the most important years of amendments in the energy conservation ordinances, see Table A3). Additionally, a number of other support measures and bans in the building sector accompany the carbon price. First, the Federal government decided to prohibit the installation of heating systems using heating oil as of 2026. Second, various subsidy programs exist to further support retrofit measures: Replacing an old oil heating system with an energy-efficient heating system is supported with a federal subsidy of up to 45%. Buying, building or renovating buildings according to energy efficiency standards of varying stringency are financially supported by the Federal Development Bank (KfW) with low interest loans and repayment bonuses of up to 40% (Sebi et al., 2019; The Federal Government, 2022). Individual energy-efficiency measures are subsidized by the KfW by covering up to 20% of the cost. Finally, for energy-related retrofits, such as the insulation of roofs and walls, the renewal of windows or the installation of energy-efficient heating systems, tax credits of up to 20% (maximum EUR 40,000) of the cost can be claimed (The Federal Government, 2022). Yet, these tax incentives can only be exploited by owner-occupiers.

More generally, the benefits of such programs might be different for tenants compared to homeowners because of the so-called split-incentives dilemma (Gillingham et al., 2012): for homeowners, incentives are aligned, i.e. they make an energy-efficient investment and reap the benefits of lower consumption rates and thus lower energy bills. In contrast, on the rental market the incentives differ as tenants usually benefit from better energy efficiency because they pay the energy bills, but landlords bear the cost of investment. However, tenants may be less informed than homeowners/landlords about the thermal quality of their dwelling.

To mitigate this information asymmetry, many governments have introduced Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) with mixed effects on purchase prices and rents (e.g. Eichholtz et al., 2013; Hyland et al., 2013). The German government introduced mandatory EPCs in May of 2014 (Frondelet et al., 2019). Specifically, vendors and landlords are obliged to disclose energy-related information whenever their dwelling is on sale or up for rent, that is, also in real estate advertisements.<sup>3</sup> The EPCs entail information on the building's annual energy consump-

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<sup>3</sup>Certain buildings are exempt from the disclosure requirement: These are for instance buildings that are not heated or cooled with the help of energy, residential buildings that are used for a maximum of four months per year (fixed period of use), such as holiday or weekend homes, and residential buildings that are used for a limited period per year and whose energy consumption during this period is less than 25% of the expected energy consumption if

tion per square meter and the related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Figure 1).<sup>4</sup> The main determinants to calculate the specific energy consumption are the building's construction year, the number of apartments, floor size, the heating source, and the kind of insulation.




Figure 1: Energy Performance Certificate

Our focus on Germany is particularly suited to explore the split-incentive problem because Germany has one of the lowest homeownership rates among the OECD countries (Andrews and Sánchez, 2011). With roughly 50%, Germany has the second lowest homeownership rate in Europe after Switzerland, while the EU average amounts to about 70% (Eurostat, 2022). In addition to specific housing policies like high transfer taxes when buying real-estate and no tax deductions for mortgage interest payments that tend to discourage homeownership in Germany (Kaas et al., 2020), it is likely that social norms and preferences also play a significant role to nudge German households away from pursuing homeownership (Huber and Schmidt, 2022). In other words, for some households the decision not to own a home may not be due to a lack of investment opportunities, but rather a lifestyle choice for many German households supported by a sufficiently high-quality rental housing supply.

the building is used all year round. Other exemptions apply to monuments and small buildings with a floor space of up to 50 square meters as well as a series of operational buildings that require low temperatures (The Federal Government, 2020).

<sup>4</sup>There are two types of energy certificates: the demand certificate (§81 GEG) and the consumption certificate (§82 GEG). In the case of the demand certificate, the energy requirement is calculated on the basis of the building and heating characteristics and a standardized consumption behavior. In the case of the consumption certificate, the energy demand is determined on the basis of measured consumption and building characteristics. Except for new as well as old buildings that do not comply with the First Heat Insulation Ordinance of 1977 (see Table A3) and have less than five residential units, the demand certificate is obligatory (§80 3 GEG). For all other residential buildings, both energy certificates are equally valid and can be freely selected by homeowners. Yet, data access for the consumption certificate is usually easier, such that the consumption certificate is often cheaper to obtain.

Moreover, private individuals are heavily engaged in renting out living space. About 60% of dwellings are rented out by private landlords and the remainder by large public or private real estate companies (Destatis, 2019). However, the two segments of owning and renting apartments are not completely separated. Owners of apartments in Germany have the possibility to stop the rental contract with the tenant if they want to use the apartment for themselves or for a close family member (“Eigennutzung” or self-use). Yet, to prevent arbitrary terminations by the landlord, tenant protection regulates all requirements for registering personal use. For instance, a certain period of notice must be observed to give tenants time to find a suitable replacement or to even lodge an objection. If all requirements are adhered to and landlords give a clear reason for wanting to use the apartment themselves, private landlords can start living in the apartment that they previously rented out. In this case, landlords may have stronger incentives to invest in energy-efficiency as they can later reap the benefits of lower energy cost themselves.

### **3 Data**

For the empirical analysis, we use data on apartments that were offered for purchase or rent on the largest online housing market in Germany (RWI and ImmobilienScout24, 2020) and were on the market between January 2019 to December 2021<sup>5</sup>. To assess the split-incentive problem in energy efficiency investments, we use the subsample of apartment transactions that were privately owned. We do not consider properties owned by companies or public institutions because we expect investment incentives to be different when compared to individuals who own property. Thus, we limit the data to those properties that were offered on the market by private individuals or indirectly through real estate agents. In addition to the energy performance score of the building, other building-level information available are the construction year of the building and the number of floors in the building. The size of the entire building measured by the number of apartments is not available, but we approximate this variable with the number of floors in the building. For our analysis, we differentiate between the following privately-owned real estate transactions on the housing market: (1) apartments for rent (looking for new

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<sup>5</sup>We were limited to using data from 2019 onwards because the required information on the seller type is not available before January 2019 in the data set.

tenants), (2) renter-occupied apartments for sale (looking for new owner/landlord), and (3) owner-occupied apartments for sale (looking for new owner). Thereby, we are able to identify those apartments that were bought as an investment for rental income.

To prepare the data for analysis we consider the fact that many sellers strategically remove the original apartment offer and repost on the housing market, sometimes multiple times within a few months to increase the number of customer views. In such cases, to avoid double or multiple counting of the same apartment offer on the market, we drop all past instances of the apartment offered within the three year period (2019-2021) and keep only the latest offer on the market before the apartment went off the online platform. This results in a total of 719,948 observations. With 74%, the major share of advertisements was posted for renting (Table 1). Among the apartment purchases, we note that 75% were owner-occupied and roughly 25% were renter-occupied.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our sample from the housing market by offer type and tenure status of the apartments. We observe that apartments sold for own use (column Owner-Occupied) do not differ significantly from rental properties (last column) in terms of observable characteristics. In contrast, compared to owner-occupied properties, apartments that offer rental income to home buyers (column Renter-Occupied) are more likely to be located in West Germany, with on average, newer construction, higher living space per apartment, and considerably higher rates of first occupancy when sold. The table also highlights that apartments that are sold for self-use versus those on the rental market have similar shares in the “Built 2002+” category and average construction year – which likely explains why the variable of key interest, the energy performance scores in the first row are on average also similar.

Next, we explore the distributions underlying the mean statistics in the EPC score. Note that higher EPC scores denote that the building has higher energy requirement per square meter of living space per annum. Thus, higher EPC scores indicate a lower level of energy efficiency. For ease of visualization, we group together all apartments that are rented out by private individuals, i.e., “Rented” refers to apartments that are renter-occupied when sold or on the rental market. Figure 2 plots the distributions of energy performance scores for apartments on rent and those sold to owner-occupiers. At first glance and using all properties in the data set,

Panel A illustrates a much higher frequency of owner-occupied apartments with high energy efficiency standards (EPC closer to zero) compared to apartments that were rented.

Table 1: Differences in Properties by Apartment Offer Type


	Apartment Purchase		
	Owner-Occupied	Renter-Occupied	Rental Market
EPC score (kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a)	110 (50)	119 (42)	111 (52)
Construction Year	1970 (36)	1962 (37)	1969 (40)
Number of Floors	4.0 (2.7)	4.1 (2.4)	3.6 (2.0)
Living Space (m <sup>2</sup> )	87 (45)	72 (38)	72 (30)
<i>Proportions</i>			
Built 2002+	0.18	0.05	0.21
EPC Type	0.36	0.23	0.38
Warm Water	0.61	0.65	0.61
East	0.29	0.45	0.33
<i>Observations</i>			
N	141,897	48,233	529,818
Share	20%	7%	74%
<i>Seller Type</i>			
Private Offer	10%	12%	47%
Real-Estate Agent	90%	88%	53%
<i>First Occupancy</i>			
Not First	77%	98%	83%
First Occupancy	23%	2%	17%

*Notes:* The table describes the main variables used from the data on housing transactions that took place from 2019 to 2021 on RWI and ImmobilienScout24 (2020). The first row for each variable reports the mean, and standards deviations are reported in parentheses. Higher EPC score indicates a lower level of energy efficiency. Number of Floors is a characteristic of the apartment's building, while "Living Space" reports the square meter space available in the apartment offered. EPC Type equals 1 if it is a Energy Demand Certificate, 0 for a Consumption-Based Certificate. Warm Water is a dummy variable indicating whether the EPC score is inclusive of water heating. East equals 1 for properties in Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia, otherwise 0. First Occupancy indicates whether the apartment on offer was listed as "First Occupancy" or "First Occupancy after Reconstruction".


In Panel B we omit those apartments that were either listed as "first occupancy" or "first occupancy after reconstruction" and further observe that the differences more or less disappear

Figure 2: Distribution of EPC Scores in the Market for Apartments

Plot A: All Properties



Plot B: Without First Occupancy



*Notes:* The graphs illustrate the distribution of energy performance certificate (EPC) scores by whether the apartment is owner-occupied or rented (grouping apartments on the rental market with those that were sold renter-occupied). Plot A plots the histogram for all properties observed from 2019 to 2021, while in Plot B, the sample was limited to those apartments that were not identified as "First Occupancy" or "First Occupancy after Reconstruction". By doing so we remove new properties from the sample. Thus, Plot B is a closer representation of existing apartments that went off the housing market during the three year window.

and thus conclude that buildings with new or fully renovated apartments are significantly more energy-efficient than existing buildings and also more likely to be owner-occupied. It is further noteworthy that we observe comparable shares of apartments with poor energy performance standards (e.g. scores above 200 kWh/m<sup>2</sup>a). Hence, even though first occupancy non-rental

properties sold on the market appear more often in the top energy efficiency class, rental properties are not more likely to appear at the bottom of the distribution.

In the Appendix, we check these differences over time as well. Figure A1 shows that the differences in average energy performance scores by mode of tenure of apartments are statistically indistinguishable once we remove the new apartments that are looking for first time occupants. In Figure A2 we further describe the distribution of energy efficiency classes, grouped by the stringency of building standards (that apply by the year of construction). In a housing market with a major problem of split-incentives in energy efficiency investments between owners and renters, we should expect to see a right-skewed distribution of energy efficiency (higher concentration of apartment buildings towards higher efficiency classes) for owner-occupied homes and a left-skewed distribution of energy efficiency for rented homes. Yet, we fail to detect such a large gap in Figure A2. We also show how energy performance scores differ between apartment offer types depending on the type of energy performance certificate in Table A4.

Ideally, we would contrast and compare the energy quality of privately owned *apartments* that are owner-occupied versus rented. However, EPCs are issued at the building level, rather than at the apartment level. Nevertheless, we observe the condition of the apartment in our data and Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of apartments sold by the mode of tenure (owner-occupied or rental). It is clear that brand new apartments ("First Occupancy") or those that have gone through significant renovations ("FO after reconstruction") are more likely to be sold to owner-occupiers. However, apartments that fall under the "Like New", "Reconstructed", "Modernised", and "Completely Renovated" categories, do not indicate an obvious energy efficiency advantage for apartments that are eventually owner-occupied compared to those that would be rented out.

## 4 Empirical Results

In this section, we explain the empirical strategy and results. The next subsection 4.1 describes the equation we use to estimate the split-incentive problem among private owners of apartments. We describe the main results in 4.2 before conducting a heterogeneity analysis in 4.3.



Figure 3: Condition of Apartment by Tenure Status



*Notes:* The graph plots the share of tenure type (owner-occupied versus rented) by the reported condition of the apartments that left the housing market from 2019 to 2021. “Rented” groups together apartments on the rental market with those that were renter-occupied on sale. Note that the information on the condition of the apartment was not available for approximately 34 percent in the apartment sale data set and about 32 percent for the rental apartment data set.

## 4.1 Estimation

Thus far, we have considered merely the average performance of buildings without accounting for building-specific factors that directly affect the energy efficiency standards of properties, such as the construction year and building size. The time when the property appears on the housing market for sale or rent may also be linked to varying energy efficiency levels. Furthermore, the propensity to disclose EPC information on the housing market differs significantly between private offers and real estate agents, which may bias our estimates for energy efficiency differences between properties that are for personal use and those that are rented out<sup>6</sup>.

To account for these influencing factors, we estimate the energy efficiency of apartments

<sup>6</sup>In the Appendix (see section B), we investigate the main predictors of compliance with the EPC disclosure mandate in Germany and show that selection across apartment offer types depends on the type of seller on the housing market.

using the following linear regression specification:

$$y_{imt} = \alpha + \beta \text{Offer Type}_i + \delta \text{Offer Type}_i \cdot \text{Seller Type}_i + \gamma \text{Seller Type}_i + \kappa_m + \phi_t + \mu_z + \mathbf{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\pi} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $y_{it}$  denotes the log of the EPC score (measured in kWh/m<sup>2</sup>a) of the building, in which apartment  $i$  was sold in month  $m$  and year  $t$ . *Offer Type* <sub>$i$</sub>  is a categorical variable for the type of transaction that took place. It equals 1 if the apartment was bought for own use (Owner-Occupied), 2 if a rental apartment was bought for rental income (Renter-Occupied), and 3 if the apartment was offered for rent on the market (Rental Market). Given seller differences in EPC disclosure rates, we include interactions between the type of seller and the type of apartment offer on the housing market. This specification allows us to estimate the extent to which energy efficiency differences between properties could potentially be attributable to the split-incentive investment problem in rental properties that are offered by the same seller type on the housing market. Moreover, we control for building-level covariates to capture the stringency of building codes that apply to properties, determined by the year of construction. Newer buildings are more energy-efficient by law and thus do not require significant investment by the owner after construction. Controlling for construction year allows us to compare the performance of buildings that were subject to the same energy standards during construction, but were used for rental purposes versus occupied by the owner. Similarly, the size of the building is an important determinant of the energy efficiency standard. We capture this using  $\mathbf{x}_i$ , characteristics of the building associated with the apartment on offer. Last, we employ a rich set of fixed effects. Specifically,  $\kappa_m$  and  $\phi_m$  denote month and year fixed effects for when the apartment was posted on the housing market and  $\mu_z$  are zip code fixed effects.

## 4.2 Main Results

Table 2 reports estimated versions of the regression Equation (1). We evaluate the differences in energy efficiency levels between owner-occupied and renter-occupied apartments and the rental market. The specification in Column (1) does not control for any building-specific variables, and the coefficients suggest that the EPC scores in apartments sold as investments (“Renter-

Occupied”) are about 12 percent higher compared to owner-occupied apartments. In turn, the difference between (“Owner-Occupied”) apartments and those on the rental market is economically very small, amounting to merely 0.7 percent. Column (2) shows that the inclusion of building size (measured by the number of floors) has only a negligible effect on the coefficients on both *Renter-Occupied* and *Rental Market*. The incorporation of building construction years in Column (3) absorbs a great deal of the differences in energy performance scores for homes sold as rental investment. In contrast, the coefficient on Rental Market increases noticeably. Column (4) allows us to assess differences across properties that are sold by the same seller type. In particular, the difference in EPC scores between owner-occupied and other apartments offered directly by private owners amounts to 1.8 percent. Given a mean EPC score of 110 (Table 1), this results in a difference of roughly 2 kWh/m<sup>2</sup>a. For comparison, an interval in the energy performance certificate spans 25 kWh/m<sup>2</sup>a. To put the results in perspective: Given an average apartment size of 75m<sup>2</sup> and current gas prices of roughly 0.21 EUR per kWh, the additional monetary burden for rented apartments is  $2 \cdot 75 \cdot 0.21 = 31.5$  EUR per year.

Hence, the distinction between whether the rental apartment was offered for purchase or rent on the housing market does not have a bearing on the estimates (test of equal coefficients yielded  $F(1,712767) = 0.00$ ,  $p = 0.9704$ , indicating that they are statistically indistinguishable). Together, estimates from the specification in Column (4) suggest that, even after comparing apartments offered by the same seller types, we can rule out very large energy efficiency differences when compared to owner-occupied apartments.

Overall, by introducing building-specific control variables incrementally in Table 2, we show that the differences in the energy efficiency performance are largely unrelated to the mode of tenure of apartments on the market. Most of the difference though is explained by the year when the building was constructed. Hence, much of the estimated differences in energy efficiency may be due to the fact that owners are much more likely to move into new or largely refurbished apartments. Petrov and Ryan (2021) also report that fewer newly constructed properties are intended for renter-occupied housing.

Table 2: Differences in EPC Scores Between Owner-Occupied and Rental Apartments

	Dependent Variable: $\ln(\text{kWh}/\text{m}^2\text{a})$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Offer Type (Base: Owner-Occupied)				
<i>Renter-Occupied</i>	0.121*** (0.003)	0.122*** (0.003)	0.015*** (0.002)	0.018** (0.007)
<i>Rental Market</i>	0.007*** (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.043*** (0.001)	0.018*** (0.004)
Seller Type (Base: Private)				
Real-estate agent				0.007* (0.004)
Offer Type $\times$ Seller Type (Base: Owner-Occupied $\times$ Private)				
Renter-Occupied $\times$ Real-estate agent				-0.002 (0.007)
Rental Market $\times$ Real-estate agent				0.043*** (0.004)
Number of Floors FE		Y	Y	Y
Building Year FE			Y	Y
$R^2$	0.156	0.159	0.510	0.512
$N$	719,948			
# Zipcodes	6823			

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the log of the reported energy performance score measured in annual kWh per square meter of living space. All regressions included fixed effects for zip code and the last year and month in which the apartment was observed on the housing market. Number of Floors captures the size of the building. The estimates in the first two rows apply to properties offered by private owners on the housing market. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

### 4.3 Heterogeneity

In this section, we will evaluate energy efficiency differences between owner-occupied and rented apartments separately for different subgroups. First, we explore more closely whether the split-incentive problem in energy efficiency investments is present among old and new buildings alike. To this end, we distinguish apartments that are on the market for first occupancy (i.e., either new construction or substantially reconstructed before coming on the housing market) or not. Table 3 reports results for the two subsamples of apartments, when the properties are offered directly by the private owner. For the subsample of existing apartments that were

on the market (i.e., not for first occupancy), we estimate a small difference in energy efficiency scores by tenure status. Estimates for first occupancy homes show that the average EPC score of rental market properties is 6.5% percent higher compared to owner-occupied properties. This potentially reveals a more pronounced energy efficiency deficit between owner-occupied and rented homes looking for first occupancy. To provide some comparison, this results in a gap of roughly 7 kWh/m<sup>2</sup>a, which is about a third of a class interval on the EPC scale.

Table 3: First Occupancy Homes

	Dependent Variable: ln(kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a)	
	First Occupancy = 0	First Occupancy = 1
Offer Type (Base: Owner-Occupied)		
<i>Renter-Occupied</i>	0.016** (0.007)	-0.099 (0.066)
<i>Rental Market</i>	0.010*** (0.004)	0.065*** (0.014)
<i>N</i>	543,861	94,897
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.449	0.691

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the log of the reported energy performance score measured in annual kWh per square meter of living space. All regressions included fixed effects for building size (number of floors), year of construction, the zip code, and the last year and month in which the apartment was observed on the housing market. The regressions also account for seller type FE, including interactions with the type of apartment offer. Thus, the estimates shown here apply to properties offered by private owners on the housing market. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

To explore the role of building age further, we conduct additional building sub-group analyses – assessing buildings according to the stringency of the energy standards that applied when the property was constructed. Once again, these estimates only apply to properties offered by private owners directly. We expect the split-incentive problem in energy efficiency to be higher in older homes, given weaker energy standards and thus a greater potential for improvements through renovations in owner-occupied properties. Contrary to our expectation, however, we find that the difference in EPC scores between owner-occupied and rental apartments among the oldest buildings (constructed before 1978) is relatively small and amounts to less than 1% (Table 4). In later years, the differences are somewhat larger. However, as the confidence bands overlap in the different estimations, we conclude, that the energy efficiency gap is likewise small across all building codes.

Table 4: Building Codes

	Dependent Variable: $\ln(\text{kWh}/\text{m}^2\text{a})$				
	Pre-1978	1978-1983	1984-1994	1995-2001	2002+
Offer Type (Base: Owner-Occupied)					
<i>Renter-Occupied</i>	0.015 (0.010)	0.018 (0.021)	0.019 (0.012)	-0.017 (0.014)	0.027 (0.026)
<i>Rental Market</i>	0.009* (0.005)	0.032*** (0.011)	0.026*** (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.023** (0.010)
<i>N</i>	378,686	32,519	81,797	82,278	140,995
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.354	0.390	0.370	0.291	0.397

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the log of the reported energy performance score measured in annual kWh per square meter of living space. All regressions included fixed effects for building size (number of floors), year of construction, the zip code, and the last year and month in which the apartment was observed on the housing market. The regressions also account for seller type FE, including interactions with the type of apartment offer. Thus, the estimates shown here apply to properties offered by private owners on the housing market. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Beyond assessing the problem of split-incentives at the national level, we are also interested in whether our estimates are equal across all regions or whether they differ across regions. This is important also because the ownership structure of housing units varies significantly between regions of Germany. First, we assess the extent of the energy efficiency differences among different apartment offer types separately for specific region types (urban, semi-urban, and rural) in Table 5. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the apartments observed on the housing market are located in zip codes that fall in urban or semi-urban regions. The coefficients in the first and second columns suggest that, within urbanized regions, owner-occupied apartments for sale are significantly more energy efficient on average than apartments on the rental market (both renter-occupied apartment for sale and those for rent). Yet, the difference amounts to less than 3%. The third column indicates that in rural areas, rental units exhibit somewhat lower EPC scores, i.e. higher energy efficiency, than owner-occupied apartments.

Next, we assess the heterogeneity with respect to two socioeconomic indicators (Table 6), purchasing power and east versus west. We utilize data on the purchasing power per household in 2019 from (RWI and microm, 2022), aggregated at the zip code level. To examine whether there is significant socioeconomic heterogeneity in the average estimates (shown in Table 2), we map each zip code to its respective tercile of the purchasing power distribution. We estimate our preferred specification that includes zip code fixed effects, for each tercile subsample. We find

positive coefficients on each term of interest, which indicates that owner-occupied properties tend to be on average more energy-efficient than their rented counterparts across all terciles. Moreover, the differences in energy efficiency between owner-occupied and rental apartment properties are potentially of similar magnitudes in all three terciles.

Table 5: Spatial Planning Regions

	Dependent Variable: ln(kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a)		
	Urban	Semi-Urban	Rural
Offer Type (Base: Owner-Occupied)			
<i>Renter-Occupied</i>	0.023*** (0.008)	0.017 (0.015)	-0.038 (0.025)
<i>Rental Market</i>	0.019*** (0.004)	0.028*** (0.008)	-0.025* (0.013)
<i>N</i>	474,794	173,991	69,670
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.502	0.525	0.566

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the log of the reported energy performance score measured in annual kWh per square meter of living space. All regressions included fixed effects for building size (number of floors), year of construction, the zip code, and the last year and month in which the apartment was observed on the housing market. Each specification also accounted for seller type FE, including interactions with the type of apartment offer. Thus, the estimates shown here apply to properties offered by private owners on the housing market. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Table 6: Purchasing Power per Household and East-West Divide

	Dependent Variable: ln(kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a)				
	Tercile 1	Tercile 2	Tercile 3	East	West
Offer Type (Base: Owner-Occupied)					
<i>Renter-Occupied</i>	0.019* (0.011)	0.009 (0.013)	0.020 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.014)	0.022*** (0.008)
<i>Rental Market</i>	0.022*** (0.006)	0.022*** (0.006)	0.015** (0.006)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.019*** (0.004)
<i>N</i>	342,296	196,196	168,586	238,737	481,159
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.424	0.562	0.599	0.406	0.568

*Notes:* The dependent variable is the log of the reported energy performance score measured in annual kWh per square meter of living space. All regressions included fixed effects for building size (number of floors), year of construction, the zip code, and the last year and month in which the apartment was observed on the housing market. Each specification also accounted for seller type FE, including interactions with the type of apartment offer. Thus, the estimates shown here apply to properties offered by private owners on the housing market. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

We also investigate potential differences between buildings in East and West Germany. As we saw earlier in the descriptives, the share of renter-occupied housing units are much higher in the East of Germany, which also happens to have historically lower incomes and wealth in financial assets. Estimates in the last two columns of Table 6 suggest that the rental housing stock in East Germany has similar energy efficiency levels compared to owner-occupied properties. Interestingly, this result may square well with a sub-result in Petrov and Ryan (2021), who find smaller differences in the energy efficiency performance of homes by tenure type in regions with higher shares of rental properties. This could explain why we see larger and significant estimates in West Germany, where home ownership is significantly higher. Together with tercile-specific estimates from Table 6, these results suggest that the poorer regions of West Germany may have rental properties that are lagging the most when compared to owner-occupied homes in the same region.

## 5 Conclusion

It is often argued that landlords may underinvest in energy efficiency because, unlike owner-occupants of homes, they do not benefit from cost savings triggered by energy efficiency when their tenants pay the energy bills directly. This problem may be particularly acute in the German multi-apartment building sector, where private individuals own 59% of housing units, of which 70% is rented out, predominantly with tenant-pay contracts. However, housing property owners can reap the economic benefits from investing in energy efficiency, if it is sufficiently capitalized during sale on the housing market or by increasing rents on long-term contracts.

We analyze data from Germany, home to one of the largest rental housing markets in the European Union. In our analysis, we find small and economically insignificant average differences in energy performance scores between buildings with owner-occupied and rental apartments. Precisely, for apartments offered directly by sellers on the market, the difference amounts to 1.8 percent in energy performance scores, equivalent to about 2 kWh/m<sup>2</sup> or roughly 30 EUR per year. This finding undermines claims of a crucial split-incentive problem in energy efficiency investments in the large rental sector of Germany.



Our analysis reveals such a small effect for Germany on average, but the results are sustained by analyzing a variety of sub-samples, splitting our data by first occupancy, building codes, spatial planning regions, and purchasing power. Moreover, our findings are further supported by regional estimates for buildings in the East of Germany, where the rental sector is considerably larger than in the West. Also by slicing the data in this way we do not find any substantial energy efficiency differences between owner- and renter-occupied properties on the market. This suggests that any long-term energy efficiency deficits in the building stock may not be attributable to the mode of tenure per se.

Our findings have important implications for climate policy targeting the building stock. The absence of large differences in energy efficiency between renter-occupied and owner-occupied properties on the housing market indicates that properties that are looking for new owners or tenants should be less of a policy concern. This paper, however, is not necessarily evidence of a similarly small deficit in existing long-standing rental properties, which may not be well-represented in our data sample. Our data set only contains apartments that are on the market for a new owner or tenant, and, more specifically, were observed on the ImmoScout24 website. Even though it is the largest online broker of Germany and thus a highly valuable source of data, we thereby necessarily disregard two important segments of the housing market: first, the share of transactions that take place via other channels and second, the share of the housing market that is not involved in any market transaction. Put differently, we do not observe existing rental properties that do not exchange ownership hands and thus are not observable on the housing market. Notwithstanding, properties that do not make it back on the housing market are arguably harder to target through market-based instruments, where energy standards for renovations and tax incentives may play a stronger role.

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

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# A Appendix


Figure A1: Differences in EPC Scores by Type of Apartment Offer




*Notes:* The graphs plot the average EPC score of buildings by year of posting of the apartment on the housing market. We differentiate between those apartments that were offered on the rental market versus those that were up for sale. We were further able to identify whether the apartment is owner-occupied or rented out after sale on the housing market. Plot A uses data for apartments observed from May 2014 to 2021, while Plot B limits the sample to those apartments that were not identified as "First Occupancy" or "First Occupancy after Reconstruction".

Plot A shows that (1) there was a minor difference between the mean energy performance of properties that were directly on the rental market and those that were bought as investment property to make rental income in 2014, but this difference has grown since EPC disclosure became mandatory, and (2) owner-occupied apartments were more energy-efficient than rental apartments on average. In Plot B, the differences between owner-occupied and rental properties shrink significantly, once we remove apartments looking for first occupants from the sample.


Figure A2: Distribution of EE Classes by Building Codes




(a) Pre-1978




(b) 1978-1983



(c) 1984-1994



(d) 1995-2001



(e) 2002+

Notes: The graphs summarize the distribution of building-level energy efficiency class/grade grouped by year of construction brackets associated with building codes. The “Rented” category groups apartments from “Rented when sold” and “Rental Market”.

Table A1: Distribution of the Building Stock by Ownership

Housing Type	Total Apartment Units	Of which				
		Owner-Occupied	On Rent, of which: Owner is a			
			Private Person	Private Company	Public Institution	Housing Cooperative
in 1000s						
Detached House (1 HH)	11874	10501	1211	62	46	53
Semi-Detached House (2 HH)	5720	3362	2218	60	30	50
Building with 3-9 Apts	12344	2403	5895	1377	285	2383
Building with 10 or more Apts	6989	894	2178	1482	342	2093
<b>Total</b>	<b>36927</b>	<b>17159</b>	<b>11503</b>	<b>2982</b>	<b>703</b>	<b>4580</b>

*Notes:* The table shows the national distribution of the building stock in Germany by ownership and housing type. The housing units highlighted in blue are homes that are owner-occupied by private individuals, while the housing units highlighted in green are homes that are owned by private individuals but rented out on the housing market. This table is reproduced from the Microcensus 2018 (Destatis, 2019), translated from German to English.

Table A2: Share of Privately-Owned Housing Units on Rent

Housing Type	Share
<i>Houses</i>	
Detached (1 Unit)	10%
Semi-Detached (2 Units)	40%
<i>Multi-Apartment Buildings</i>	
with 3-9 Apt Units	71%
with 10+ Apt Units	71%
All	40%

*Notes:* The table reports the share of German housing units (apartments) in each housing type that were owned by private individuals and rented out. Data sourced from the Microcensus 2018 (Destatis, 2019).



Table A3: Standards for New Construction

Year of Construction	Regulation	Max. per annum
Pre-1978	No regulation	
1978	Heat insulation (WSchV)	250 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a
1984	Amendment of WSchV	220 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a
1995	Amendment of WSchV	150 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a
2002	Energy saving (EnEV)	100 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a
2009	Amendment of EnEV	60 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a
2016	Amendment of EnEV	45 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a
2020	Building Energy Act (GEG)	35 kWh/m <sup>2</sup> a

*Notes:* The second column indicates the respective regulation that applies to buildings with years of construction in the range of the years in the first column.

Table A4: Energy Efficiency Differences by EPC Type and Building Codes

<b>Energy Demand Certificate</b>			
	Apartment Purchase		
	Owner-Occupied	Renter-Occupied	Rental Market
Pre 1978	127	144	138
	(67)	(57)	(66)
	26,367	7,699	87,057
1978 - 1983	132	128	125
	(44)	(40)	(45)
	1,571	317	5,178
1984 - 1994	121	120	123
	(41)	(33)	(44)
	2,932	1,021	10,011
1995 - 2001	104	104	106
	(35)	(31)	(36)
	2,017	1,038	8,888
2002+	52	60	56
	(28)	(31)	(30)
	18,602	1,212	89,925
<b>Energy Use Certificate</b>			
	Apartment Purchase		
	Owner-Occupied	Renter-Occupied	Rental Market
Pre 1978	126	124	129
	(38)	(37)	(41)
	49,849	20,548	187,501
1978 - 1983	122	122	122
	(37)	(35)	(38)
	6,440	1,795	18,023
1984 - 1994	114	117	114
	(33)	(33)	(35)
	14,913	5,736	47,893
1995 - 2001	101	101	101
	(30)	(27)	(30)
	12,448	7,366	51,295
2002+	78	82	81
	(31)	(29)	(38)
	6,532	1,400	23,903

*Notes:* The table reports summary statistics (mean, standard deviation in parentheses, and the number of observations) for the reported energy performance scores (kWh/m<sup>2</sup>a) by the type of energy performance certificate and building codes categories.

## B Addressing Self-Selection in EPC Disclosure

In May 2014, it became mandatory in Germany to disclose online information on energy performance certificates (EPC) for properties that were up for sale or rent on the housing market. The majority of EPC scores observed in the data did indeed become available only after this date. But despite the legal obligation to disclose energy-related information, there remained a high share of non-disclosing sellers in the market for apartments and houses, suggesting that some sellers with bad lemons may have had the incentive to not disclose energy-related information (for a related discussion, see Frondel et al., 2019). We show in Table A5 that there are stark differences in the compliance rate by seller type in particular. The rate of compliance when individuals sell their apartments through a real estate agent is significantly higher than when these individuals post their property directly on the online housing market. Furthermore, the share of apartment posts by owners that disclose the EPC on the rental market was only 33 percent from 2019 to 2021.

Our dependent variables in the main analysis is an outcome of EPC disclosure. Yet, we do not observe the energy efficiency performance of all apartments that were up for sale or rent on the market in the sample because of selective reporting. We assess the determinants of EPC disclosure on the housing market for apartments using the following equation:

$$EPC_i = \alpha + \beta \text{Seller Type}_i + \delta \text{Offer Type}_i + \gamma \text{Seller Type}_i \cdot \text{Offer Type}_i + \mathbf{z}'_i \boldsymbol{\pi} + \phi_t + \kappa_m + \epsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where  $EPC_i$  is equal to one if the energy performance score was reported for apartment offer  $i$ . *Seller Type* distinguishes between private offers and offers via a real estate agent and *Offer Type* captures the tenure type, that is, whether the apartment is for purchase or offered for rent. To allow for any offer-type-specific disclosure differences between sellers, we further include the interaction term. Vector  $\mathbf{z}$  covers building characteristics (year of construction grouped by applicable building energy regulation, number of floors of building) and location (spatial planning region type). Finally, we capture year and month of posting effects, using  $\phi_t$  and  $\kappa_m$  respectively.

Table A5: EPC Compliance by Apartment Offer Type

	Compliance Rate	N
<i>Owner-Occupied</i>		
Private offer	0.4	31,745
Real-estate agent	0.68	178,530
<i>Renter-Occupied</i>		
Private offer	0.4	9,191
Real-estate agent	0.74	55,590
<i>Rental Market</i>		
Private offer	0.33	502,912
Real-estate agent	0.75	492,184
Total	0.56	1,270,152

Table A6 presents the results of a linear probability model estimation of Equation (2). We estimate two models with and without the inclusion of the covariate vector  $\mathbf{z}$  in Column 1 and 2, respectively. The coefficient estimates in the first three row blocks confirm the pattern observed in Table A5 – private individuals who offer their properties for sale via agents are significantly more likely to disclose EPC information than without real-estate agents. This holds especially in the market for rental apartments.

Moreover, private offers for rental apartments have lower compliance rates on the market compared to owners offering rented apartments for sale. We show in Table 1 that on the market for apartments on sale, the vast majority (approximately 90%) of apartments are sold by real estate agents, and this is also the case for apartments that have tenants. For this reason, we expect the problem of self-selection into providing EPC scores to be less severe when comparing across tenure types of apartments sold on the market. Surprisingly, apartments in the newest year of construction bracket (2002+) do not have a higher compliance rate than properties located in apartment buildings that were built before 1978, when building regulation began. This may be because prospective buyers or renters already have a strong signal of building quality from the fact that the property is newly constructed. Generally, estimates suggest that apartments in newer and larger buildings make their energy performance certificates available on the online platform at higher rates. Finally, the estimates also suggest that EPC disclosure rates do not vary considerably between region types (urban, semi-urban, and rural). Overall, differences

of EPC disclosure rates by regions and building type are dominated by differences across seller types and whether the property was for sale or rent.

Table A6: Determinants of EPC Availability

	(1)	(2)
Seller Type (Base: Private)		
Real-estate agent	0.280*** (0.003)	0.284*** (0.003)
Offer Type (Base: Owner-Occupied)		
Renter-Occupied	0.001 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)
Rental Market	-0.064*** (0.003)	-0.052*** (0.003)
Seller Type × Offer Type (Base: Private × Owner-Occupied)		
Real-estate agent × Renter-Occupied	0.068*** (0.006)	0.064*** (0.006)
Real-estate agent × Rental Market	0.135*** (0.003)	0.124*** (0.003)
Year of Construction (Base: Pre 1978)		
1978 - 1983		0.056*** (0.002)
1984 - 1994		0.088*** (0.001)
1995 - 2001		0.095*** (0.001)
2002+		-0.003*** (0.001)
Number of Floors in Building (Base: 0-1 Floors)		
2 Floors		0.040*** (0.002)
3 Floors		0.059*** (0.002)
4 Floors		0.057*** (0.002)
5 Floors		0.088*** (0.002)
6+ Floors		0.101*** (0.002)
Planning Region Type (Base: Urban)		
Semi-Urban		0.012*** (0.001)
Rural		0.002 (0.001)
Observations	1,278,820	1,278,820
$R^2$	0.155	0.163

*Notes:* The table presents estimated versions of Equation (2). The binary dependent variable indicates whether the EPC issued for the building was available in the real estate apartment advertisement. The coefficient estimates on the year of posting and the month of posting were omitted for readability purposes. Standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .