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Karolin Süß

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Karolin Süß[1]

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Abstract

This paper studies the effect of inheritance customs for agricultural land on household formation and gender disparities. Under partible inheritance, agricultural land is split equally among all siblings. Under impartible inheritance, only one descendant inherits the entire land. Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, I find that partible inheritance has a persistent negative effect on household size but not fertility. It has a positive impact on today's female political representation and a negative effect on the gender gap in employment. Fathers also have a lower probability of making use of parental leave benefits but receive them for a longer time.

JEL-Codes: J16, N53, R23

Keywords: Inheritance; agriculture; gender disparities

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1 Introduction

The male breadwinner model postulates that a man's key responsibility is to earn money, while the woman primarily cares for the household, children, and the elderly, with paid labor being of minor importance (Lewis, 2001). This gender model still prevails in many German families. Only 9.9% of all men in Germany work part-time compared to 46.8% of all women. The unequal division of labor between sexes within a household not only prevents progress towards more egalitarian gender norms but also results in lower disposable income for women and an increased risk for poverty, especially in old age (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2020). This phenomenon lasts despite higher levels of female education - 54.4% of all high-school graduates are female - and social policies aimed at increasing female labor supply, such as the provision of public childcare and generous parental leave policies.

The economic literature has stressed the long-lasting effects that historical conditions in agriculture have on current gender norms (Alesina et al., 2013; Carranza, 2014; Xue, 2023). In this paper, I focus on inheritance customs and their effect on household formation and gender disparities. There are two main concepts of how agricultural land is passed on from one generation to the next. Under *impartible* inheritance, agricultural land is considered indivisible in order to preserve large farms. Property is passed on to a single heir, mostly the eldest or the youngest son. *Partible* inheritance prescribes that all (male) siblings inherit an equal share.[1] To identify the effect of inheritance customs, I exploit small-scale regional variation in these rules in the territory of today's Baden-Württemberg.

Using a spatial regression discontinuity design, I find that areas of partible inheritance exhibit smaller households. The effect is not driven by lower fertility rates. This implies that under partible inheritance the nuclear family consisting of the parents and their children is more prevalent than the concept of a stem family where a household consists of children, their parents, grandparents, and unmarried aunts and uncles. Partible inheritance has a positive effect on today's share of females in local political councils and a negative effect on the gender gap in employment. This effect is driven by lower male full-time employment rates and higher female part-time employment rates. Data on firm size and commuting behavior suggest that differences

[1] I refer to the German term *Geschlossene Vererbung* as impartible inheritance and to *Realteilung* as partible inheritance.

in employment patterns are driven by the structure of the labor market. I use the take-up rate of parental leave benefits as a proxy for the division of childcare between parents. I find suggestive evidence that in areas of partible inheritance, fathers have a lower probability of making use of parental leave benefits, while those who do receive parental leave benefits, seem to receive them for a longer time. One underlying reason could be the positive relationship between partible inheritance and income Huning and Wahl (2021a), making fathers more confident to go on paternal leave (Samtleben et al., 2019).

My paper adds to two emerging strands of literature. First, it is related to studies examining the effect of agricultural practices on gender norms (Alesina et al., 2013; Carranza, 2014; Xue, 2023). In their pioneering work, Alesina et al. (2013) test the theoretical framework of Boserup (1971) on the effect of the division of labor in agriculture on gender norms. Boserup (1971) distinguishes between two forms of agricultural cultivation: plough and shifting cultivation. She argues that the plough was mainly *"used in regions with private ownership of land and with a comparatively numerous class of landless families" (Boserup, 1971, p. 26)*. In these regions, paid farm workers were more prevalent, and hence, female family members did not have to participate in the cultivation of crops but instead stayed at home. This generated more separated workplaces than in areas of shifting cultivation. Alesina et al. (2013) also argue that men possess a comparative advantage over women due to the physical strength that is required to operate the plough. They find that separated workplaces and the lower social status of women due to the comparative advantage of men had adverse effects on gender norms. Societies that traditionally practiced plough use exhibit less egalitarian gender norms till today. Analogously, Carranza (2014) finds that areas in India characterized by a soil texture that facilitates agricultural tasks traditionally conducted by women have a more balanced sex ratio in favor of women. Xue (2023) shows that with the cotton revolution and the introduction of the spinning wheel in China, skilled labor became more important and men lost their comparative advantage over women. This led to a persistent change in gender norms, resulting in less sex-selective abortion, an increase in female representation in authorities, and more gender-equitable beliefs. I add to this part of the literature by providing evidence from a European country and by taking into account legal institutions on top of practices in the agricultural sector to explain gender disparities in current outcomes.

The second strand of literature that my paper builds on studies the effect of inheritance customs

for agricultural land in Germany on economic outcomes (Bartels et al., 2020; Hager and Hilbig, 2019; Huning and Wahl, 2021a,b; Wegge, 2021). Huning and Wahl (2021a) apply an instrumental variable approach that relies on conditions for viniculture and a fuzzy spatial regression discontinuity design. They find that partible inheritance reduced emigration and by tying cheap labor to the land allowed for a higher degree of industrialization which fosters average income and population density in the long run.

Using a geographic regression discontinuity design at the county level, Bartels et al. (2020) show that partible inheritance equalized the distribution of land with persistent effects till today. In line with Huning and Wahl (2021a), they find that areas of partible inheritance possess higher GDP levels, higher top incomes, and top wealth shares. They argue that - by decreasing average farm size - partible inheritance forced people to search for employment outside the agricultural sector. This triggered innovation, diversified employment options, and increased education and labor productivity.

Applying an IV approach based on the distance to the rivers Rhine and Neckar and a matching strategy, Hager and Hilbig (2019) show that partible inheritance attenuates wealth inequality and leads to more egalitarian preferences in terms of higher communist vote shares. They find that municipalities practicing partible inheritance have a higher share of females in political councils and fewer aristocrats in the social elite.

For the area Hesse-Cassel, Wegge (2021) documents that impartible inheritance causes landholding inequality and emigration.

I contribute to this part of the literature in several ways. First, I provide evidence on how inheritance customs change structures within households. such as its size and the division of care and paid work between sexes. Second, I elaborate on the work by Hager and Hilbig (2019) on females in local political councils. Instead of an instrumental variable approach, I use a spatial regression discontinuity design - similar to Huning and Wahl (2021a) to estimate the causal effect of partible inheritance on the female share in local political councils.[2] The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the history of inheritance customs

[2]In the IV approach, using the distance to the rivers Rhine and Neckar as an instrument for partible inheritance, we cannot rule out that the exclusion restriction is violated.

in Baden-Württemberg and provides a conceptual framework for the link between inheritance, household formation, and gender disparities. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis and provides some descriptives. In Section 4, I introduce the empirical strategy. The results are depicted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.

2 Historical Background and Conceptual Framework

This section gives an overview of the emergence of inheritance customs in Southwestern Germany and introduces a conceptual framework for how partible inheritance affects household formation and gender disparities.

2.1 Historical Origin of Inheritance Customs

Before looking at the effect of inheritance customs, it is important to understand the origins of these inheritance customs. Without this understanding, we might miss a crucial link in the causal chain between inheritance customs and gender norms, as we cannot differentiate between the direct effect of inheritance customs on e.g. gender disparities and other factors that affect both, gender disparities and inheritance customs, at the same time.

According to Kroeschell (1978), one of the oldest records of impartible inheritance is from the year 1132 AD. Before, the land was either split equally among all sons, or it was considered a common good without individual property rights. Impartible inheritance was mainly imposed by the landlords after the Great Famine of 1315-1317 and the Black Death that had led to a population decline (Kroeschell, 1978). Partible inheritance mostly prevailed in areas with options for out-of-agriculture employment, and geographic conditions that allowed for intensive agricultural land use, particularly vineyards Schröder (1979). Higher returns of agricultural land allowed for smaller farms and led to higher population growth rates that reinforced the need to split farms to endow every descendant with private property. Röhm (1957), however, also stresses that a conglomeration of different factors led to the perpetuation of the inheritance customs and that no single factor can be considered decisive. Quite the opposite, he claims that *"[v]on der Gegenwart her betrachtet, scheinen Willkür und Zufall die Erbformen geprägt zu haben" 'from a current perspective, arbitrariness and chance have shaped inheritance rules'* (Röhm, 1957, p.93).

He argues that not all areas of partible inheritance can be characterized as fertile. Huning and Wahl (2021b) are the first to provide empirical evidence on the drivers of partible inheritance in Baden-Württemberg. In line with the historical literature, they find that areas with higher soil quality and lower elevation allowing for intensive agricultural land use with a special role of viniculture facilitated the retention of partible inheritance. Even after controlling for geographic conditions, the probability of partible inheritance is also significantly higher in areas settled before the Middle Ages. Cultural traditions and (former) administrative borders seem to be of minor importance, though.

2.2 Conceptual Framework

Inheritance customs affected agricultural life, household formation, and therefrom gender norms in multiple ways. First of all, Röhm (1957) shows that partible inheritance often coincides with areas where daughters are considered as heirs, while only sons inherit property in areas of impartible inheritance (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Research on the effects of female rights to inherit land is mostly limited to a reform in India. Evidence on the effect on female outcomes is mixed. While Bose and Das (2017) and Deininger et al. (2013) show that the right to inherit improves female education, Bahrami-Rad (2021) show that the reform also increased the likelihood of females being married to their cousins to keep property within a family.

Second, by its nature, the division of land among all siblings leads to more fragmented land, where small farms practice agriculture at the subsistence level. According to Inhetveen and Blasche (1983), female labor force participation decreases with the size of farms. On smaller farms, there are lower returns to scale and heavy machinery requiring physical strength is less of an advantage than on large farms. Following Alesina et al. (2013), men do not possess a comparative advantage over women. Especially in vineyards, till the mid-20th century fine manual work was predominant over work involving heavy machinery. Hence, in areas of partible inheritance and on smaller farms, more females are expected to work in the agricultural sector along with men. Huppertz (1939) argues that female farmers, therefore, had a higher social status and more egalitarian gender norms evolved. At the same time, larger farms had more hired laborers which decreased the need for females to participate in the cultivation of crops

(Boserup, 1971) or replace men in the field work when they were sick or absent for other reasons (Schildt, 1993). Moreover, male-dominated sectors such as forestry[3] and livestock farming are more prevalent in areas of large landholdings and impartible inheritance (Abetz, 1949).

Third, the family structure varies between areas of partible and impartible inheritance. In general, impartible land is associated with a *stem family* that usually consists of the grandparents and one married child with his (or her) family and, potentially, other non-married siblings. Under partible inheritance, where each descendant possesses his own piece of land, a household regularly consists only of the *nuclear family* with aunts and uncles living on other farms (Berkner, 1976). Hence, in areas of impartible inheritance, the division of labor might be separated more strictly by sex. Women specialize in care work for children and the elderly living on the same farm, while men work on the field.

Fourth, smaller farms also allow and increase the need for activities outside the agricultural sector to sustain a family. In the 19th century, women primarily engaged in the textile and tobacco industry. This often involved activities that could be carried out from home and hence facilitated child care, such as cigarette rolling (von Hindenburg, 2018). Huning and Wahl (2021a) provide evidence that these industries evolved especially in areas of partible inheritance. Hence, women had more options to contribute to the household income, increasing their social status and bargaining power within the marriage.[4]

3 Data and Descriptives

My analysis focuses on the state of Baden-Württemberg for two reasons. First, Baden-Württemberg provides an optimal setting to study inheritance as partible and impartible inheritance are equally prevalent across the state and less clustered than in other states of Germany. Second, historical data for this region are comparably rich. Krafft (1930) provides a map of the distribution of inheritance customs in the Kingdom of Württemberg for the year 1905 and the *Historical Atlas of Baden-Württemberg* provides information on numerous control variables such as the location of historical vineyards or early monasteries (Müller and Blessing, 1975; Nüske and Schröder,

[3] In West-Germany women can only become foresters since the 1980s and till today the share of females lies below 9% (Meier, 2018).

[4] According to Hager and Hilbig (2019), the simple fact of equal sharing reinforces pro-egalitarian preferences and leads to more equal gender norms.

1977). The same holds for data on parental leave benefits. The Federal Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg is the only office that collects information on parental leave at the municipality level, the smallest administrative unit (LAU) in Germany.

Table B.1 gives an overview of the data sources I use in my analysis.

Outcome Variables - Historical

To obtain historical demographic information, I geocode data from the census of the Kingdom of Württemberg of the years 1834 to 1925.The data set covers 1,909 municipalities at 23 points in time. It includes information on the number of households, population by sex (and age), civil status, the right of domicile, domestic worker, and religion. Descriptive statistics for the outcomes of interest are depicted in Table C.2 in the Appendix.

I construct the average household size by dividing the total population by the number of households in the respective municipality. On average, households have 5.0 members under impartible and 4.5 members under partible inheritance.

For the year 1858, I have population data for separate age groups. To achieve a measure of fertility, I divide the number of children under the age of six by the number of females in the reproductive age (14-39 years). This gives me the number of children, a woman got within the previous six years 1852-1858 that survived until 1858. To obtain the expected number of children a woman has over her whole reproductive age (26 years), I multiply this number by $\frac{26}{6}$. For the whole Kingdom of Württemberg, the average number of children per woman is 2.68.[5] This is 43% lower than the official rate of 4.7 for the year 1871 (BIB, 2022). However, the under-five mortality was approximately 46.9% in 1858 (Gapminder, 2020) which explains the difference between the fertility rates. Fertility is slightly higher under impartible than under partible inheritance. The difference is only marginally significant.

In both areas, the sex ratio, measured in men per women, is below one, meaning there is a female surplus. Under partible inheritance, the surplus is larger with only 91.8 men per 100 women compared to 94.4 under impartible inheritance.

For the census years 1858-1885, I observe the civil status of people over the age of 14 in each

[5]The unweighted average in Table C.2 is much higher as larger cities with a larger population, usually have lower fertility rates but receive the same weight as small villages.

municipality. On average, individuals in areas of partible inheritance have a 1.4 or 2.2 percentage points lower probability of being single. The difference is larger for males than for females.

I assess the number of hired laborers, I divide the number of domestic workers by the number of close relatives. This information is only available for the year 1900. The fraction of domestic workers is almost three times higher under impartible than under partible inheritance.

For the years 1867 and 1871, the census includes information on the right of domicile for the residents in each municipality. The right of domicile (*Heimatrecht*) assigns each individual to a home municipality. It is transferred by the father and, for women, it can only change through marriage. The home municipality has to provide basic social services to each of its citizens and migrants can be sent back to the home municipality in the case of impoverishment (Althammer, 2021). Under impartible inheritance, 23% of the population received their right of domicile from another municipality than the one they are living in at the time of the census. I, therefore, consider them as non-natives in the following. For partible inheritance, only 13.3% (15.2%) of all males (females) are non-natives. Hence, there seems to be more immigration of foreigners or more emigration of natives under impartible than under partible inheritance.

Outcome Variables - Contemporaneous

To assess the long-term effects of partible inheritance, I first look at household size after WWII. Table C.2 also contains the descriptives for contemporaneous outcomes. I use data from the censuses 1961, 1970, 1987, and 2011 to estimate the effect of partible inheritance on household size. The descriptives show that, even though, household size decreased remarkably compared to the census before WWII, there is still a significant difference between both inheritance regimes. On average, a household has 3.1 members under impartible inheritance and only 2.8 members under partible inheritance.

The sex ratio is slightly above one for impartible and slightly below one for partible inheritance and hence much more balanced than in the historical census.

I use the share of females in local political councils as a proxy for female political participation and gender norms. The Statistical Office of Baden-Württemberg (2021) provides election results for the years 1989-2019. Elections take place every five years and councils have a size of 7 to 68 members depending on the size of the municipality. Members carry out their activities on a

voluntary basis. The share of females within councils ranges from 0 to 64.3%, while it reaches more than 50% in only seven (out of 7,707) councils across the whole time span. On average, in areas of partible inheritance, 21.5% of the councils' members are female across all elections. This is 4.7 percentage points more than in areas of impartible inheritance.

I assess employment effects with data from the Federal Employment Agency for the years 2003, 2011, and 2018. The data set includes the number of employees subject to social security contributions separately for 9 age groups and gender. Self-employed workers and public servants are not included. I measure employment rates by dividing the number of employees by the official population statistics on the respective sex-age category. On average, 53.9% of females are employed under impartible inheritance and 55.2% under partible inheritance. Employment rates for males are 14.6 and 10.2 percentage points higher. The gender gap in total employment is significantly higher under impartible inheritance. For part-time employment, there are only marginal differences between both inheritance regimes. 24.6 to 25% of all females work part-time, while this holds for 3.4% of men.

The share of self-employed individuals over the total population is significantly higher under impartible than under partible inheritance.

To look at different dimensions of gender equality, I use a unique data set on parental leave benefits for the birth cohorts 2013-2015 in Baden-Württemberg provided by destatis. In Germany, parents are entitled to take in total 14 months of paid parental leave after childbirth if both parents take at least two months. A total of 14 months can be split freely between both parents. Benefits amount to $65\% - 100\%$ of the previous income or 300-1800 Euro. Single parents with an income of more than 250K Euro p.a. and couples with a joint income of 500K Euro p.a. have no right to parental leave benefits (BMFSFJ, 2021). For each municipality in Baden-Württemberg, my data set includes the number of parents who received parental leave benefits and the average length of paid leave. Due to anonymity requirements, the information is aggregated for the birth cohorts 2013-2015. I normalize the number of mothers and fathers receiving benefits by the number of births in the given period to obtain the share of mothers and fathers who receive benefits at all. Due to moves within the three years, some measurement error evolves. Parents might show up in the parental leave records of one municipality, even though, their child was born in another municipality. On average, 97.6%-98.3% of all mothers receive benefits. The

difference between both inheritance regimes is only significant at the 5% level. Under impartible inheritance, 44.1% of all fathers receive benefits. Under partible inheritance, this decreases to only 36.8%. On average, mothers receive benefits for 11.9 months under impartible and partible inheritance. With 2.57 months, the length of paternal leave under impartible inheritance falls short after the length of leave under partible inheritance with 2.67 months.

Inheritance Customs

To define historical inheritance customs, I geocode a map by Krafft (1930). It covers inheritance customs in the former territory of Württemberg and Hohenzollern in the year 1905 and distinguishes between partible inheritance, impartible inheritance, and mixed forms of inheritance. Unlike Huning and Wahl (2021a,b) and Hager and Hilbig (2019), I do not rely on one of the more detailed but later conducted surveys by Röhm (1957, 1962) that cover the whole of Baden-Württemberg (1957) and West-Germany (1962), since the *historical* border of inheritance rules as it existed in the 19th century, has undergone considerable changes in World War I and II.[6] To link the information on inheritance rules with the historical outcome variables, I overlay the map by Krafft (1930) with the geocoded center of the municipalities as of 1871 to check whether the municipalities fall into an area of partible, impartible, or mixed forms of inheritance. I create a dummy variable for inheritance that is equal to one for partible and mixed forms. For impartible inheritance, the variable takes on the value zero. 51.2% of the municipalities from 1871 practice impartible inheritance, and 48.8% practice partible inheritance. Figure 1 illustrates inheritance customs in the Kingdom of Württemberg and the principality Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Geocoded municipalities of the census are denoted by crosses. The area in the center and the very South of the map, without any located municipalities, is the principality Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen which was not part of the census of Württemberg.

[Insert Figure 1 here.]

[6] Especially the Reichserbhofgesetz (1933) under the NS-Regime fostered impartible inheritance to preserve large farms (Münkel, 1996).

For the contemporaneous outcomes, I overlay the map by Krafft (1930) with municipality borders as of 2018. The variable for inheritance is equal to one if in more than 50% of a municipality's territory, partible or mixed forms of inheritance are practiced, and zero otherwise. I obtain information on inheritance for 662 of the 1,103 municipalities of today's Baden-Württemberg. In my sample, partible inheritance is practiced in 55.44% of the municipalities. Figure C.2 in the Online Appendix maps inheritance customs for the municipalities of 2018. The map also includes important waterways such as Rhine, Neckar, and Lake Constance and the mountain ranges Black Forest and Swabian Jura. Partible inheritance is mostly practiced in the fertile regions along the Neckar. Impartible inheritance dominates in municipalities with greater altitude such as the Swabian Jura.

Control Variables

In the regression analysis, I control for the most important predictors of inheritance customs as identified by Huning and Wahl (2021a). For information on historical vineyards, I rely on a map of specialized crops by Nüske and Schröder (1977). The map measures the historical dispersion of vineyards at different points in time. For each of the municipalities of the census of 1871, I check whether they had vineyards till 1624. In line with the historical literature, wine is strongly correlated with inheritance. 67.1% of the municipalities with partible inheritance historically had vineyards, while this holds for only 24% of the municipalities with impartible inheritance (see Table C.2). To control for the distance to historical trade routes and Roman influence on agriculture and inheritance, I calculate the distance of each municipality's centroid to Roman roads (McCormick et al., 2013). Similarly, I estimate the distance to important waterways such as the rivers Rhine, Neckar, and Lake Constance using geodata from the BKG (Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy).

Historically, monasteries point to early settlements. They also played an important role in viniculture and provided education. To control for these aspects, I add a municipality's distance to *early* monasteries. This information is based on a map by Müller and Blessing (1975) that visualizes monasteries built before the year 900. From Table C.2 we see that areas of partible inheritance are significantly closer to important waterways, early monasteries, and Roman roads. Geographical controls such as longitude, latitude, and measures of elevation rely on publicly avail-

able geodata from GeoBasis-DE / BKG (2021). From Table C.2 we see that areas characterized by lower elevation and less rugged territory, where agricultural land use is more convenient, were more likely to stick with partible inheritance.

Huning and Wahl (2021a) identify precipitation as an important factor for viniculture and hence also partible inheritance. Weather data on rainfalls and temperature are based on Fick and Hijmans (2017). The data include monthly averages for the years 1970-2000 on a 30 seconds ($\approx 1km^2$) grid. Precipitation is significantly lower and average annual temperature significantly higher for partible inheritance. The *Energieatlas* for Baden-Württemberg includes annual solar radiation (LUBW, 2021) on a $1km^2$ grid for the years 1981-2000. Contrary to temperature, solar radiation is significantly higher in areas of *impartible* inheritance. From Panagos (2006) I construct the dominant soil type for each municipality as visualized in Figure C.3h.

To control for cultural factors, I add dummies for different dialects (Bühler et al., 2017) in Baden-Württemberg and the average share of protestants in the historical censuses. The share of protestants is 35.5 percentage points higher under partible than under impartible inheritance. Figure C.3 provides maps for the control variables within the municipality borders of 2018.

4 Empirical Strategy

In this section, I introduce my empirical strategy. To identify the causal effect of inheritance customs by using simple OLS, we would need to assume that inheritance rules were as good as randomly assigned across municipalities in Baden-Württemberg. However, from the literature on the origin of inheritance customs and the comparison of control variables for partible and impartible inheritance in Table C.2, we see that both regions differ significantly in important characteristics that might affect outcomes and the treatment variable *Inheritance*. For instance, soil texture is a determinant of partible inheritance and might affect gender norms (Carranza, 2014). To circumvent that my estimates suffer from an omitted variable bias, I apply a *spatial regression discontinuity design* (see e.g., Dell, 2010; Keele and Titiunik, 2015; Ehrlich and Seidel, 2018) as used by Bartels et al. (2020) and Huning and Wahl (2021a).

The idea of a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD) is to identify the local average effect by looking at a border where treatment changes discontinuously. Estimating the discontinuity of the outcome at the border should resemble the local average treatment effect (LATE), assuming that the treatment is the only underlying factor that changes discontinuously at the border. I use a sharp RDD framework where the treatment variable is a deterministic function of the *forcing* or running variable. In my setting, $Inheritance_i$ - the inheritance rule applied in municipality i - is the treatment variable. The *running* variable d_i measures the distance of municipality i to the closest municipality with a different inheritance rule and hence the *inheritance border*. Municipalities with $d_i < 0$ apply impartible inheritance ($Inheritance_i$=0). Municipalities with $d_i > 0$ apply partible inheritance ($Inheritance_i$=1). I exclude areas from the analysis, where I do not have municipalities on both sides of the inheritance border. This applies to the areas around Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen in the center and the south of the map. I also exclude municipalities that are closer to the border with the Kingdom of Baden to the west of Württemberg than to the opposite inheritance rule as I have no information on inheritance customs in the Kingdom of Baden. In Bavaria in the east of the Kingdom of Württemberg, impartible inheritance was widespread (Huppertz, 1939; Röhm, 1962). I, therefore, keep municipalities close to the Bavarian border in my sample. Figure 2 visualizes all remaining municipalities with a distance of 20 km or less to a municipality of the opposite inheritance rule. Turquoise denotes partible and grey impartible inheritance, with darker municipalities being closer to the border.

[Insert Figure 2 here.]

Using municipalities within the 20 km interval around the border, I estimate the following regression

$$Y_{i,b,c,t} = \alpha + \beta Inheritance_i + f(d_i) + \mathbf{X_i'}\gamma + \theta_b + \delta_t + \zeta_c + \epsilon_{i,c,b,t}. \quad (1)$$

Where $Y_{i,c,b,t}$ is one of the outcome variables for municipality i in year t. $f(d_i)$ is a polynomial of the municipality's distance to the inheritance border. I use different specifications with a linear, quadratic, or cubic polynomial interacted with *Inheritance* to allow for different slopes on both sides of the border. $f(d_i)$ can thus take on the form $f(d_i) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \delta_k d_i^k + \mu_k Inheritance_i \times d_i^k$, with $K \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. $\mathbf{X_i'}$ is a vector of geographic, historical, and cultural control variables as

introduced in Table C.2. δ_t includes year dummies and ζ_c county fixed effects. For the border segment fixed effects θ_b, I divide the border into six different segments and link every municipality to the closest border segment. This ensures that only nearby municipalities are compared with each other. Otherwise, the effect of *Inheritance* would be identified by comparing municipalities that have similar values of d_i but are actually very far and hence very distinct from each other (see e.g., Gonzalez, 2021; Huning and Wahl, 2021a). Following Abadie et al. (2022), my treatment assignment is perfectly clustered, meaning that each individual in a certain municipality is subject to the same inheritance rule. Therefore, I use standard errors clustered on the municipality level. With aggregated data, I have only one observation per cluster (municipality) and year. For the outcomes that I observe at only one point in time, standard errors clustered at the municipality level are equivalent to heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.

For β to identify a causal effect, two identifying assumptions must hold. First, potential outcomes under treatment and non-treatment must be continuous at the border. That is, municipalities at the border differ in no respect but their treatment status. This is generally assessed by testing for discontinuities in relevant control variables at the border. I do so by estimating the following regression

$$X_i = \alpha + \beta Inheritance_i + f(d_i) + \epsilon_i. \tag{2}$$

Each of the control variables is regressed on a flexible polynomial of d_i and the treatment variable $Inheritance_i$. I create dummy variables for each type of soil and each dialect observed in my sample. In total, I end up with 28 control variables. Table D.3 presents the regression results for different bandwidths (5, 10, 15, and 20 km) and a linear or quadratic function of d_i. Figure D.4 shows the results graphically. Using a 20 km bandwidth and a quadratic polynomial, the probability of having vineyards in 1624 is significantly higher under partible than under impartible inheritance. This is in line with the historical literature introduced in Section 2. I therefore carefully control for vineyards in my main specifications. The effect is, however, only marginally significant and changes in magnitude for different bandwidths and the order of the polynomial.

The second assumption requires that there is no sorting into treatment. This could be the case if, for instance, individuals with more progressive gender norms are more likely to move to urban

centers, which are generally located in areas of partible inheritance. I can not totally rebut this argument. However, I include population density as an additional control variable. In principle, population density could be a bad control. Huning and Wahl (2021a) show that population density increases under partible inheritance. Hence, a part of the causal effect of inheritance on gender norms might be captured by population density. I, therefore, provide specifications with and without population density as a control variable.

5 Results

5.1 Effect of Partible Inheritance on Historical Outcomes

I now turn to the regression analysis. Table 1 shows the results for historical outcomes. In line with the conceptual framework, households in areas of partible inheritance are remarkably smaller than those under impartible inheritance (Panel A of Table 1). At the border, household size decreases by 0.27 to 0.39 individuals. This is 37.7 to 53.5% of a standard deviation. The effect drops by almost one quarter when geographic controls are added in specification (2), but is robust to additional covariates and county-fixed effects in columns (3) and (4). Figure E.7a visualizes the relation between household size and inheritance. We observe a sharp drop right at the border. Panel B in Table 1 and Figure E.7b show that the effect of partible inheritance on fertility is close to zero and not significant. Hence, larger household size under impartible inheritance is not driven by families having more children, but by the fact that the concept of a nuclear family is less prevalent in these areas than under partible inheritance. The results also complement findings by Bartels et al. (2020) who show that there are significantly more small farms under partible inheritance at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.

Panel C shows that the sex ratio, measured in men per woman, drops significantly at the inheritance border by 2.41 to 2.63 men per 100 women. With a sex ratio below one, the number of women exceeds the number of men under both inheritance regimes, but especially under impartible inheritance.

The sex ratio cannot be interpreted as a measure of gender norms per se. Angrist (2002), however, shows that a higher sex ratio is associated with a higher probability of females getting

married and an improved bargaining position within the household. At the same time, the need for females to invest in skills to make their own money declines. This reduces female labor force participation. If the marriage market was primarily determined by the sex ratio, partible inheritance should have a positive effect on the probability of females being single and a negative effect on males, as the number of men per woman decreases with partible inheritance. However, we observe a negative effect for both sexes in Figure E.7e and E.7f, though the decline of singles is more pronounced for men than for women. This could be explained by the fact that the observed sex ratio does not necessarily meet the *virtual* sex ratio: the number of men actually being disposable for marriage over the number of women (Angrist, 2002). In 19th-century Germany, several states adopted laws restricting marriage to attenuate population growth. Men had to provide evidence that they had sufficient income and property to sustain a family to receive permission to get married (Knodel, 1972). Especially non-inheriting sons under impartible inheritance and men with only a small piece of land under partible inheritance may not have fulfilled these requirements. Non-inheriting siblings under impartible inheritance might have stayed on their siblings' farms to work instead of getting married and having their own farm. Men with a small piece of land under partible inheritance may have moved to areas of impartible inheritance, to work on the larger farms as employed laborers. To find evidence for these considerations, I look at the effect of partible inheritance on the number of domestic workers over close relatives and the share of individuals without a right of domicile in each municipality.

Panel F of Table 1 shows that the effect of partible inheritance on domestic workers amounts to around -0.0157. This is a decline by approximately 13.9% at the average value of domestic workers under impartible inheritance. The effect is robust to additional control variables but not significant (p-value of 0.11 in the specification (4)). Panel G and H of Table 1 suggest that for both sexes, the share of non-natives is around 3 percentage points lower under partible inheritance. The effect is of similar magnitude for both sexes and the inclusion of additional control variables. The effect could either be driven by a higher influx of migrants from partible inheritance municipalities or as Wegge (1999) finds, by more emigration of natives from impartible inheritance to overseas assuming immigration to be the same under both inheritance regimes.

[Insert Table 1 here.]

5.2 Effect of Partible Inheritance on Contemporaneous Gender Disparities

Before studying the effect of partible inheritance on gender disparities nowadays, I check whether the most striking effect - on household size - still prevails at the end of the 20th century. Table 2 and Figure 4a show the effect of partible inheritance on household size for the census 1961-2011. The effect is still negative, though it is much smaller and more sensitive to adding additional control variables than before WWII. Panel B shows the effect of partible inheritance on the current sex ratio. The effect reverses compared to the historical sex ratio and becomes positive. However, effect size and significance are very sensitive to outliers close to the border (see also Figure 4b). The effect of partible inheritance halves if I exclude the municipality with the highest and the municipality with the lowest sex ratio from the analysis (see Panel C).

To assess how the effect of partible inheritance on household size changes over time, I estimate equation (1) separately for each census year since 1834. Figure 3 depicts the corresponding coefficients. The negative effect of partible inheritance on household size is strongest for the years 1900-1925. It diminishes but remains negative after WWII, with around 12% of a standard deviation in 2011.

[Insert Figure 3 here.]

[Insert Table 2 here.]

In the following, I focus on measures of gender disparities. Table 3 provides estimates for equation (1) with the share of females in local political councils as an outcome and a stepwise introduction of control variables. Figure 4c plots the female share in local political councils against the distance to the inheritance border. Estimates for partible inheritance range from $2.37 - 3.44$ percentage points. The effect size is of similar magnitude as in Hager and Hilbig (2019) using a matching strategy and lower than in their instrumental variable approach. Considering an average female share of 19.2% in the whole sample my estimate implies that partible inheritance increases female representation in local political councils by 12.4 to 18.0% which is around one-fifth to one-third of a standard deviation. The effect is significant at the 90 or 95%-level across all specifications and decreases only marginally when additional control variables are included. Important to note, the effect does not change if population density and council size are added as controls. Both variables

have been identified as important predictors of female representation in political councils (see Alozie and Manganaro, 1993; Davidson-Schmich, 2016; Hager and Hilbig, 2019) and are likely to be correlated with partible inheritance (Huning and Wahl, 2021a). A priori, they could bias the coefficient towards zero as bad controls. In Table E.4, I provide estimates using different polynomials. The effect is larger and highly significant using a linear polynomial and smaller and insignificant using a cubic polynomial.

[Insert Table 3 here.]

[Insert Figure 4 here.]

Table 4 depicts the effect of partible inheritance on the employment rates for females (columns (1) and (2)) and males (columns (3) and (4)) separately and the difference between sexes (column (5) and (6)). Overall, the effects are small and mostly insignificant. There is some indication that partible inheritance decreases the gender gap in total employment by 1.5 to 1.7 percentage points, which is a reduction by 10.5 to 12.5% at the sample mean, as can be seen in columns (5) and (6) of Panel A. The reduction seems to be driven by a decrease in male full-time employment (Panel B, columns (3) and (4)) and an increase in female part-time employment (Panel C, columns (1) and (2)). Figure E.9 visualizes the results. On the left side of the border, we observe an increase in female full-time employment and a decrease in female part-time employment. Approaching the inheritance border under impartible inheritance seems to induce a switch from part- to full-time for female employees.

A similar decline, as for female part-time employment, can be seen in Figure 4c for the share of females in local political councils. Membership in a local political council is mostly voluntary work. Hence, the increase in full-time employment under impartible inheritance close to the border might leave less time for voluntary commitment such as activities in the local council.

[Insert Table 4 here.]

The utilization of maternal leave benefits is relatively stable across municipalities (see Figure 5a), with only a few outliers that might be driven by measurement error (see Section 3). Also, the length of leave for mothers changes only marginally at the border (see Figure 5b). Even if we took the effect size in Table 5 at face value, mothers received maternal leave benefits only 0.4-0.7% longer under partible than under impartible inheritance.

Fathers exhibit much more variation in the utilization of parental leave benefits. At the border,

the share of fathers making use of parental leave benefits decreases by approx. 2.74 to 3.35 percentage points, which corresponds to 6.8 to 8.3% at the mean. The differences in the take-up rates of parental leave benefits for fathers might be either rooted in different gender norms or in the employment structure that facilitates or hinders paternal leave. Bartels et al. (2020) find that partible inheritance fosters self-employment out of the agricultural sector. In general, self-employment makes it more difficult to go on parental leave due to forgone income and the need for a replacement. However, I show in Figure E.10 and Table E.5 in the Appendix that *overall* self-employment is lower under partible than under impartible inheritance. Hence, the decrease in the take-up rate cannot be explained by self-employment. The results also show that historically high self-employment out of the agricultural sector does not trigger long-term overall self-employment.

Panel D of Table 5 reveals that those fathers who go on parental leave, stay at home for a longer time. This may be explained by income differences between partible and impartible inheritance. Huning and Wahl (2021a) find that partible inheritance has a positive effect on income per capita. Samtleben et al. (2019) report that fathers indicate financial concerns as their main motive for not extending parental leave. Hence, fathers may slightly increase the length of their leave under partible inheritance due to higher household incomes under partible inheritance.

[Insert Figure 5 here.]

[Table Figure 5 here.]

5.3 Placebo Analysis

As a first robustness check, I test if there is a significant change in the outcome variables at other values of the running variable. Similar to Dehos (2022), I run a Monte-Carlo study, drawing placebo borders from the left or from the right side of the true inheritance border, and compute the distance to the placebo border to define the running variable. I reestimate equation (1) $1,000$ times, using the full set of control variables. For each estimation, I use only observations from the same side of the true border in order to avoid potential misspecification due to falsely assuming continuity at the true border. I further only allow for placebo borders where I have at least 100 of the historical or 30 of the current municipalities on both sides of the placebo border. I plot

the distribution of the t-statistics that I obtain from the placebo regression and the actual t-statistic for each outcome in Figure E.11. Ideally, the placebo distribution follows an asymptotic Student's t probability density function with the t-statistic of the baseline specification located in the tail in case of a significant effect. Besides the effect on male full-time employment, the distributions confirm the robustness of my results. The t-statistics at the true inheritance border lie at the tail of the distribution of the placebo t-statistics.

In a related test, I shuffle the distance to the inheritance border across municipalities and then reestimate the same specification as before $1,000$ times. Figure E.13 presents the distribution of the t-statistics.

6 Conclusion

This paper studies historical inheritance rules for agricultural land in the territory of today's Baden-Württemberg and its effect on household formation and gender disparities, using a spatial regression discontinuity design. I add to the growing literature on historical inheritance customs and their effect on today's outcomes and to the literature on the historical origins of gender norms.

My analysis relies on data from historical maps, regional statistics from the Federal Employment Agency and the Statistical Office in Baden-Württemberg, and data from contemporary and historical censuses. I find that areas of partible inheritance historically exhibit smaller households. The effect attenuates over time but is still visible until 2011. I can reject the presumption that this is driven by lower fertility rates. It implies that the concept of the nuclear family instead of the concept of the stem family, where grandchildren grow up in the same household as their grandparents, is still more prevalent under partible inheritance. I also find that the sex ratio (measured in men over women), the share of non-natives (individuals without a right of domicile), and the share of singles are historically higher under impartible inheritance. I suggest that this is driven by the effect of hired workers who are employed on large farms under impartible inheritance. These individuals have a lower chance to get married.

I provide evidence that partible inheritance has had a significant positive effect on the share of females in local political councils over the last 30 years. At the same time, there is some evidence

of a negative effect on the gender gap in employment due to partible inheritance. This effect is driven by higher female part-time employment rates. I also use the utilization of parental leave benefits as a proxy for how childcare is split among parents. I find that in areas of partible inheritance, fathers have a lower probability of making use of parental leave benefits, while those who do receive parental leave benefits, receive them for a longer time. One explanation might be higher average incomes under partible inheritance, which might give men more flexibility to go on parental leave. The effect is not driven by higher self-employment rates. Despite there being some evidence in the literature, that partible inheritance promotes self-employment out of the agricultural sector, I show that overall self-employment is actually lower under inheritance than under impartible inheritance.

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Appendix

Figure 1: Inheritance Law in 1905 in the Kingdom of Württemberg and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen



Note: The figure shows inheritance customs applied in the Kingdom of Württemberg and Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen in 1905 (Krafft, 1930). Turquoise denotes partible and grey impartible inheritance. Light grey to black lines depict administrative boundaries in 1890.

Figure 2: Distance to Inheritance Border in Württemberg



Source: Own illustration based on Krafft (1930)

Table 1: Effect of Partible Inheritance on Historical Outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Household Size 1834-1925				
Partible	-0.3888***	-0.3001***	-0.2742***	-0.3166***
	(0.0647)	(0.0604)	(0.0598)	(0.0667)
Observations	26543	26543	26543	26543
Adjusted R^2	0.1351	0.2219	0.2329	0.2457
Panel B: Fertility 1858				
Partible	-0.0427	-0.0054	0.0099	0.0315
	(0.0835)	(0.0805)	(0.0822)	(0.0867)
Observations	1156	1156	1156	1156
Adjusted R^2	0.0261	0.1067	0.1182	0.1546
Panel C: Sex Ratio 1834-1925				
Partible	-0.0254***	-0.0246***	-0.0241***	-0.0263***
	(0.0075)	(0.0069)	(0.0068)	(0.0075)
Observations	26577	26577	26577	26577
Adjusted R^2	0.0433	0.1235	0.1356	0.1474
Panel F: Share Female Singles 1858-1890				
Partible	-0.0130**	-0.0080*	-0.0073*	-0.0140***
	(0.0052)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)	(0.0046)
Observations	10442	10442	10442	10442
Adjusted R^2	0.0976	0.2631	0.2824	0.3387
Panel G: Share Male Singles 1858-1890				
Partible	-0.0191***	-0.0149***	-0.0145***	-0.0196***
	(0.0048)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)	(0.0048)
Observations	10442	10442	10442	10442
Adjusted R^2	0.1143	0.2421	0.2496	0.2899
Panel F: Domestic Worker 1900				
Partible	-0.0207**	-0.0134	-0.0134	-0.0157
	(0.0085)	(0.0087)	(0.0087)	(0.0097)
Observations	1021	1021	1021	1021
Adjusted R^2	0.2139	0.2624	0.2696	0.2832
Panel D: No Right of Domicile - Female 1867-1871				
Partible	-0.0306***	-0.0290**	-0.0299***	-0.0343***
	(0.0117)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)	(0.0118)
Observations	2322	2322	2322	2322
Adjusted R^2	0.3702	0.4448	0.4646	0.4950
Panel E: No Right of Domicile - Male 1867-1871				
Partible	-0.0298**	-0.0323**	-0.0332**	-0.0293**
	(0.0137)	(0.0137)	(0.0136)	(0.0141)
Observations	2322	2322	2322	2322
Adjusted R^2	0.2210	0.3065	0.3322	0.3890
Census Year	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border Segment		✓	✓	
Geographic Controls		✓	✓	✓
Historical and Cultural Controls			✓	✓
County Fixed Effects				✓

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

20km bandwidth. All regressions include a flexible quadratic polynomial of the running variable. Geographic controls include distance to the rivers Rhine, Neckar, and Lake Constance, elevation, slope, precipitation, temperature, solar radiation, and soil type. Historical and cultural controls include vineyards in 1624, distance to early monasteries (999 AD), distance to Roman roads, dialects, and the share of protestants from 1858 to 1925.

Figure 3: Effect of Partible Inheritance on Household Size over Time (1834-2011)



Note: The figure plots the coefficients and the 95% confidence interval with robust standard errors for the effect of partible inheritance on household size for each census year separately. Circles denote regressions from the census of the former Kingdom of Württemberg. Diamonds denote regressions from the census 1961-2011. The regressions include the same set of control variables as in column (3) of Table 1 and Table 2.

Table 2: Effect of Partible Inheritance on Household Size 1961-2011

Panel A: Household Size 1961-2011				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partible	-0.1603**	-0.1126**	-0.0845	-0.0837
	(0.0697)	(0.0550)	(0.0528)	(0.0531)
Observations	1619	1619	1619	1619
Adjusted R^2	0.6091	0.7059	0.7247	0.7474
Panel B: Sex Ratio 2008-2021				
Partible	0.0260*	0.0318*	0.0348**	0.0357**
	(0.0156)	(0.0165)	(0.0163)	(0.0172)
Observations	5656	5656	5656	5656
Adjusted R^2	0.0730	0.1287	0.1461	0.1706
Panel C: Sex Ratio 2008-2021 (without outlier)				
Partible	0.0118	0.0147	0.0181*	0.0175*
	(0.0108)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)	(0.0100)
Observations	5628	5628	5628	5628
Adjusted R^2	0.0873	0.1506	0.1747	0.1960
Census Year	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border Segment		✓	✓	
Geographic Controls		✓	✓	✓
Historical and Cultural Controls			✓	✓
County Fixed Effects				✓

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. 20km bandwidth. All regressions include a flexible quadratic polynomial of the running variable. Geographic controls include distance to the rivers Rhine, Neckar, and Lake Constance, elevation, slope, precipitation, temperature, solar radiation, and soil type. Historical and cultural controls include vineyards in 1624, distance to early monasteries (999 AD), distance to Roman roads, dialects, religion in 1610, and a dummy variable for belonging to Hohenzollern-Sigmaring or Württemberg in 1890.

Table 3: Share of Females in Local Political Councils 1989-2019

Dependent Variable: Share of Females in Local Political Councils 1989-2019					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Partible	0.0344**	0.0276**	0.0263**	0.0256*	0.0237*
	(0.0157)	(0.0134)	(0.0133)	(0.0136)	(0.0131)
Observations	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828
Adjusted R^2	0.2309	0.3172	0.3293	0.3348	0.3499
Year Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border Segment		✓	✓		
Geographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓
Historical and Cultural Controls			✓	✓	✓
County Fixed Effects				✓	✓
Population Density and Council Size					✓

Notes: See Table 2.

Figure 4: Graphics for Regression Discontinuity Design - Household Size, Sex Ratio and Political Participation

(a) Household Size 1961-2011



(b) Sex Ratio 2008-2021



(c) Female Share in Local Political Councils



Note: The figures show the outcomes on the y-axis as a quadratic function of the running variable: distance to the inheritance border. Negative values of the running variable denote impartible inheritance, and positive, partible inheritance. In the blue dots, municipalities are grouped into 40 equally sized bins. The shaded grey area denotes the 95% confidence interval with standard errors clustered at the municipality level.

Table 4: Employment Rates 2003, 2011 and 2018

	Female		Male		Male-Female	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Full- and part-time						
Partible	-0.0004	0.0057	-0.0150	-0.0117	-0.0146	-0.0174
	(0.0087)	(0.0074)	(0.0107)	(0.0083)	(0.0133)	(0.0109)
Observations	9686	9686	9686	9686	9686	9686
Adjusted R^2	0.7138	0.7207	0.6256	0.6432	0.1364	0.1600
Mean	0.5447	0.5447	0.6833	0.6833	0.1386	0.1386
Panel B: Full-time						
Partible	-0.0070	-0.0019	-0.0140	-0.0087	-0.0070	-0.0069
	(0.0070)	(0.0058)	(0.0112)	(0.0086)	(0.0113)	(0.0092)
Observations	9686	9686	9686	9686	9686	9686
Adjusted R^2	0.7330	0.7393	0.6467	0.6674	0.4321	0.4530
Mean	0.2934	0.2934	0.6473	0.6473	0.3539	0.3539
Panel C: Part-time						
Partible	0.0077	0.0099*	-0.0006	-0.0018	-0.0083	-0.0117**
	(0.0059)	(0.0051)	(0.0021)	(0.0020)	(0.0062)	(0.0059)
Observations	9686	9686	9686	9686	9686	9686
Adjusted R^2	0.7185	0.7261	0.1601	0.1817	0.6714	0.6773
Mean	0.2491	0.2491	0.0332	0.0332	-0.2159	-0.2159
Year Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Age Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Full Set of Controls		✓		✓		✓

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$. 20km bandwidth. All regressions include a flexible quadratic polynomial of the running variable. The full set of control variables includes distance to the rivers Rhine, Neckar, and Lake Constance, elevation (range), precipitation, temperature, solar radiation, soil type, vineyards in 1624, distance to early monasteries (999 AD), distance to Roman roads, dialects, religion in 1610, a dummy variable for belonging to Hohenzollern-Sigmaring or Württemberg in 1890, and border segment fixed effects.

Figure 5: Parental Leave Benefits

(a) Maternal Leave



(b) Length Mothers



(c) Paternal Leave



(d) Length Fathers



Note: See Figure 4.

Table 5: Parental Leave

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Maternal Leave				
Partible	-0.0023	-0.0042	-0.0069	-0.0109
	(0.0144)	(0.0145)	(0.0122)	(0.0127)
Observations	393	393	393	393
Adjusted R^2	0.0046	0.0154	0.0295	0.0276
Panel B: Length Mothers				
Partible	0.0670	0.0699	0.0462	0.0782
	(0.0888)	(0.0890)	(0.0875)	(0.0801)
Observations	396	396	396	396
Adjusted R^2	0.0018	0.0384	0.0359	0.0648
Panel C: Paternal Leave				
Partible	-0.0274	-0.0335	-0.0292	-0.0331
	(0.0255)	(0.0237)	(0.0231)	(0.0241)
Observations	392	392	392	392
Adjusted R^2	0.1307	0.2491	0.2669	0.2795
Panel D: Length Fathers				
Partible	0.1532	0.1540	0.1828	0.2100
	(0.2040)	(0.2075)	(0.1894)	(0.1936)
Observations	396	396	396	396
Adjusted R^2	0.0186	0.0468	0.0399	0.0106
Geographic Controls		✓	✓	✓
Border Segment		✓	✓	
Historical and Cultural Controls			✓	✓
County Fixed Effects				✓

Notes: See Table 2.

A.1 Additional Material

Figure A.1: Female Heirs



Source: Röhm (1957). Notes: In crossed areas, females inherited regularly, in striped sometimes, otherwise never.

B.2 Data Sources

Table B.1: Data Sources

Data	Time period	Source
Explanatory variables and controls		
Inheritance customs	1960	Krafft (1930)
Historical vineyards	Before 1624	Nüske and Schröder (1977)
Roman road network	*NA*	McCormick et al. (2013)
Early monasteries	Before 900	Müller and Blessing (1975)
Precipitation and Temperature	1970-2000	Fick and Hijmans (2017)
Solar Radiation	1981-2000	LUBW (2021)
Soil type	2006	European Soil Database (ESDB) by Panagos (2006)
Geographical controls	2019	GeoBasis-DE / BKG (2021)
Dialects	2017	Bühler et al. (2017)
Religion	1610	Ward et al. (1912)
Outcomes		
Historical Outcomes	1834-1925	Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (2008)
Sex Ratio	2008-2021	destatis
Household Size, Self Employment	1961, 1970, 1987, 2011	Statistisches Bundesamt (2014), Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg
Share of females in political councils	1989-2019	Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg (2021)
Employment Rates	2003, 2011, 2018	Federal Employment Agency
Firm Size	2013-2022	Federal Employment Agency
Parental leave use	2013-2015	destatis
Commuting Behavior	2021	destatis

C.3 Descriptives

Figure C.2: Inheritance Law in 1905 for Municipality Boundaries as of 2018



Note: The figure shows inheritance customs applied in the Kingdom of Württemberg in 1905 (Krafft, 1930). Turquoise denotes partible and grey impartible inheritance. Light grey to black lines depict administrative boundaries in 2018.

Table C.2: Summary Statistics by Inheritance

	Impartible		Partible		t-test		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Diff.	SE	N
Historical Outcomes							
Household Size	5.035	0.824	4.480	0.581	-0.556***	0.0069	43500
Approx. Fertility 1858	2.892	0.638	2.840	0.540	-0.052*	0.0274	1882
Sex Ratio	0.944	0.098	0.918	0.085	-0.026***	0.0009	43569
Share Female Singles	0.616	0.044	0.602	0.037	-0.014***	0.0006	17146
Share Male Singles	0.622	0.048	0.600	0.041	-0.022***	0.0007	17146
Domestic Worker	0.113	0.074	0.041	0.041	-0.072***	0.0029	1720
No Right of Domicile - Female	0.233	0.128	0.152	0.110	-0.081***	0.0039	3816
No Right of Domicile - Male	0.232	0.125	0.133	0.107	-0.098***	0.0038	3816
Current Outcomes							
Household Size 1961-2011	3.112	0.514	2.787	0.345	-0.326***	0.0168	2647
Sex Ratio 2008-2021	1.011	0.054	0.996	0.042	-0.015***	0.0010	9254
Females in political councils 1989-2019	0.168	0.099	0.215	0.104	0.047***	0.0030	4627
Employment Rates							
Female	0.539	0.172	0.552	0.154	0.013***	0.0026	15853
Male	0.684	0.193	0.686	0.159	0.002	0.0028	15853
Male-Female	0.146	0.158	0.135	0.102	-0.011***	0.0021	15853
Full-time Female	0.286	0.145	0.304	0.129	0.018***	0.0022	15853
Full-time Male	0.647	0.192	0.651	0.161	0.003	0.0028	15853
Full-time Male-Female	0.361	0.173	0.347	0.134	-0.015***	0.0024	15853
Part-time Female	0.250	0.124	0.246	0.110	-0.004**	0.0019	15853
Part-time Male	0.034	0.032	0.034	0.022	-0.000	0.0004	15853
Part-time Male-Female	-0.216	0.127	-0.213	0.112	0.004*	0.0019	15853
Share of Self-Employed Individuals	0.118	0.060	0.087	0.045	-0.032***	0.0023	2126
Parental Leave							
Maternal Leave	0.983	0.046	0.976	0.044	-0.006*	0.0035	650
Paternal Leave	0.441	0.103	0.368	0.074	-0.073***	0.0069	649
Length Mothers	11.933	0.313	11.924	0.256	-0.009	0.0223	653
Length Fathers	2.569	0.566	2.670	0.420	0.102***	0.0386	653
Controls							
Wine 1624	0.240	0.427	0.671	0.470	0.431***	0.0205	1909
Distance Waterways	40.915	17.876	12.711	9.902	-28.204***	0.6658	1909
Distance Monasteries	11.941	6.477	8.198	4.457	-3.742***	0.2556	1909
Distance Roman Roads	12.501	10.659	5.157	4.429	-7.344***	0.3768	1909
Elevation	513.651	126.855	414.141	176.964	-99.510***	7.0228	1909
Slope	4.554	4.095	4.968	3.894	0.414**	0.1831	1909
Precipitation	77.998	14.509	71.981	11.460	-6.017***	0.6002	1909
Temperature	8.116	0.583	8.615	0.929	0.499***	0.0353	1909
Solar Radiation	1113.325	24.473	1102.894	10.712	-10.432***	0.8718	1909
Protestants	0.448	0.458	0.803	0.365	0.355***	0.0190	1909

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

For the control variables, municipalities from the censuses 1834-1925 are the unit of observation.

Figure C.3: Maps of Control Variables

(a) Wine 1624



Source: Own illustration based on Nüske and Schröder (1977).

(b) Distance to Waterways, Roman Roads and Early Monasteries



Source: Own illustration based on Krafft (1930); McCormick et al. (2013); Müller and Blessing (1975).

(c) Elevation



Source: Own illustration based on GeoBasis-DE / BKG (2021).

(d) Elevation range



Source: Own illustration based on GeoBasis-DE / BKG (2021).

(e) Temperature



Source: Own illustration based on Fick and Hijmans (2017).

(f) Solar Radiation



Source: Own illustration based on LUBW (2021).

(g) Precipitation



Source: Own illustration based on Fick and Hijmans (2017).

(h) Soil Type



Source: Own illustration based on Panagos (2006).

(i) Dialects



Source: Own illustration based on Bühler et al. (2017).

(j) Religion in 1610



Source: Own illustration based on Ward et al. (1912).

D.4 Empirical Strategy

Figure D.4: Check for Discontinuities in Covariates

(a) Wine 1624



(b) Distance Waterways



(c) Distance Early Monasteries



(d) Distance Roman Roads



(e) Elevation



(f) Elevation range



(g) Precipitation



(h) Temperature



(i) Solar radiation



(j) Average Share of Protestants



Note: See Figure 4.

Figure D.5: Check for Discontinuities in Soil

(a) Sandstone



(b) Claystone/Mudstone



(c) Limestone



(d) Marl



(e) Fluvial Clays, Silts, and Loams



(f) Residual Loam



(g) Residual Clay



(h) Boulder Clay



(i) Loess



(j) Organic Materials



Note: See Figure 4.

Figure D.6: Check for Discontinuities in Dialects

(a) Mittelostschwäbisch



(b) Nordostschwäbisch



(c) Ostfränkisch



(d) Schwäbisch-Fränkisch



(e) Südfränkisch



(f) Südschwäbisch



(g) Westschwäbisch



(h) Zentral-Schwäbisch



Note: See Figure 4.

Table D.3: Check for Discontinuities in Controls

Linear				Quadratic			
5km	10km	15km	20km	5km	10km	15km	20km
Wine 1624							
0.1339*	0.1847***	0.2198***	0.2079***	0.0811	0.1070	0.1185*	0.1887***
(0.0796)	(0.0579)	(0.0501)	(0.0439)	(0.1303)	(0.0877)	(0.0715)	(0.0630)
Distance Waterways							
0.2394	-4.2444**	-5.5747***	-6.9877***	0.4607	0.3846	-1.7189	-2.5449
(2.4386)	(1.6782)	(1.4020)	(1.2407)	(4.1623)	(2.6414)	(2.1127)	(1.8556)
Distance Monasteries							
0.5290	-0.3564	-0.6307	-0.3632	0.7057	1.2391	0.3110	-0.4037
(0.8584)	(0.6227)	(0.5342)	(0.4873)	(1.3851)	(0.9326)	(0.7617)	(0.6843)
Distance Roman Roads							
-1.7542*	-0.6361	-0.1589	-0.4828	0.0890	-2.3781**	-1.5491	-0.4281
(1.0602)	(0.7720)	(0.6700)	(0.6041)	(1.6273)	(1.1586)	(0.9539)	(0.8598)
Elevation							
-31.1805	-29.9484	-28.1451	-20.4258	-52.8049	-35.8672	-31.3723	-32.3570
(28.4723)	(20.6652)	(17.5113)	(15.4341)	(45.7448)	(30.7752)	(25.2670)	(22.2746)
Slope							
-2.2057**	-0.8402	-0.4804	-0.2613	-0.8698	-2.4834**	-1.5313**	-1.0605
(0.8864)	(0.5863)	(0.5050)	(0.4354)	(1.6731)	(0.9767)	(0.7598)	(0.6626)
Precipitation							
-5.5428**	-1.6653	-0.3893	0.7895	-5.6125	-6.3125**	-3.8865*	-2.7436
(2.3124)	(1.6384)	(1.3534)	(1.2007)	(4.0055)	(2.5392)	(2.0392)	(1.7837)
Temperature							
0.0921	0.0692	0.0710	0.0404	0.1956	0.1276	0.0760	0.0778
(0.1372)	(0.0998)	(0.0844)	(0.0746)	(0.2242)	(0.1485)	(0.1217)	(0.1070)
Solar Radiation							
5.2663**	-0.2866	-1.5820	-2.2165	4.4214	5.2143*	2.1121	0.5105
(2.4404)	(1.7607)	(1.5412)	(1.4012)	(4.3035)	(2.6807)	(2.1952)	(1.9635)
Protestants							
-0.0074	0.0398	0.0618	0.0733*	-0.0853	-0.0208	0.0082	0.0383
(0.0755)	(0.0534)	(0.0461)	(0.0409)	(0.1267)	(0.0818)	(0.0664)	(0.0587)
Observations							
507	831	1009	1161	507	831	1009	1161

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

Table D.3: Check for Discontinuities in Controls

Linear				Quadratic			
5km	10km	15km	20km	5km	10km	15km	20km
Sandstone							
-0.0672	-0.0726**	-0.0726***	-0.0668***	-0.0610	-0.0777	-0.0745*	-0.0790**
(0.0475)	(0.0324)	(0.0276)	(0.0254)	(0.0766)	(0.0503)	(0.0389)	(0.0347)
Claystone/Mudstone							
-0.1334*	-0.0348	0.0127	0.0317	-0.2624**	-0.1207	-0.0733	-0.0486
(0.0725)	(0.0533)	(0.0457)	(0.0411)	(0.1227)	(0.0807)	(0.0658)	(0.0582)
Limestone							
0.0390	0.0106	-0.0143	-0.0481	0.0641	0.0154	0.0343	0.0344
(0.0641)	(0.0465)	(0.0402)	(0.0353)	(0.1007)	(0.0711)	(0.0588)	(0.0520)
Marl							
0.0706*	0.0323	0.0125	-0.0004	0.0483	0.0637	0.0481	0.0494
(0.0425)	(0.0308)	(0.0267)	(0.0244)	(0.0765)	(0.0458)	(0.0378)	(0.0347)
Fluvial Clays, Silts and Loams							
0.0172	0.0022	-0.0408*	-0.0280	0.0685	0.0326	0.0382	-0.0167
(0.0354)	(0.0248)	(0.0218)	(0.0198)	(0.0720)	(0.0399)	(0.0325)	(0.0289)
Residual Loam							
0.0729	0.0616*	0.0193	-0.0177	0.1385*	0.1047**	0.1055**	0.0854**
(0.0462)	(0.0328)	(0.0282)	(0.0258)	(0.0819)	(0.0509)	(0.0423)	(0.0369)
Residual Clay							
-0.0210	-0.0485	0.0131	0.0304	-0.0783	-0.0392	-0.0771	-0.0369
(0.0691)	(0.0499)	(0.0433)	(0.0385)	(0.1119)	(0.0737)	(0.0609)	(0.0538)
Boulder Clay							
0.0028	0.0286**	0.0292**	0.0088	0.0160*	-0.0164	0.0098	0.0326**
(0.0054)	(0.0117)	(0.0120)	(0.0107)	(0.0095)	(0.0136)	(0.0151)	(0.0141)
Loess							
0.0191	0.0175	0.0384	0.0886***	0.0664	0.0393	-0.0138	-0.0253
(0.0531)	(0.0392)	(0.0351)	(0.0321)	(0.0822)	(0.0582)	(0.0473)	(0.0430)
Organic Materials							
0.0000	0.0030	0.0026	0.0016	0.0000	-0.0018	0.0028	0.0048
(.)	(0.0030)	(0.0025)	(0.0023)	(.)	(0.0019)	(0.0031)	(0.0034)
Mittelostschwäbisch							
0.0356*	0.0187	0.0099	-0.0157	-0.0043	0.0449**	0.0393*	0.0461**
(0.0215)	(0.0159)	(0.0157)	(0.0143)	(0.0235)	(0.0228)	(0.0207)	(0.0182)
Nordostschwäbisch							
-0.0133	-0.0150	-0.0197	-0.0131	-0.0613	0.0170	-0.0007	-0.0161
(0.0314)	(0.0217)	(0.0202)	(0.0193)	(0.0519)	(0.0371)	(0.0295)	(0.0264)
Ostfränkisch							
0.0335	-0.0361	-0.0609	-0.0866***	0.1066	0.0256	-0.0018	-0.0144
(0.0647)	(0.0449)	(0.0377)	(0.0329)	(0.1058)	(0.0712)	(0.0566)	(0.0497)
Schwäbisch-Fränkisch							
-0.0623	0.0193	0.0461	0.0626**	0.1240	-0.0800	-0.0219	-0.0033
(0.0527)	(0.0358)	(0.0304)	(0.0270)	(0.0915)	(0.0563)	(0.0441)	(0.0384)
Südfränkisch							
0.0370	0.0592**	0.0684***	0.0674***	0.0410	0.0437	0.0492	0.0603**
(0.0401)	(0.0286)	(0.0237)	(0.0207)	(0.0596)	(0.0416)	(0.0346)	(0.0307)
Südschwäbisch							
0.0000	0.0000	0.0468***	0.0635***	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0353***	-0.0100
(.)	(.)	(0.0112)	(0.0105)	(.)	(.)	(0.0106)	(0.0121)
Westschwäbisch							
-0.0561	0.0474	0.0953**	0.1672***	-0.1534	-0.0583	-0.0287	-0.0188
(0.0775)	(0.0558)	(0.0475)	(0.0420)	(0.1310)	(0.0851)	(0.0691)	(0.0609)
Zentral-Schwäbisch							
0.0256	-0.0935	-0.1858***	-0.2452***	-0.0526	0.0070	-0.0001	-0.0438
(0.0788)	(0.0589)	(0.0510)	(0.0454)	(0.1357)	(0.0871)	(0.0713)	(0.0635)
Observations							
507	831	1009	1161	507	831	1009	1161

Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$.

E.5 Results

E.5.1 Main Results

Figure E.7: Graphics for Regression Discontinuity Design - Demographics

(a) Household Size 1834-1925



(b) Fertility 1858



(c) Sex Ratio



(d) Domestic Worker



(e) Share of Singles - Male



(f) Share of Singles - Female



Note: See Figure 4.

Figure E.8: Graphics for Regression Discontinuity Design - Right of Domicile

(a) No Right of Domicile - Male



(b) No Right of Domicile - Female



Note: See Figure 4.

Table E.4: Share of Females in Local Political Councils - Different Polynomials

Dependent Variable: Share of Females in Local Political Councils 1989-2019										
	Linear Polynomial					Cubic Polynomial				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Partible	0.0454***	0.0358***	0.0376***	0.0340***	0.0345***	0.0437**	0.0167	0.0177	0.0114	0.0132
	(0.0107)	(0.0096)	(0.0096)	(0.0099)	(0.0094)	(0.0220)	(0.0189)	(0.0186)	(0.0192)	(0.0183)
Observations	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828	2828
Adjusted R^2	0.2294	0.3161	0.3283	0.3343	0.3487	0.2306	0.3171	0.3294	0.3351	0.3499
Year Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border Segment		✓	✓				✓	✓		
Geographic Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
Historical and Cultural Controls			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
County Fixed Effects				✓	✓				✓	✓
Population Density and Council Size					✓					✓

Notes: See Table 2.

Figure E.9: Share of Employees in the Working Age Population

(a) Panel A: Full- and Part-time



(b) Panel B: Full-time



(c) Panel C: Part-time



Note: See Figure 4.

Figure E.10: Self-Employment 1961, 1970, 1989, and 2011.



Note: See Figure 4.

Table E.5: Effect of Partible Inheritance on Self-Employment 1961-2011

Dependent Variable: Self-Employment 1961-2011				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Partible	-0.0233**	-0.0171*	-0.0153*	-0.0122
	(0.0101)	(0.0090)	(0.0085)	(0.0083)
Observations	1215	1215	1215	1215
Adjusted R^2	0.4878	0.5694	0.5917	0.6255
Census Year	✓	✓	✓	✓
Border Segment		✓	✓	
Geographic Controls		✓	✓	✓
Historical and Cultural Controls			✓	✓
County Fixed Effects				✓

Notes: See Table 2.

E.5.2 Robustness Checks

Figure E.11: Randomize Border

(a) Household Size 1834-1925



(b) Household Size 1961-2011



(c) Sex Ratio 1834-1925



(d) Domestic Workers 1900



(e) Female Singles 1858-1890



(f) Male Singles 1858-1890



Figure E.11: Randomize Border

(g) No Right of Domicile - Female 1867-1871



(h) No Right of Domicile - Male 1867-1871



(i) Female Share in Local Political Councils 1989-2019



Figure E.12: Randomize Border - Employment and Parental Leave

(a) Full- and Part-time Male-Female



(b) Part-time Female



(c) Full-time Male



(d) Self-Employment



(e) Parental Leave Share



(f) Length Paternal Leave



Figure E.13: Shuffle Distances

(a) Household Size 1834-1925



(b) Household Size 1961-2011



(c) Sex Ratio 1834-1925



(d) Domestic Workers 1900



(e) Female Singles 1858-1890



(f) Male Singles 1858-1890



Figure E.13: Shuffle Distances

(g) No Right of Domicile - Female 1867-1871



(h) No Right of Domicile - Male 1867-1871



(i) Female Share in Local Political Councils 1989-2019



Figure E.14: Shuffle Distances - Employment and Parental Leave

(a) Full- and Part-time Male-Female



(b) Part-time Female



(c) Full-time Male



(d) Self-Employment



(e) Parental Leave Share



(f) Length Paternal Leave