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Gender Gap in Politician Performance and its Determinants

Abstract

Women politicians face barriers that can undermine their performance relative to men. Using original micro-data from Uganda, we test for gender gaps in performance across different job duties in subnational legislatures. We hypothesize, and find, that performance gender gaps are greatest in job duties that require greater peer interaction (legislative duties), while no such gaps exist in more individually-performed duties (e.g., meeting with the electorate, facilitating constituency development). Fine-grained network data reveals women's informal exclusion in politician networks, and this exclusion holds explanatory power in explaining job duties requiring interaction with fellow politicians. Further, qualifications and previous experience also determine part of the gender performance gap in more intricate tasks. Moving forward, advocacy organizations may consider holding trainings and simulations with politicians on performing job duties in ways that encourage cross-gender professional network ties.

JEL-Code: O10, H79, H83, H11

Keywords: Politician performance; informal exclusion; networks, gender gap

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1. Introduction

Political leadership positions have traditionally been controlled by men, and women have faced multiple barriers to entry. However, in recent years, there has been a global increase in the share of women in parliaments and subnational legislators both as a result of affirmative action (e.g., reservations; quotas) and changing norms (Pande and Ford, 2012; Beaman et al., 2009). Given that politicians' performance affects economic outcomes (Jones and Olken, 2005; Besley et al., 2011; Prakash et al., 2019)[1], it is critical to understand whether—and if so, why—female legislators face barriers to conduct their job duties compared to their male counterparts. Answering these questions requires detailed and granular data on performance and individual and contextual explanatory factors, which are not easy to gather in most contexts. Thus, these questions remain understudied, particularly outside of data-rich consolidated democracies.

Taking a critical step in this important area, this paper investigates whether a gender gap in performance exists in different aspects of legally-defined job duties of local politicians in Uganda and – if so – what factors determine the disparity. While most studies of politician performance focus solely on legislative duties, our data allows us to investigate performance gaps across multiple job duties: facilitating constituency development, monitoring public service delivery, participating in lower local government, and legislative activities. Examining multiple job duties beyond legislative duties is important, not only because citizens tend to care deeply about constituency development and service delivery in Global South contexts (Grossman and Slough, 2022), but also to gain an accurate portrait of whether and why gender gaps exist in some duties but not others.

We assess the most common barriers identified by existing scholarship that could explain gender performance gaps: 1) *lag in human capital*, such as education and previous work experience, 3) *lag in social capital*, measured as exclusion in networks, and 3) *political factors*, such as partisan alignment and the constituency size. Of course, these factors can contribute to gender gaps in politicians' performance only to the extent to which gender disparities exist in these factors.

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[1]Better political connections also increase performance (Li et al. (2008))

We make the simple observation that politicians' job duties range widely in terms of what types of efforts or skills are required to perform them. We thus argue that the degree to which gender disparities in human and social capital matter is conditional on the particular job duty under question. Applying this logic to the context at hand, we investigate whether: (1) gender disparities in network centrality are more important predictors of gender gaps in job duties that require more interaction with fellow politicians (e.g., legislative duties); and (2) gender disparities in human capital (e.g., education) are more likely to result in gender gaps in job duties that require more intricate skills. By contrast, gender disparities in political factors (e.g., constituency competitiveness) may affect job performance across the board.

To test this argument, we collect unique network data, background experience and qualifications data, and job duty performance data for over 800 local politicians in Uganda. These politicians represent 49 (of 112) subnational (district) governments, where one-third of seats are reserved for women. Since men hold almost all open-gender seats, we effectively compare performance and gender disparities between reserved-seat woman politicians and open-seat men politicians. To capture performance across all job duties of Ugandan subnational politicians, we use five data sources: (1) plenary meeting minutes (2011-2015, 49 districts), capturing legislative activity; (2) a civil society organization's annual politician performance scorecard (2011-2015, 25 districts), capturing legislative activities, participation in lower local governments and constituency development such as, monitoring public service providers and contact with constituents; and (3) original data on constituency development (20 district governments), namely the extent to which politicians help schools in their constituency to apply for grants; (4) two original in-person surveys capturing politicians' professional and personal network ties, background characteristics, and political knowledge, and (5) a survey of senior bureaucrats (20 districts), capturing their evaluations of politicians.

Consistent with our framework, we find that performance gender gaps of different magnitudes appear across different job duties. On one hand, we find large and significant differences between female and male politicians in legislative activities. An index of legislative activities — based on a local NGO's scorecard — shows a 16% reduction for a female politician compared to the average man. Legislative activities, extracted by the authors from the

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universe of all plenary meeting minutes, exhibits an even larger gender gap: 79% reduction. On the other hand, we do not find any gender differences in meeting with the electorate or facilitating the procurement of constituency development funds. We further find moderate differences favoring men in monitoring public services and participating in lower local government. In summary, we discover mixed findings regarding the gender gap in performance and conclude that measuring only one aspect of a politician's activity — common in almost all past work — can paint a misleading and incomplete assessment of women's performance as politicians.

Turning to mechanisms, we find that female legislators have fewer years of education, are less politically experienced, represent larger and less competitive constituencies, and are less central in politician networks and that these differences drive a large part of the gender gap in performance. More importantly from a theoretical point of view, the contribution of any such factor to gender gap in politician performance depends on the specific domain or job duty. For example, women's peripheral position within the legislators' professional networks explains a large part of the gender gap in activities that require interaction with fellow politicians (43% of the difference in legislative activity and 51% in monitoring public services), but is less consequential in other duties, such as meeting with the electorate. Similarly, the contribution of education disparities to a gender gap in politicians' performance is larger for duties requiring a more intricate understanding of rules and procedures (e.g., monitoring public services, legislative responsibilities).

This paper contributes to three main strands of literature. First, we contribute to research on determinants of politicians' performance in developing countries. Past studies focus in particular on institutional factors that affect politician's performance, such as renumeration (Ferraz and Finan, 2009), levels of political competition (Poulsen and Varjao, 2018; Grossman and Michelitch, 2018), and term limits (Dal Bó and Rossi, 2011; Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017). However, evidence regarding individual and relational traits that influence a politician's performance is limited. We advance this body of work by examining individual, relational and political factors.

Second, we add to the literature that explores gender gaps in performance in, and beyond, the political realm. Past research has explored gender gaps in school performance (Dickerson et al., 2015), as well as in professional careers,

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be it the productivity of lawyers (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017), manufacturing workers (Dong and Zhang, 2009), and entrepreneurs (De Mel et al., 2008). In politics, performance has been generally proxied by outcomes since it is hard to observe it directly. Women are found to be less corrupt (Dollar et al., 2001; Swamy et al., 2001; Bauhr and Charron, 2021) and in some contexts, provide more public goods when they are leaders (Andersen et al., 2008). We measure the performance of female politicians directly, using objective data on legally defined duties, as well as a novel original measure of the extent to which politicians help procure constituency development funds.

Lastly, we also contribute to a strand of literature that uses network data to explain the barriers that women face in exerting political influence.[2] Bjarnegård argues that in clientelistic contexts, it is harder for women to become politicians since the system benefits already powerful and influential men. (Prillaman, 2020) argues that women's political participation is negatively affected by their marginalization in village network. Methodologically, while many such studies suggest the importance of networks, few [e.g., Prillaman (2020) and Cruz and Tolentino (2021)] assemble detailed social network data to test such claims systematically. To the best of our knowledge, the only other work examining the effect of politician network position with network data is Cruz et al. (2020), which shows that politicians' vertical network position affects their electoral mobilization strategy. Our study innovates by studying the effect of politician network position on their performance in legally-defined job duties regarding gender.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the context of the study and the data used to explore the gender gap in performance and its determinants. In section 3, we describe our main hypotheses and the empirical strategy used to answer the questions. Section 4 presents the results and we finalize in section 5 with the conclusion and discussion of the results.

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[2]Networks have been extensively analyzed to explain diffusion of agricultural practices. Several papers identify gender differences in network centrality and informal exclusion in this context (Beaman and Dillon, 2018; BenYishay et al., 2020).

2. Context

We examine the job duty performance of Ugandan woman politicians, elected via reserved seats, as compared to men politicians elected from open seats, in subnational (district) governments. Below the central government, Uganda has three subnational government tiers: district (LC5), sub-county (LC3), and village (LC1). District politicians (councilors) and bureaucrats are jointly responsible to develop annual budgets and work-plans for public service delivery. District councils are further vested with the power to make laws, regulate and monitor public service delivery, formulate comprehensive development plans based on local priorities, and supervise the district bureaucracy.

The study area consists of 50 (of 112) district local governments from all of Uganda's four regions. In 25 districts, a leading non-partisan civil society organization (CSO)—Advocates Coalition for Development and the Environment (ACODE)—produces an annual performance scorecard for each politician serving at the district council. The remaining 25 districts were selected by matching non-ACODE districts with districts in which ACODE operates. District councils in the sample have, on average, 23 politicians.[3] See Supplemental Information (SI) Appendix A.1 for a map of the study area and SI Appendix A.2 on the CSO's selection of districts and the matching details.[4]

District politicians, whether elected in open-seat or women's reserved seats, have four key job duties, as stipulated in the Local Government Act: *legislative* (e.g., passing motions in plenary, committee work), *lower local government participation* (e.g., attending LC3 meetings), *monitoring public service provision* (e.g., visiting schools and clinics to ensure service delivery standards are met), and *contact with and service to the electorate* (e.g., meeting with constituents and community-based organizations and providing constituency services).

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[3]By comparison, the Ninth Parliament (2011-2016) had 238 constituency MPs, 112 Women (district) MPs and 25 Indirect seats (e.g., youth, PWD and military).

[4]We do not find that results are different across ACODE and non-ACODE districts — results available upon request.

Uganda is a semi-democracy at the national level. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) has controlled the presidency since 1986 and held about 70% of national and subnational legislative seats in 2011. At the national level, the NRM's hegemony has been built on a combination of genuine popular support, intimidation of opposition, and misuse of state resources to support patronage networks. During the study period, NRM did not engage in widespread election rigging. At subnational levels of government during the study period, there is heterogeneity in the level of political competition with opposition parties and elections and/or primaries can be rather competitive. In that regard, Ugandan district politicians have an incentive to perform well, since their performance significantly affects their reelection prospect (Grossman et al., 2021).

3. Data

3.1. Measuring politician's performance

We use the following data sources to assess possible gaps in performance between men and women politicians across different job duties at the district level in Uganda:

Plenary Meeting Minutes. We use plenary session meeting minutes to construct performance measures of legislative activities. Since Ugandan districts governments do not make meeting minutes available online, we dispatched local research assistants to all district headquarters to scan hardcopy transcripts over the 2011-2015 period. On average, we obtained 20 meeting minutes per district for the 2011-2015 cycle (with range of 2–41), for a the total of 1,009 plenary session meetings in 49 districts.[5] We code for each politician-meeting dyad: (a) the number of *motions* proposed; (b) the number of *bills* sponsored; (c) the number of *presentations* made; and (d) the number of *remarks* made during the session. We then normalize actions by the number of meetings. Finally, we calculate (e) a summary measure of legislative performance *total actions* per meeting, which sums the legislative actions (a)-(d). See SI Appendix A.3 for more detail and descriptive statistics.

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[5]One district (Nebbi) refused to share the minutes with the research team, pointing to its bylaws that indicate that meeting minutes are not shareable with the general public.

Performance Scorecard. We leverage ACODE's annual scorecard available in 25 districts for each politician over a 4-years period to examine politicians' performance in all four (legally-defined) job duties. One advantage of ACODE's scorecard is that in addition to legislative duties, it captures performance in three additional duties: *lower local government participation*, *monitoring public service points*, and *contact with the electorate*. ACODE's scorecard is based on administrative data and does not rely on citizen's attitudes or opinions, and is constructed using local researchers who collect the underlying data in reference to the previous fiscal year (June-July). The first scorecard of the 2011-2016 term covered July 2011 to June 2012, and the last scorecard covered July 2014 to June 2015.[6] Wide variation exists in scores which range between 0 and 100. See SI Appendix A.4 for more detail on the scorecard methodology.

Facilitating School Improvement Grants. To measure politician performance in constituency development, we designed a unique behavioral task in collaboration with District Education Offices in the study area. The task mimics a common practice in which politicians help to secure development funds to their constituency in collaboration with the district bureaucracy. Specifically, district council politicians were given an opportunity to help primary schools in their constituency to apply for a grant to support school improvements. The grant's value, which was advertised after the politician survey in 20 study area districts, was about 100 USD. The application process involved mobilizing the school principal and parents and teachers association (PTA) representatives who had to sign the application and accompanied budget to deem an application valid. Politicians could only submit one application per school in their constituency.[7] Only valid applications entered a public lottery carried out at the district headquarters. The number of grants per district was proportional to the population and ranged between two and five, to ensure equal probability of winning across politicians. We received a total of 1,662 out of 4,585 possible applications and 61 grants were allocated. The outcome of interest here is the number of school grant applications fa-

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[6]One exception is Agago district where ACODE began operating only in 2012.

[7]Schools could apply twice, given the overlap in the regular and special woman constituencies.

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cilitated out of the total number of schools in a politician's constituency. See SI Appendix A.5 for more detail and descriptive statistics.[8]

In-Person Politician Surveys. To collect data on politicians' human capital (e.g., education), social capital (network ties), political knowledge, and subjective peer evaluations, we carried out two original politician surveys, one at the start and one at the end of the term. At the start of term in 2012, we surveyed all politicians elected to serve in 20 districts councils, while at the end of term in 2016, we surveyed all politicians from 50 district councils. Committee chairs were further asked to provide an assessment of the performance of committee members. Descriptive statistics are listed in the online appendix — on background qualifications and political factors in SI Appendix A.6, for subjective peer and committee chair evaluations in SI Appendix A.7, and for network position in SI Appendix A.9.

In-Person Bureaucrat Surveys. To collect data on the perceptions of district bureaucrats, we conducted in-person interviews with senior civil servants in district health, education, and general administration offices. District bureaucrats have unique insight into politicians' efforts and effectiveness in job duties related to monitoring public services and constituency development. Bureaucrats in the original sample of 20 districts were interviewed between June and August 2015 and were asked to assess politicians along four performance dimensions, using a five-point scale. We averaged the ratings on these dimensions across surveyed bureaucrats to create a single composite index (Cronbach's alpha = 0.91). See SI Appendix A.8 for descriptive statistics.

3.2. Measuring barriers for performance

In other to evaluate how effectively undertaking specific job duties may vary in (a) the level of interaction with fellow politicians they entail, (b) the importance of background qualifications, and (c) political factors, we construct the following scales.

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[8]Results are similar using alternative operationalizations: total applications facilitated, and a binary variable for facilitating at least one application — see SI Appendix B.1.

Informal Exclusion. We proxy informal exclusion (i.e., lag in social capital) using the network position of politicians within the legislature. Measures of network centrality (such as degree, betweenness and eigenvector) capture the set of ties that can help agents (in this case, politicians) wield influence and thus be more effective. Unlike covariates that precede the electoral term (e.g., education, experience), network ties can change over time. We thus collected network data both at the electoral term start (20 district councils) and at the term's end (all 50 district councils in the study area). We measure both personal and professional ties because politicians are likely connected differently along these two relationship dimensions. Personal ties in legislatures, for example, have been noted as more salient in the US context (Ringe et al., 2017), but it is unclear ex-ante which type of relationship matters most for politician performance in this study context.

At term start, district politicians were read the names of all fellow politicians in their legislature, and were asked to indicate for each one if they consulted them when undertaking their job duties (*professional network*) and if they consider them as friends (*personal network*). When we repeated this process in the middle of the term, politicians indicated almost everyone in their legislature such that there was little, if any, variation.[9] Thus, at end of term, we construct networks by using instead a standard name generator technique (Knoke and Yang, 2008). Here, we asked politicians to name up to five co-politicians for each type of relationship.

For each politician, we then calculate core centrality measures, such as indegree and eigenvector, for each of the two network ties. *Indegree* centrality measures the number of links a politician "receives" from other politicians. Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the influence of a politician in a network. Specifically, connections to high-scoring nodes contribute more to the score of a node than equal connections to low-scoring nodes. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.2 illustrate the professional ties and personal ties at term's end on the example of 4 of the 50 district councils. See SI Appendix A.9 for additional information regarding the procedures for collecting and coding the network data, as well as descriptive statistics, network figures, and robust-

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[9]Ringe et al. (2017) point out this difficulty in studying legislative networks longitudinally.

ness checks for alternative centrality measures — betweenness, and closeness.

Figure 1: Professional Networks (Term End). Men politicians in blue, RS-women politicians in red. Blue arrows connect between men politicians, red arrows connect between woman politicians, and back arrows connect politicians from opposite sex.

Figure 2: Personal Networks (Term End). Men politicians in blue, RS-women politicians in red. Blue arrows connect between men politicians, red arrows connect between woman politicians, and back arrows connect politicians from opposite sex

Qualifications (human capital). We proxy qualifications using *edu-*

cation, a three-category variable capturing below secondary, secondary and post-secondary education; and *number of terms*, a continuous variable of the number of terms a politician has previously served at the district-level, which captures political experience. We measure two other covariates that can affect politician performance: *wealth*, using two context-appropriate binary indicators (household car and motorcycle ownership); and a continuous measure of *age*, which can be consequential given that in this context, deference is accorded to elders.

Political Factors. We explore possible disparities in formal leadership position, partisanship and constituency characteristics. *Formal leadership* is a binary variable that is equal one for politicians that either serve as the LC5 Speaker or who chair one of the district council's standing committees. For partisanship, *NRM*, indicates whether a politician caucuses with Uganda's ruling party. For constituency competitiveness, we calculate *margin of victory*: the difference in vote share between the incumbent and the runner up in the previous (2011) elections. Given RS-women's constituencies are larger than men's, on average, we construct the variable *constituency size*, measured as the number of registered voters in a politician's constituency. These last two variables were culled from Uganda's Electoral Commission.[10]

4. Hypotheses

We hypothesize that the gender gap in various activities will be of different magnitude depending on both the ties and skills that help to perform a politician's duty. Thus, we distinguish duties by the level of interaction with other politicians and the level of complexity and know-how that they involve.

Among all job duties, legislative activities require the highest level of interaction with fellow politicians, as well as the most intricate skills in order to be performed effectively. Politicians propose bills and motions, remark on debated issues, and prepare presentations on topical policy areas during plenary sessions according to rules of order. Such legislative duties require

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[10]We also measure *desire leave politics*, a binary variable indicating a politician no longer aspires to run for reelection. We treat this measure with care since it is 'post-treatment' and not a covariate.

significant interactions with fellow politicians to push legislation forward. Thus their performance is likely affected by formal leadership positions and lag in social capital (informal exclusion). Further, rules surrounding legislative activities are fairly intricate. We argue, following Johnson et al. (2003), that performance in more intricate duties is likely to be positively related to human capital (qualifications).

Contact with the electorate and constituency development do not require interaction with fellow politicians or intricate skills, and should not be affected by gender disparities in qualifications or network exclusion among fellow politicians. Politicians are expected to meet regularly with constituents to hear their requests and then represent constituents' interests vis-à-vis fellow politicians and the bureaucracy. Further, NGOs or foreign aid donors provide opportunities for constituency development in improving public services, and politicians play a role in securing such funds in their constituency, often times in collaboration with the district bureaucracy.

Monitoring public service delivery requires an intermediate level of skills. Politicians are expected to report public service delivery violations by auditing service providers and ongoing development projects in their constituency. Thus, politicians must know what public service delivery standards are, be able to assess compliance, and report violations to the bureaucracy — a series of activities likely aided by qualifications. Network position vis-à-vis fellow politicians also arguably would have little effect here.

Lower local government participation does not require a high level of skills or interaction with fellow politicians. Lower local government participation simply means being present — attending the plenary sessions in order to be in tune with the deliberations taking place at the lower local government tiers within one's constituency. This politician duty does not require high levels of human capital.

Thus, we hypothesize that gender disparities in informal (network) exclusion and formal leadership positions affect gender gaps in legislative duties, but likely not other duties. Gender disparities in background qualifications, we expect, will drive gender gaps in legislative duties and monitoring public services. Gender disparities in these factors will not be as consequential in contact with the electorate and constituency development, or lower local

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government participation.

5. Empirical Strategy

The analysis proceeds in three steps. First we examine whether gender gaps in politician performance exist and whether they differ across job duties. To answer those questions, we estimate the following regression model for each job duty performance measure:

$$Performance_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RSWoman_{ij} + \theta_j + \epsilon_i \qquad (1)$$

where Y_{ij} is a performance outcome, $RSWoman_{ij}$ is an indicator equal to 1 for RS-woman politicians from district j, and θ_j captures district fixed effects, which effectively allows us to compare women and men politicians from the same districts. We cluster standard errors at the politician level and standardized outcome variables to allow comparability of coefficient magnitude. We are initially interested in the relationship between gender and politicians' performance brought about through any mechanism and therefore do not control for any characteristics which could result from, rather than proceed, gender (see also, Gottlieb et al. (2018)). Further, we examine whether gender gaps in performance (captured by β_1) are significantly different from one another across job duties.

The second step is testing for gender disparities in politician network centrality (i.e., informal inclusion and exclusion), background qualifications, and political factors. We use a similar model as above to estimate whether there are gaps in disparities across these factors.

$$Covariate_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RSWoman_{ij} + \theta_j + \epsilon_i \qquad (2)$$

The third step is to examine whether any gender gaps in the performance of certain job duties are explained by any gender disparities we may find in network centrality, background qualifications, and political factors. Of course, if there is no gender disparity in a covariate, it cannot explain a gender gap in performance. Thus, for each covariate in which we detect a gender disparity, we will add in one-by-one to the base gender gap model. Formally:

$$Performance_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 RSWoman_{ij} + \beta_2 Covariate{ij} + \theta_j + \epsilon_i \qquad (3)$$

We will examine whether β_2 is significant, which suggests that some variation in performance is explained by the included covariate, as well as the magnitude of change in β_1 towards 0 (compared to the model without the covariate), indicating that the inclusion of the covariate "explains" a portion of the gender gap. Covariates that are both significant and reduce the gender gap substantially arguably have the most explanatory power. When discussing results, we refrain from using causal language given that both gender and the included covariates are not randomly assigned and may be correlated with unobservables.

6. Results

6.1. Performance Gaps

We first report the results of the analyses on the gender gap in performance. For the analysis, we restrict the sample to those politicians for whom we have non-missing data in all measures of performance — 820 politicians. In SI Appendix B.2, we present equivalent results for the unrestricted sample.[11]

Table B.36 reports the coefficient on the RS-woman indicator (column 3) for all outcomes across all job duties (rows): legislative activities as captured in meeting minutes (Panel A); ACODE's scorecard (Panel B); school grant application activity (Panel C), and subjective evaluations of peers, committe chairs, and bureaucrats (Panel D).[12]

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[11]While the unrestricted sample has larger number of observations per outcome (compared to the restricted ample), it is hard to compare across outcomes since the sample itself is not constant.

[12]Meeting minutes outcomes are weighted by the share of meetings politicians attended. SI Appendix B.1 shows similar results when we do not weight the data by the share of meetings the politician attended, as well as when we restrict the sample to the 19 districts we have both baseline network data and meeting minutes information (weighted and unweighted).

Table 1: Politician Performance by Gender

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Panel A: Plenary Session Minutes					
Total Actions (Sum Index)	-0.219***	(0.081)	-0.490***	(0.054)	820 (49)
Motions	0.008	(0.126)	-0.247***	(0.055)	820 (49)
Bills	-0.180***	(0.032)	-0.141**	(0.065)	820 (49)
Presentations	-0.255***	(0.077)	-0.225***	(0.061)	820 (49)
Remarks	-0.323***	(0.067)	-0.569***	(0.055)	820 (49)
Share meeting attended	0.049	(0.125)	-0.067*	(0.039)	820 (49)
Panel B: ACODE scorecard					
Total Score (Sum Index)	-0.371***	(0.085)	-0.399***	(0.068)	374 * 4 yrs (25)
Legislative	0.401***	(0.062)	-0.499***	(0.058)	374 * 4 yrs (25)
Meeting Electorate	-0.503***	(0.123)	-0.048	(0.062)	374 * 4 yrs (25)
Monitoring	-0.462***	(0.071)	-0.311***	(0.064)	374 * 4 yrs (25)
Lower Local Government	-0.104	(0.099)	-0.222***	(0.059)	374 * 4 yrs (25)
Panel C: School grant applications					
Apps/# schools	0.200	(0.232)	0.077	(0.135)	284 (19)
Panel D: Subjective Evaluations					
Peer Politician Assessments	3.114***	(0.125)	-0.382***	(0.080)	271 (25)
Bureaucrat Assessments	0.215***	(0.076)	-0.297***	(0.042)	733 (49)
CommitteeChair Assessments	8.184***	(0.638)	-0.790***	(0.198)	378 (49)

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at the politician level. Standardized outcome variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $*p < 0.10$, $**p < 0.05$, $***p < 0.01$. In Panel A, Session minutes are weighted by the share of meetings politicians attended. In Panel B, we use four annual scorecards; the number of unique councilors is 374. In the observations column, the number in parentheses refers to the number of districts.

We find support in Table B.36 for the core hypothesis that gender gaps vary across politicians' job duties. First, we do not find evidence of gender gaps in meeting the electorate (Panel B *meeting electorate*) and facilitating *school grant applications* (Panel C). Since voters place a high value on these constituency development job duties, this is an important finding.

Second, we find evidence of moderate gender gaps favoring men in monitoring public services (Panel B *monitoring*, a .31 sd gap, or 29% lower than mean values for men politicians). Subjective evaluations from bureaucrats (Panel D) corroborate this finding. We also find moderate gender gaps in participating in lower local government (Panel B *lower local government*, a

.22 sd gap, or 18.5% lower than the mean men's score).

Third, we find relatively large gender gaps favoring men in legislative activities. This is the case whether legislative activities are measured using plenary meeting minutes (Panel A *Total Score* - a 0.49 sd gap, or 79% lower than the mean men's score), or ACODE's scorecard (Panel B *legislative duties* - a 0.4 sd gap, or reduction of 15.6% compared to men politicians' mean score). Politician peer evaluations (0.38 sd) and committee chair evaluations (0.79 sd) corroborate these finding (Panel D).

Overall, the findings present a mixed picture of gender gaps in performance across different job duties. Using pairwise coefficient tests, the differences in the size of these gaps across job duties are by and large statistically significant for the majority of pairs of job duties compared.[13] The findings suggest that different incentives and barriers likely exist across RS-women and men in different job duties, which produce gaps of different sizes. Had we considered only a single job duty (in most studies, legislative duties), the study could have reached a misleading conclusion.

6.2. Gender Disparities in Network Position, Background Qualifications, and Political Factors

We turn to examine whether gender disparities exist in factors discussed above that may play a role in these gaps. Recall that to test whether significant differences in these factors exist across RS-women and men politicians, we regress each covariate separately on a RS-woman indicator and district fixed effects, as described in Equation 2.

Table 2 reports the findings using the sample of 49 districts,[14] save for

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[13]However, we cannot reject the null that gender gaps for legislative activities and monitoring outcomes are of different magnitude. We also cannot reject the null that gender gaps are significantly different for lower local government participation (where only a small gap was detected) and contact with the electorate (where no gap of statistical significance was found. Of course, we have limited statistical power in the reduced sample of the scorecard outcomes (25 districts).

[14]Findings are similar when restricting the sample to the 19 districts we have both baseline network and meeting minutes information (SI **??**) and when using the expansive

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network measures at term start, where we have 19 districts (omitting the 1 district that did not produce meeting minutes). We find disparities between RS-women and men politicians in some but not all individual covariates and political factors. RS-women have, on average, lower education levels (60% less likely to complete post-secondary education) and are less wealthy (44% less likely to own a motor vehicle). RS-women also represent less competitive and significantly larger constituencies. Conversely, we find no discernible differences by politician gender with respect to age, political experience and partisanship.

Moving to the measures of exclusion, we find that 12% of women politicians but 22% of men politicians hold some formal leadership position, and that this difference is statistically significant. As for informal exclusion—which recall we proxy using social network position—we find again significant gender-based disparities in politicians' centrality scores. RS-women are less central (i.e., more marginal) in networks defined by *professional ties* at both the start and the end of the electoral term. And while they are somewhat more peripheral in *personal ties* at the start of the term, this is not the case at the end of term. Consistent with the idea that network ties are sticky (Carrington et al., 2005), we find a high correlation from start to end in professional networks in the 20 legislatures for which we have data in both periods.[15]

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unrestricted sample (SI Appendix B.2).

[15]As mentioned above, network data was collected using different elicitation methods at the start and end of the term. Thus, to compare politicians' network position across time, we further transform the centrality measures into a within-legislature ranking at start and at end, respectively. In SI Appendix A.9, we provide lowess scatterplots of the professional and personal in-degree centrality ranking.

Table 2: Gender Gaps in Politician Characteristics

	Constant	SE	RS-Women Coefficient	SE	Observations
Background Characteristics					
Education level	2.681***	(0.207)	-0.572***	(0.058)	820 (49)
Below Sec	-0.424*	(0.252)	0.619***	(0.072)	820 (49)
Secondary	0.198	(0.339)	0.143*	(0.078)	820 (49)
Post Secondary	0.552**	(0.263)	-0.613***	(0.066)	820 (49)
Age	-0.513*	(0.268)	0.029	(0.075)	820 (49)
Wealth	-0.236	(0.193)	-0.385***	(0.070)	820 (49)
Number of terms	0.121	(0.232)	0.105	(0.077)	820 (49)
Political Factors					
Formal leadership position	0.423***	(0.136)	-0.099***	(0.027)	820 (49)
NRM	0.119	(0.233)	0.067	(0.073)	820 (49)
Margin of Victory 2011	-0.428***	(0.144)	0.152**	(0.067)	820 (49)
Constituency size (N. Voters)	-0.913***	(0.108)	0.797***	(0.057)	820 (49)
Run Unopposed	-0.451***	(0.042)	0.229***	(0.072)	820 (49)
Informal Exclusion (TERM START)					
In-degree centrality					
Professional Network	1.232**	(0.560)	-0.419***	(0.092)	274 (19)
Personal Network	2.698***	(0.322)	-0.257***	(0.079)	274 (19)
Eigenvectorcentrality					
Professional Network	0.815***	(0.298)	-0.406***	(0.120)	274 (19)
Personal Network	1.050***	(0.284)	-0.317***	(0.110)	274 (19)
Informal Exclusion (TERM END)					
In-degree centrality					
Professional Network	1.129***	(0.318)	-0.555***	(0.071)	820 (49)
Personal Network	0.943*	(0.534)	0.230***	(0.072)	820 (49)
Eigenvector centrality					
Professional Network	0.911***	(0.241)	-0.432***	(0.067)	820 (49)
Personal Network	0.083	(0.249)	0.243***	(0.074)	820 (49)

Regression results are reported by row and not column. Regressions include district fixed effects and variables are standardized to facilitate comparison. Standard errors are clustered at the politician level. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. In the observations column, the number in parentheses refers to the number of districts.

6.3. Which Gender Disparities Drive Which Performance Gaps

To examine which disparities are contributing to which gender gap in politician job duty performance, we regress the performance outcome variables for which we find significant gender gaps—legislative activities, monitoring public services, and lower local government participation—on a RS-woman indicator and covariates (one at a time) for which a gender disparity exists (equation 3) reported in Table 2). These covariates include: wealth and education (the proxy for human capital), formal leadership (proxy for formal exclusion), network centrality (proxy for informal exclusion), constituency competitiveness, and constituency size.

For network centrality measures, we separately include indegree and eigenvector centrality, at the start and end of term. Network measures computed for the term start are available for only 20 legislatures, but have the advantage that they are measured prior in time to performance outcome. Network measures computed for the term end have the advantage that they were collected for all 50 legislatures. Of course, networks and performance could mutually reinforce over time (Ringe et al., 2017). While we note a high correlation of network centrality from term start to end, we nonetheless treat the term end measures with a grain of salt.

In Tables 3 and 4 we report the results of these regressions by row, indicating the name of the included covariate in the first column. For consistency, here too we drop from all analyses the one district (Nebbi) for which we are missing meeting minutes data; results for the other data sources including that district are almost identical and available upon request. Table 3 reports results from the scorecard performance measures in the 19 districts: legislative, lower local government participation, and monitoring public services. In Table 4, we report results from the meeting minutes, with the top panel reporting results for the same sample of 19 districts and the bottom panel reporting results for the full sample of 49 districts. In the former, we can additionally report the results of network measures from the term start.

In both tables, in the first row we report the estimate of the RS-women coefficient without any covariate, along with the constant and the number of observations. In each subsequent row, we report these estimates alongside the estimate of the additionally included covariate coefficient and standard

error, as well as the percentage change in the RS-woman coefficient (next to last column) and absolute change in RS-woman coefficient (last column) as a result of the inclusion of the said covariate. The last row in each panel shows results from a saturated model that includes all covariates in the same regression, reporting just the RS-woman coefficient for brevity.

Informal Exclusion

Turning attention to our hypothesis that network gender gap disparities may drive gender gaps in legislative activities, we find that professional networks (as captured by either indegree or eigenvector centrality) are an important contributor, while personal networks are not. Professional networks, at both term start and term end, are significantly associated with performance and contribute to a substantively large drop in the RS-woman coefficient. For example, in Table 3 on the scorecard measures, including the end of term professional indegree network measure as a covariate reduces the RS-woman coefficient in legislative activities by 25%. In Table 4, including the end of term professional indegree network measure as a covariate reduces the RS-woman coefficient in the legislative activities according to the meeting minutes by 43% in the reduced sample and 33% in the full sample (indegree measured at term start - by 18% in the restricted sample).

Professional network gender disparities also matter for monitoring public services at term start and end, and for lower local government at term end. Specifically, including professional network centrality as a covariate reduces the RS-woman coefficient in monitoring public services component by 51% at term end and 15% at term start, and in lower local government performance by 46% at term end. Exclusion might matter here because 'know-how' information can be shared between politicians about how to monitor frontline providers effectively as well as interact with bureaucrats. In addition, it is possible that centrality in politician networks is more broadly reflective of connections to the district government line ministries.

Table 3: Legislative Activities from Scorecard (top panel), Lower Local Government Participation (middle panel) and Monitoring Public Services (bottom panel) - Sample 19 districts.

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Covariate coefficient	SE	Observations	% Change	Absolute Change
Legislative activities (scorecard component)									
None	0.477***	(0.065)	-0.482***	(0.066)			1036		
Education	0.414***	(0.068)	-0.421***	(0.069)	0.099***	(0.032)	1036	-12.7%	-0.06
Wealth	0.490***	(0.067)	-0.444***	(0.069)	0.074**	(0.034)	1036	-7.9%	-0.04
Margin of Victory	0.474***	(0.067)	-0.488***	(0.066)	-0.016	(0.033)	1036	+1.2%	+0.01
Size Constituency	0.566***	(0.075)	-0.555***	(0.068)	0.089**	(0.043)	1036	+15.00%	+0.07
Leadership position	0.442***	(0.066)	-0.468***	(0.066)	0.074*	(0.033)	1036	-3.0%	-0.01
Start Professional InD	0.555***	(0.067)	-0.423***	(0.067)	0.165***	(0.043)	1036	-12.3%	0.06
Start Personal InD	0.508***	(0.065)	-0.437***	(0.067)	0.189***	(0.049)	1036	-9.3%	-0.04
Start Professional EV	0.484***	(0.062)	-0.453***	(0.068)	0.068*	(0.039)	1036	-6.0%	-0.03
Start Personal EV	0.518***	(0.068)	-0.448***	(0.066)	0.113***	(0.038)	1036	-7.2%	-0.03
End Professional InD	0.463***	(0.065)	-0.361***	(0.067)	0.185***	(0.033)	1036	-25.1%	-0.12
End Personal InD	0.476***	(0.064)	-0.491***	(0.066)	0.043	(0.033)	1036	+1.7%	+0.01
End Professional EV	0.423***	(0.070)	-0.422***	(0.066)	0.144***	(0.033)	1036	-12.5%	-0.06
End Personal EV	0.475***	(0.066)	-0.484***	(0.065)	0.004	(0.030)	1036	+0.4%	+0.00
All	0.561***	(0.096)	-0.255***	(0.068)			1036	-47.0%	-0.23
Lower Local Government participation (scorecard component)									
None	-0.174*	(0.101)	-0.189***	(0.072)			1036		
Education	-0.162	(0.102)	-0.200***	(0.074)	-0.019	(0.037)	1036	+6.1%	+0.01
Wealth	-0.162*	(0.097)	-0.155**	(0.071)	0.067	(0.042)	1036	-18.1%	-0.03
Margin of Victory	-0.175*	(0.102)	-0.190***	(0.072)	-0.002	(0.044)	1036	+0.4%	0.00
Size Constituency	-0.061	(0.106)	-0.281***	(0.079)	0.113**	(0.044)	1036	+48.7%	+0.09
Leadership position	-0.197	(0.108)	-0.179*	(0.072)	0.050	(0.035)	1036	-5.1%	-0.01
Start Professional InD	-0.153	(0.107)	-0.173**	(0.074)	0.045	(0.057)	1036	-8.6%	-0.02
Start Personal InD	-0.172*	(0.102)	-0.185**	(0.072)	0.015	(0.059)	1036	-1.9%	0.00
Start Professional EV	-0.170	(0.105)	-0.173**	(0.071)	0.036	(0.040)	1036	-8.1%	-0.02
Start Personal EV	-0.164	(0.104)	-0.180**	(0.071)	0.028	(0.044)	1036	-4.5%	-0.01
End Professional InD	-0.184*	(0.103)	-0.101	(0.073)	0.134***	(0.040)	1036	-46.4%	-0.09
End Personal InD	-0.176*	(0.102)	-0.199***	(0.071)	0.055	(0.037)	1036	+5.6%	+0.01
End Professional EV	-0.242	(0.099)	-0.112	(0.070)	0.183***	(0.037)	1036	-40.8%	-0.08
End Personal EV	-0.206	(0.100)	-0.232***	(0.073)	0.089***	(0.032)	1036	+23.1%	+0.04
All	-0.170	(0.123)	-0.153*	(0.085)			1036	-19.2%	-0.04
Monitoring public services (scorecard component)									
None	-0.443***	(0.077)	-0.276***	(0.079)			1036		
Education	-0.501***	(0.082)	-0.219**	(0.086)	0.092**	(0.043)	1036	-20.6%	-0.06
Wealth	-0.416***	(0.079)	-0.199**	(0.079)	0.149***	(0.044)	1036	-27.8%	-0.08
Margin of Victory	-0.452***	(0.077)	-0.276***	(0.080)	-0.030	(0.043)	1036	+0.3%	0.00
Size Constituency	-0.403***	(0.095)	-0.308***	(0.088)	0.040	(0.057)	1036	-11.8%	-0.03
Leadership position	-0.470***	(0.082)	-0.264***	(0.079)	0.057	(0.047)	1036	-4.0%	-0.01
Start Professional InD	-0.387***	(0.083)	-0.233***	(0.082)	0.118**	(0.056)	1036	-15.4%	-0.04
Start Personal InD	-0.422 ***	(0.079)	-0.246***	(0.079)	0.124**	(0.063)	1036	-10.6%	-0.03
Start Professional EV	-0.428***	(0.080)	-0.218***	(0.081)	0.136***	(0.039)	1036	-20.8%	-0.06
Start Personal EV	-0.417***	(0.079)	-0.254***	(0.081)	0.071	(0.050)	1036	-7.8%	-0.02
End Professional InD	-0.459***	(0.081)	-0.135**	(0.079)	0.216***	(0.042)	1036	-51.1%	-0.14
End Personal InD	-0.445***	(0.079)	-0.293***	(0.078)	0.089***	(0.044)	1036	+6.3%	+0.02
End Professional EV	-0.528***	(0.084)	-0.179**	(0.076)	0.229***	(0.042)	1036	-34.9%	-0.10
End Personal EV	-0.481***	(0.076)	-0.328***	(0.080)	0.107***	(0.037)	1036	+19.1%	+0.05
All	-0.552***	(0.119)	0.006	(0.091)			1036	-102.2%	-0.28

Table reports the information for each regression by row and not by column. The regression includes district and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table 4: Legislative Activities Index from Meeting Minutes in 19 districts (top panel) and same in 49 districts (bottom panel).

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Covariate coefficient	SE	Observations	% Change	Absolute Change
Legislative activities index (meeting minutes) - 19 districts									
None	0.261	(0.159)	-0.550***	(0.105)			274		
Education	0.179	(0.160)	-0.472***	(0.108)	0.127**	(0.053)	274	-14.1%	-0.08
Wealth	0.273*	(0.158)	-0.520***	(0.101)	0.058	(0.052)	274	-5.4%	-0.03
Margin of Victory	0.248	(0.160)	-0.553***	(0.106)	-0.046	(0.055)	274	+0.5%	0.00
Size Constituency	0.354**	(0.175)	-0.622***	(0.131)	0.092*	(0.055)	274	+13.2%	+0.07
Leadership position	0.202	(0.148)	-0.529***	(0.105)	0.146***	(0.050)	274	-3.8%	- 0.02
Start Professional InD	0.380***	(0.143)	-0.444***	(0.103)	0.253***	(0.080)	274	-19.3%	-0.11
Start Personal InD	0.306**	(0.141)	-0.480***	(0.105)	0.271***	(0.087)	274	-12.7%	-0.07
Start Professional EV	0.284*	(0.151)	-0.478***	(0.104)	0.176***	(0.067)	274	-13.0%	-0.07
Start Personal EV	0.294*	(0.159)	-0.520***	(0.106)	0.095	(0.061)	274	-5.5%	-0.03
End Professional InD	0.227*	(0.134)	-0.312***	(0.090)	0.343***	(0.068)	274	-43.2%	-0.24
End Personal InD	0.261*	(0.158)	-0.566***	(0.109)	0.079	(0.054)	274	+3.0%	+0.01
End Professional EV	0.139	(0.148)	-0.425***	(0.098)	0.256***	(0.055)	274	-22.6%	-0.12
End Personal EV	0.263	(0.160)	-0.546***	(0.114)	-0.007	(0.050)	274	-0.6%	-0.00
All	0.356**	(0.152)	-0.152	(0.116)			274	-72.4%	-0.40
Legislative activities index (meeting minutes) - 49 districts									
None	-0.219***	(0.081)	-0.490***	(0.054)			820		
Education	-0.262***	(0.080)	-0.418***	(0.057)	0.107***	(0.026)	820	-14.7%	-0.07
Wealth	-0.206**	(0.087)	-0.471***	(0.053)	0.054**	(0.026)	820	-3.9%	-0.02
Margin of Victory	-0.214**	(0.083)	-0.494***	(0.055)	0.009	(0.030)	820	+0.8%	0.00
Size of Constituency	-0.209**	(0.087)	-0.498***	(0.065)	0.011	(0.030)	820	+1.5%	+0.01
Leadership position	-0.276***	(0.105)	-0.467***	(0.055)	0.092***	(0.027)	820	-4.8%	-0.02
End Professional InD	-0.550***	(0.127)	-0.327***	(0.049)	0.293***	(0.030)	820	-33.2%	-0.16
End Personal InD	-0.322***	(0.108)	-0.514***	(0.055)	0.109***	(0.028)	820	+4.9%	+0.02
End Professional EV	-0.428***	(0.106)	-0.390***	(0.053)	0.229***	(0.029)	820	-20.5%	-0.10
End Personal EV	-0.224***	(0.082)	-0.503***	(0.056)	0.056*	(0.032)	820	+2.6%	+0.01
All	-0.569***	(0.138)	-0.239***	(0.059)			820	-51.2%	-0.25

Table reports the information for each regression by row and not by column. Regression includes district and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

While highly correlated, we note that the magnitude of the reduction is typically larger for the measure of professional networks at the end of the term than the start. While we do not want to put too much weight into the evidence, the larger magnitude at term end is consistent with the idea that some mutual reinforcement of networks and performance takes place over the term. Importantly, adding personal network centrality measures do not reduce the RS-woman coefficient, and are therefore not a factor contributing to politician performance gender gap.

The finding that RS-women are less central in professional networks and that such marginalization or exclusion are associated with performance gender gaps in interactive duties is an important finding, and consistent with our hypothesis. Additional survey evidence shows that women, more so than

men politicians, are aware of how women's exclusion affects performance (see SI Appendix C for survey question wording and analysis). When asked what barriers RS-women face to better perform, RS-women were significantly more likely to mention discrimination/harassment by colleagues (21% RS-women, 6% men). By contrast, men politicians are significantly more likely to argue that traditional societal/family gender roles (37% RS-women, 47% men) and low self esteem (26% RS-women, 45% men) are what holding RS-women politicians back. Thus, men and women politicians have different perceptions with respect to the main barriers that RS-women's face.[16]

Unlike informal exclusion, formal leadership appears to play only a small role (noting that leadership is defined here as the district council speaker or the chairperson of a standing committee).[17] Formal leadership is only significantly associated with legislative activities (whether using the scorecard or the meeting minutes data) and it's inclusion reduces the gender gap in performance in legislative activity mildly (by 3% on the scorecard and 4-5.5% in the meeting minutes). Importantly, the results on informal exclusion are not simply capturing formal leadership effects – the network results are robust to dropping those politicians holding formal leadership positions (results available upon request).

Qualifications (human capital)

Consistent with our hypotheses, we find suggestive evidence that education disparities play a role in the performance gap. Education seems to matter more for job duties that require high levels of qualification such as legislative activities (scorecard and in plenary meeting minutes), and monitoring public services. Wealth seems to matter for lower local government

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[16]As for other reasons, RS-women and men were equally likely to cite lower qualifications (42% RS-women, 43% men mention). RS-women were more likely to mention a structural barrier — constituency size (52% RS-women versus 38% men). In the data, constituency size was not found to be a significant driver of performance, however, suggesting that there may be ways that constituency size may affects performance in ways that we did not pick up. Further, RS-women politicians are three times more likely to perceive favoritism towards men by the chairperson (only 8% of men but 22% of RS-women report that men are favored).

[17]This finding contrasts with the national level finding that leadership plays a large role (Wang, 2014).

participation and monitoring public services, perhaps reflecting the idea that resources are required to travel to perform these activities.[18]

Is education really capturing qualifications and expertise needed to navigate the demanding legislative process? We test that using knowledge vignettes regarding legislative procedure, which we have embedded in our in-person surveys with politicians (see Table 5 using the 49 district sample). We find that men politicians are more knowledgable about rules governing district plenary and committee meetings (0.28 sd gap); procedures for passing bills and motions (.21 sd gap); and budget procedures (.35 sd gap). Further, we find that education has a statistically significant effect on knowledge (see SI Appendix D). Such rules and procedures are quite intricate and the degree of knowledge and application of these legislative procedures are likely mutually reinforcing. These findings are consistent with Johnson et al. (2003)'s earlier field interviews with district and lower tier (subcounty, and village) politicians that RS-women politician's legislative activities were perceived to be hindered by lack of procedural knowledge, which was speculated to result from lower education background.

Table 5: Politician Performance: knowledge questions

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Knowledge Questions					
Public Service Delivery	0.487	(0.441)	-0.187***	(0.070)	820 (49 districts)
Procedures/Rules Council	0.238	(0.279)	-0.281***	(0.070)	820 (49 districts)
Passing Bills/Motions	0.037	(0.231)	-0.208***	(0.072)	820 (49 districts)
Knowledge Budget	0.088	(0.340)	-0.350***	(0.072)	820 (49 districts)
Knowledge Total	0.435	(0.302)	-0.453***	(0.068)	820 (49 districts)

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at the politician level. Standardized outcome variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Session minutes are weighted by the share of meetings politician attended

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[18]These findings contrast with the national level, where O'Brien (2012) shows there is no qualification gaps between men and women.

7. Discussion and Conclusion

Studying gender gaps in job duty performance is important as women increasingly enter ever more historically-male professions across the Global South. Gender gaps in politician performance are critical to uncover and address because they not only affect women's professional trajectory, but also the potential to improve policymaking on issues (such as water access) that women are more likely to prioritize (Gottlieb et al., 2018). Gender gaps in performance also matter since they affect women's leadership role modeling.

We examine whether gender gaps in job duty performance exist across reserved-seat-women (RS-women) and men politicians from 50 subnational governments in Uganda over a full electoral term (2011-2016). While past work generally focuses on a single job duty (often legislative activity), we cast a wider net, testing whether different job duties present different barriers for woman politicians. We find significant variation in performance gender gaps across politicians' job duties. Job duties requiring high levels of interaction with fellow politicians, namely legislative activities, show large performance gender gaps. Moderate performance gender gaps exist in duties requiring moderate interaction with fellow politicians—monitoring public services and lower local government participation. Finally, we find no evidence of performance gaps for various types of constituency services, which politicians undertake relatively independently.

To explain variation in the size of the gender gap across job duties we assemble unique network data, capturing both professional and personal ties within 50 subnational legislative bodies. Network data allow us to measure the position (centrality) of all politicians in the sample in their respective legislature. We find that RS-women politicians are significantly less central in professional networks within (what are clearly male-dominated) legislatures. Such peripherality, we empirically show, can help explain variation in gender gaps across different politician job duties. Informal exclusion in professional networks minimizes RS-women's influence and ability to wield power within legislatures, which is especially consequential for one's effectiveness in job duties that entail interaction with peer politicians. By contrast, informal exclusion is largely inconsequential when politicians undertake relatively independent tasks.

We are not the first to suggest that informal marginalization of women is consequential for job duty performance (see, for example, Kantor (2009); BenYishay et al. (2020)). However, our study builds on past work by focusing on politicians and demonstrating marginalization systematically across a large number of comparable legislatures, and by employing original network data that separates between informal personal and professional ties. By so doing, we expand the study of networks in legislatures outside the United States suing what, to our knowledge, is the largest scale collection of network data on politicians to date (Ringe et al., 2017).

One open question is how to assess our findings normatively. Legislative activities are undoubtedly a core job duty for legislators. It is thus not surprising that most of the scholarship on possible gender gaps in politician performance focuses on this domain. From this perspective, large gender gaps in legislative activities are problematic. However, some studies (e.g., Dunning et al. (2018)) have documented that legislative activities, at least in developing countries, is not particularly salient to citizens. Politicians often do not experience strong accountability pressure—from citizens—for passing bills or attending plenary sessions. Constituency services—for example, maintaining contact with the electorate—are both more visible and salient to citizens (Ofosu, 2019). Especially where multiparty competition are relatively new, these activities by local government politicians are important in legitimizing the system as a whole.

Our study is not without limitations. First, we may be missing some important drivers of the performance gap. For example, disparities in personality traits or working "styles" may be relevant (Volden et al., 2013). Further, we do not have data on every possible aspect of performance — for example, no systematic objective data exists in Uganda for committee work (even though we provided supportive subjective evaluations by committee chairpersons). In addition, it could be that despite sharing formal (that is legally-defined) job duties, RS-women and men may view (or believe citizens value) their performance across different job duties differently. However, examining survey responses at term end, we find no differences between men and RS-women politicians regarding (a) beliefs about citizens' ability to monitor their performance, (b) ways citizens contact them, and (c) efficacy in performing job duties (results available on request). Admittedly, there could be other differences in perceptions of job duties for which we have no

measures.

Given the study's findings, future research should explore what forces might make professional political networks more inclusive. Many "team building" or social events focusing on *social* inclusion may not be effective, since this study shows that RS-women can be central in personal networks, and simultaneously excluded professionally. Interventions strengthening gender-sensitive collaborative professional task-working skills may be more effective. In particular, our survey data reveal that barriers to RS-women's performance are seen very differently by men and RS-women. In particular, interventions could attempt to address a dynamic where men politicians fail to recognize discrimination that RS-women experience, viewing the behavior of RS-women as stemming instead from low self-esteem. Further, given that RS-women perceive the legislature's leadership to be biased against them, political leaders in particular may benefit from training on implicit bias that could lead to greater inclusion of RS-women in a mixed-gender legislature.

Appendix A. Research Design and Data

Appendix A.1. Research Design and Data

The data captures performance of a sample of subnational politicians in Uganda (councilors) who are elected to serve at the district level; the higher subnational government entity. In this paper, we use data from up to 50 (out of 112) districts. Figure A.3 maps the study area districts.

Figure A.3: Study Area

Depending on the data source used, some analysis is based on smaller samples. For example, the scorecard is created by a ACODE, a Ugandan civil society organization (CSO). ACODE was operating in 25 districts (dark shaded districts on the map in Figure A.3). The school grant application activity was conducted in 20 ACODE districts as part of a different study. To increase our sample size for the present study, we further matched the "ACODE" districts with 25 similar districts that had not been part of the CSO's scorecard program (medium shaded districts on the map in Figure A.3). We conducted in-person surveys of councilors from all 50 matched districts, and collected council meeting minutes in 49 of those districts.[19]

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[19]As mentioned in the main text, one district (Nebbi) did not provide the team with

In Table A.6 we report the number of councilors for which we have data on, for each data source. For the purpose of the empirical analysis, we use the set of councilors for which we have both performance information (e.g., council meetings or scorecard data) *and* demographic data as derived from the in-person survey.

Table A.6: Sample Size Politicians - Different datasets

Data source	Original sample size	N. districts	Notes
Politician survey 1 (2012)	396	20	Response Rate 98%
Politician survey 2 (2015)	374	20	Response Rate 93%
Politician survey 3 (2016)	943	50	Includes 25 ACODE & 25 matched districts Response Rate 94%
School grant application	395	20	
ACODE Scorecard data	514	25	Includes original 20 districts
Council meeting minutes	820	49	1 refusal district from original 20

Appendix A.2. District Matching

ACODE selected program districts such to achieve diversity in region, levels of development, and age of district, following the creation of many new districts after 1995. We use matching to identify non-ACODE districts to serve as plausible counterfactuals for ACODE districts. We match on districts' (a) age; i.e., years since district creation, and (b) number of sub-counties. We also use two variables to proxy development: (c) distance to Kampala, and (d) night-light density. Finally, we match on (e) region, using four indicators for North, Western, Central and Eastern Uganda.

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meeting minutes.

Table A.7 provides balance statistics, comparing 25 ACODE districts with 81 Non-ACODE potential matches. We use a flexible optimal full matching algorithm—using the *optmatch R* package, matching on the propensity score, two calipers (for both the propensity score and Mahalanobis distance), while also restricting to exact matching of regions.[20] In Table A.8 we provide balance statistics of the resulting matched sample, and in Figure A.3 we present a map of the matched districts.

Table A.7: Balance (pre-matching)

	ACODE Mean	Non-ACODE Mean	SD Diff	SD Diff pooled	Variance Ratio	T p-value T	KS p-value	QQ Mean Diff	QQ Med Diff	QQ Max Diff
num_subc	12.36	11.65	14.36	13.45	0.78	0.55	0.20	0.07	0.06	0.21
age	27.40	14.10	114.48	119.43	1.19	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.37	0.52
Kampala Dist	223.88	206.99	17.53	18.27	1.19	0.44	0.18	0.10	0.11	0.24
Light Density	0.21	0.04	40.16	55.25	17.52	0.06	0.00	0.22	0.21	0.35
region_1	0.12	0.23	-34.54	-30.00	0.60	0.17		0.06	0.06	0.12
region_2	0.28	0.31	-6.25	-6.21	0.97	0.79		0.01	0.01	0.03
region_3	0.32	0.23	17.94	18.90	1.25	0.43		0.04	0.04	0.09
region_4	0.28	0.22	12.61	13.17	1.20	0.58		0.03	0.03	0.06
N	25	81								

Table A.8: Balance (post-matching)

	ACODE Mean	Non-ACODE Mean	SD Diff	SD Diff pooled	Variance Ratio	T p-value T	KS p-value	QQ Mean Diff	QQ Med Diff	QQ Max Diff
num_subc	12.36	13.88	-30.93	-26.73	0.60	0.35	0.79	0.07	0.08	0.16
age	27.40	24.32	26.51	25.86	0.91	0.36	0.54	0.07	0.04	0.16
Kampala Dist	223.88	241.52	-18.30	-19.10	1.20	0.50	0.66	0.07	0.08	0.20
Light Density	0.21	0.06	34.70	47.81	18.65	0.10	0.45	0.12	0.12	0.20
region_1	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
region_2	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
region_3	0.32	0.32	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
region_4	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.00	1.00	1.00		0.00	0.00	0.00
N	25	25								

Appendix A.3. District Council Meetings Minutes

In late 2015, we collected plenary council meeting minutes from district government headquarters for the study period (2011-2015). Research team visited all the districts in the sample and scanned the physical copies of the meeting minutes, which were later coded into datasets used later for analysis. The research team hired a local company, based in Kampala, to enter the DCM minutes scans in a way that would allow capturing outcomes of interest.

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[20]Following Rosenbaum (2012), our matching algorithm penalizing non-exact matches.

The company held a 3-day training sessions in cooperation with IPA. At the end of the training, job candidates took an exam prepared by IPA and the PIs, and the company hired the best performing coders. The company used 18 politician-level coders, 5 district-level coders, and 2 back-checkers. Coding activities commenced in Jun-2016 and ended in Aug-2016. Coders first read the minutes and marked every remark or comment; they then used SurveyCTO program to code the scan copies. Back-check was conducted on a randomly selected sample of 10% of meeting minutes. Back-checkers went over the work of the coders and corrected mistakes when necessary. For those coders who made frequent mistakes, 1-day re-training was provided. While the company completed 90% of the work, a contractual difficulty with the company led IPA to take over the remaining work in-house. This did not affect the quality of coding data. IPA held 3-day training sessions with the identical training materials and adhered to the previously established coding and back-check process. The last phase of the coding began in Oct-2016 and ended in Nov-2016. Upon completion of the coding work, the research team combined the data from the coding company and IPA into a complete dataset.

This dataset contains information on the meetings, including the councilors that were present and the activities they performed in the meetings: passing bills, raising motions, making remarks and presenting. Each is also coded by topic, i.e. health, education, transport. For the purpose of the study we sum up the actions by politician, throughout the electoral period, and we normalize it by the number of meetings in held in the district. The number of meetings in each electoral period varies from district to district. In Figure A.4 we plot the average number of politician meetings per year in the period 2008-2015 for each district in our sample. This number varies from 1 meeting in Bushenyi to almost 8 in Moroto. In Table A.9–A.12, we present the summary statistics of the average actions per meeting in the electoral period by sample.

Appendix A.4. Scorecard Methodology

ACODE's methodology for collecting data on politicians' performance includes several steps. First, ACODE engages in document review of service delivery and infrastructure reports, budgets, planning documents, minutes of district councils and their committees, and other relevant documents. Second, ACODE researchers conduct interviews with politicians — and subsequently, any assertions made by politicians are followed up with written evi-

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
Figure A.4: Average annual number of Council Meeting Minutes by district over the study period.

Table A.9: Summary statistics: District Council Meeting Minutes

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Observt**
lightgray Total Actions	2.05	2.17	0.05	16.6	488
Motions	0.83	1.02	0	8.6	488
Bills	0.01	0.04	0	0.29	488
Presentation	0.14	0.24	0	1.88	488
Remarks	1.07	1.32	0	7.17	488
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**Observt**
lightgray Total Actions	1.2	1.3	0.05	7	332
Motions	0.65	0.76	0	4.11	332
Bills	0	0.02	0	0.25	332
Presentations	0.09	0.2	0	1.44	332
Remarks	0.45	0.67	0	4.33	332

dence. Third, field visits are conducted at service delivery units (e.g. schools, clinics). Fourth, ACODE facilitates focus group discussions with citizens at

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Table A.10: Summary statistics: District Council Meeting Minutes weighted by share of meetings attended by politician

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Total Actions	2.13	2.42	0	16.6	488
Motions	0.87	1.21	0	13	488
Bills	0.01	0.04	0	0.31	488
Presentations	0.14	0.25	0	2.03	488
Remarks	1.1	1.45	0	8.58	488
Share meetings attended	0.86	0.25	0	1	488
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Total Actions	1.27	1.43	0	9.33	332
Motions	0.68	0.83	0	5	332
Bills	0.01	0.03	0	0.28	332
Presentations	0.09	0.21	0	1.69	332
Remarks	0.48	0.74	0	4.88	332
Share meetings attended	0.87	0.22	0	1	332

Table A.11: Summary statistics: Regular Councilors - Sample 25 districts

Regular politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Total Actions	2.48	2.45	0.05	16.6	154
Motions	0.97	1.15	0	8.6	154
Bills	0.01	0.05	0	0.25	154
Presentations	0.18	0.29	0	1.88	154
Remarks	1.31	1.5	0	7	154
RS-Women politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Total Actions	1.46	1.32	0.06	7	120
Motions	0.78	0.83	0	3.75	120
Bills	0.01	0.02	0	0.08	120
Presentations	0.15	0.25	0	1.44	120
Remarks	0.54	0.66	0	3	120

the sub-county level with a sampling methodology that seeks gender-parity of community leaders and representation of 'ordinary' citizens and youth. Last, interviews with the bureaucracy's technical staff are conducted at the

Table A.12: Summary statistics: District Council Meeting Minutes weighted by share of meetings attended by politician - Sample 25 districts

Regular politicians

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
lightgray Total Actions	2.67	2.64	0	16.6	154
Motions	1.03	1.2	0	8.6	154
Bills	0.02	0.05	0	0.27	154
Presentations	0.2	0.31	0	2.03	154
Remarks	1.43	1.7	0	8.58	154
Share meetings attended	0.87	0.21	0	1	154

RS-Women politicians

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
lightgray Total Actions	1.57	1.5	0	9.33	120
Motions	0.83	0.94	0	5	120
Bills	0.01	0.02	0	0.09	120
Presentations	0.15	0.28	0	1.69	120
Remarks	0.58	0.72	0	3.33	120
Share meetings attended	0.88	0.2	0	1	120

district and sub-county levels. These include, for example, interviews with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) heading the district bureaucracy and heads of departments. Participants gave informed consent, and participation was voluntary.

The politician scorecard is divided into four components with a set of indicators for each, as depicted in Figure A.5).

Each indicator is assigned a score, awarded with a threshold approach. This means that a politician who, for example, has pushed forward more motions in plenary sessions than the designated threshold, receives the same number of points as another politician who has only just met the threshold. One disadvantage of this method is that score-conscious politicians do not have a strong incentive to exert further effort once an indicator threshold is reached. However, there are also advantages to this scoring system. For one, politicians have different sized constituencies, and politicians with larger constituencies (especially RS-women councilors) are not disadvantaged. Another advantage is that it is arguably the easiest type of scoring system for Ugandan politicians and citizens to comprehend. All indicators sum up to a maximum possible 100 points, similar to school grades in Uganda. Figure

PARAMETER/INDICATOR	Actual Score	Maximum Score
1. LEGISLATIVE ROLE		**25**
i) Participation in plenary sessions		8
ii) Participation in Committees		8
iii) Moved motions in Council		5
iiii) Provided special skills/knowledge to the Council or committees		4
2. CONTACT WITH ELECTORATE		**20**
i) Meeting with Electorate		11
ii) Office or coordination centre in the constituency		9
3. PARTICIPATION IN LOWER LOCAL GOVERMENT		**10**
i) Attendance in sub-county Council sessions		10
4. MONITORING SERVICE DELIVERY ON NATIONAL PRIORITY PROGRAMMES AREAS		**45**
i) Monitoring of Health Service delivery units		7
ii) Monitoring Agricultural Projects		7
iii) Monitoring Education facilities		7
iv) Monitoring Road projects		7
v) Monitoring Water facilities		7
vi) Monitoring Functional Adult Literacy programmes		5
vii) Monitoring Environment and natural resources		5

Figure A.5: ACODE Scorecard components

A.6 depicts an example scorecard from Nakapiripirit District.[21]

Once ACODE completes assembling the scores of all politicians, it holds an annual dissemination event in each district's headquarters. ACODE invites to this event the legislative and bureaucratic district officials as well as other local stakeholders, such as journalists, civil society groups, and traditional and party leaders. In this workshop, ACODE explains the components

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[21]Ssemakula, E., G., Longole, L., and Atyang, S., Local Government Councils' Performance and Public Service Delivery in Uganda: Nakapiripirit District Council Score-Card Report 2013/14, Kampala, ACODE Public Service Delivery and Accountability Report Series No.52, 2015.

Nakapiripirit

Name	Sub county	Political Party	Gender	Legislative role	Contact with electorate	Participation in LLGs	Monitoring NPPAs	Total
Ilukol Raphael Lorika	Lorengedwat	NRM	Male	22	20	10	23	75
Longelech John Marko	Loregae Marisetry	NRM	Male	21	11	10	24	66
Sagal William	Nakapiripirit T/C	NRM	Male	13	12	10	18	53
Nanyima Abraham	Lolachat	NRM	Male	12	7	10	21	50
Lochoto Richard Safari	Youth	FDC	Male	15	11	10	18	54
Lorukale Paul	Lorengedwat	NRM	Male	9	13	10	7	39
Loonye John K	Moruita	NRM	Male	5	13	2	13	33
Average Male				14	12	9	18	53
Hellen Pulkol		NRM	Female	17	16	4	17	54
Aluka Lucy	PWD	NRM	Female	14	13	8	18	53
Longole Maria	Lorengedwat	NRM	Female	10	17	10	16	53
Longole Erina	Loregae	NRM	Female	18	2	10	17	47
Aleper Agnes Lokuda	Nabilatuk	NRM	Female	9	17	10	9	45
Kodet Sofia Jane	Kakomon-gole T.C	NRM	Female	10	4	0	24	38
Chero Scholar Akol	Nabilatuk	NRM	Female	10	2	4	8	24
Lopuwa Lucy	Namalu	NRM	Female	6	5	2	8	21

Figure A.6: Scorecard Example - Nakapiripirit District

of the scorecard and reports on each politician's score.

To strengthen the reliability of the disseminated scores, ACODE undertakes several quality-control measures:

- The scorecard undergoes periodic reviews by an expert Taskforce comprised of academics, officials from the Ministry of Local Government, representatives from the parliamentary committee on local governments, district technical and political leaders, and civil society representatives.

- District research teams are made up of three people (a lead researcher and two resident assistants of the district) who speak the local languages. Those researchers are not allowed to be involved in electoral or partisan politics. Prior to data collection, the research teams are

trained intensively over a centralized three-day Workshop accompanied by an official Researchers' Guide in basic methods, ethics, etc.

- Following data collection, district research teams come together for a three-day workshop to peer-review the information collected and compute scorecard marks. A team of experienced Lead Researchers directly monitor and supervise the research teams, and are also responsible for managing fieldwork and producing district reports, as well as doing on-spot checks.

- The HQ leadership team and a technical backstopping team are responsible for the final review and validation of data used in the scoring. Before publication of the scores, the report is externally reviewed and edited to ensure consistency and quality of content. Thus, the scorecard has a multi-layered review. A full description of the ACODE methodology and reporting can be found at `http://www.acode-u.org/documents/PRS_64.pdf`

We present descriptive statistics of regular politicians and RS-women politicians' scores in Table A.13 and Table A.14 respectively, for the four years of electoral period, between 2012 and 2015. The average score increases slightly from the first year to the last.

Appendix A.5. School Grant Applications

During the survey conducted in 2014 we gave the politicians the opportunity to participate in an exercise that mimic a common practice in which politicians help to secure development funds to their constituency from an external organization, in collaboration with the district bureaucracy. We aimed to measure politicians' performance in improving service delivery in the constituency. For that we designed a unique behavioral task in collaboration with our donor partner and the District Education Offices.

Specifically, politicians were given an opportunity to help primary schools in their constituency to apply for a grant to support school improvements. The grant's value, which was advertised after the politician survey in 20 study area districts, was about 100 USD. In order to become eligible for the grant, the politician had to visit the school, mobilize the school principal and representatives of the teachers and parents association to sign a form that was delivered to the district offices. We assigned the grants via a lottery that was carried out at the district level with all the valid applications submitted.

Table A.13: Summary statistics: Scorecard Regular Councilors

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Observat
Regular Politicians					
Total Score					
Pooled	55.76	18.06	11	99	840
2012	49.25	15.98	12	87	210
2013	59.19	15.06	21	89	210
2014	58.02	18.92	11	89	210
2015	56.59	20.23	13	99	210
Subscore: Legislative Activity					
Pooled	15.85	4.72	0	25	840
2012	15.37	5.61	1	25	210
2013	16.83	3.85	2	23	210
2014	15.33	4.79	0	23	210
2015	15.85	4.34	1	25	210
Subscore: Meeting with Electorate					
Pooled	13.54	5.77	0	20	
2012	11.94	6.05	0	20	210
2013	14.45	5.06	0	20	210
2014	13.49	5.87	0	18	210
2015	14.28	5.74	0	20	210
Subscore: Monitoring					
Pooled	20.83	10.76	0	47	840
2012	16.55	8.6	1	39	210
2013	21.75	9.31	5	45	210
2014	23.33	11.24	0	42	210
2015	21.7	12.32	0	47	210
Subscore: Lower Local Government					
Pooled	5.55	3.98	0	10	840
2012	5.47	3.78	0	10	210
2013	6.07	3.65	0	10	210
2014	5.9	4.01	0	10	210
2015	4.76	4.34	0	10	210

The number of grants per district was proportional to the population and ranged between two and five, to ensure equal probability of winning across politicians.

We received a total of 1,662 out of 4,585 possible applications and 61 grants were allocated. Our outcome of interest here is the share of school grant applications out of the total number of schools in a politicians constituency. In Table A.15 we present the descriptive statistics of the application. The variable represents the number of applications sent by politicians as a share of the number of schools in their constituency.

Table A.14: Summary statistics: Scorecard RS-Women Councilors

		RS-Women Politicians			
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	
		Total Score			
Pooled	49.14	16.94	0	89	840
2012	40.82	16.43	10	81	210
2013	53.37	13.92	23	87	210
2014	51.68	16.8	0	86	210
2015	50.68	17.64	1	89	210
		Subscore: Legislative Activity			
Pooled	13.38	5.26	0	25	840
2012	12.34	5.57	1	25	210
2013	15	4.11	2	21	210
2014	12.34	5.69	0	23	210
2015	13.82	5.10	1	25	210
		Subscore: Meeting with Electorate			
Pooled	13.03	5.83	0	20	840
2012	10.51	6.21	0	20	210
2013	14.49	4.68	0	20	210
2014	13.38	5.72	0	18	210
2015	13.73	5.84	0	20	210
		Subscore: Monitoring			
Pooled	18.02	10	0	45	840
2012	13.51	8.27	0	37	210
2013	18.97	8.62	0	42	210
2014	20.72	10.4	0	42	210
2015	18.9	11	0	45	210
		Subscore: Lower Local Government			
Pooled	4.76	3.89	0	10	840
2012	4.48	3.92	0	10	210
2013	4.99	3.76	0	10	210
2014	5.35	3.82	0	10	210
2015	4.22	3.99	0	10	210

Table A.15: Behavioral Measures: Descriptive Statistics

Applications for schools					
Regular Politician	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Number Applications	3.42	4.28	0	18	158
Sent Application Dummy	0.71	0.46	0	1	158
Relative apps/numb schools	0.45	0.59	0	3.5	158
Relative apps/numb schools (standardized)	-0.03	0.73	-0.58	3.75	158
RS-Women Politician	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Total Number Applications	5.28	6.43	0	28	126
Sent Application Dummy	0.75	0.44	0	1	126
Relative apps/numb schools	0.5	1.02	0	10	126
Relative apps/numb schools (standardized)	0.04	1.26	-0.58	11.79	126

Application: Uganda Primary School Development Grant

Councilor Details		
Councilor Name:	Councilor Phone Number:	Councilor Mandate (Circle): Regular District Councilor Special Woman District Councilor

School Details
School Name:

District:	Sub-County:	Parish:	Village:

School Management Contacts	
Head/Deputy Head Teacher Name:	Head/Deputy Head Teacher Phone Number:
PTA Chairperson Name:	PTA Chairperson Phone Number:
School Treasurer Name:	School Treasurer Phone Number:

Narrative and Budget	
Budget Narrative: How would the school use 300,000 Ugx?	Budget:

School's Bank Account Details		
Bank:	Branch:	Account Number:

Signatures and Authorization	
Head Teacher Signature and **STAMP:** Date:	DEO Signature and **STAMP:** Date:

School Treasurer Signature: Date:	PTA/SMC Chairperson Signature: Date:	District Councilor Signature: Date:

Figure A.7: Blank grant application

Appendix A.6. Background information politicians

The demographic information of the councilors was collected using an in-person survey conducted in summer 2015. In this survey, we collected information from 1131 politicians in the 50 study area districts. In Table A.17, we present the descriptive statistics of some of the variables we use throughout the paper as control variables, and in TableA.18 we show the correlation between these covariates. Some of these variables describe Politicians' background characteristics, while others describe other political factors, such as the party they caucus with, their margin of victory in the previous (2011) elections and an indicator of whether they run unopposed. We also include a proxy for the size of the constituency using the number of votes cast in the previous election.

Appendix A.7. Peer and committee chair assessments

The peer councilor performance data were collected in the endline councilor survey, asking each councilor to rate five other councilors in their district on a scale from 1 to 5.[22] For each councilor an average score is constructed by taking the mean score they received from the councilors in their district. Each councilor thus received between 3-7 peer evaluations (depending on the size of the district's council). The distribution of the average councilor evaluation is presented in Figure **??**. Figure **??** provides information on the distribution of peer evaluations by treatment group.

Table A.20: Summary statistics: Committee Chairs Assessment

Regular Councilors	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Average Committee Chair evaluation	7.56	1.95	1	10	210
RS-Women Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Average Committee Chair evaluation	6.83	1.99	1	10	168

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[22]*I am now going to give you a list with 5 names of councilors in your district, which we picked randomly. We don?t know them and chose them out of the list of the district councilors. Based on YOUR OWN ideas, could you privately rate the following 5 councilors? general performance? This information will be anonymously added to the responses of others and reported only in aggregate. Thus, privacy will be maintained. (Enum, please give the paper with the ID of the councilor you are surveying, explain the answer options and how to answer. Give the councilor some minutes. Ask him/her to put it in the box with the other responses)*

Table A.16: Summary statistics: Demographic Information

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Politician Education level	9.13	1.79	3	12	487
Below secondary	0.16	0.37	0	1	488
Secondary	0.14	0.35	0	1	488
Post-secondary	0.69	0.46	0	1	488
Politician Age	44.55	10.57	25	78	488
Politician Wealth	0.72	0.66	0	2	488
N. terms as politician	0.48	0.81	0	3	488
NRM	0.83	0.37	0	1	488
Margin Of Victory	0.34	0.3	0	1	488
Constituency Size	5956.25	4442.91	935	29661	356
Desire leave politics	0.16	0.37	0	1	156
Hold leadership position	0.22	0 .42	0	1	488
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Politician Education level	7.83	1.93	3	12	332
Below secondary	0.42	0.49	0	1	332
Secondary	0.19	0.4	0	1	332
Post-secondary	0.39	0.49	0	1	332
Politician Age	44.9	9.4	26	71	332
Politician Wealth	0.49	0.63	0	2	332
N. terms as politician	0.58	0.82	0	3	332
NRM	0.86	0.35	0	1	332
Margin Of Victory	0.38	0.33	0	1	332
Constituency Size	9968.88	6577.68	1090	48787	215
Desire leave politics	0.15	0.35	0	1	123
Hold leadership position	0.12	0 .33	0	1	332

Table A.21: Summary statistics: Peer Assessments

Regular Councilors	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Average peer evaluation	3.26	0.57	1	4.60	151
RS-Women Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Average peer evaluation	2.91	0.72	1.2	4.67	120

Appendix A.8. Bureaucrat assessments

In Uganda, civil servants are often referred to as "technocrats." The short technocrats' survey (22 questions) involved 77 respondents and took

Table A.17: Summary statistics: Demographic Information - Sample 25 districts

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Politician Education level	2.62	0.72	1	3	154
Below secondary	0.14	0.35	0	1	154
Secondary	0.1	0.3	0	1	154
Post-secondary	0.76	0.43	0	1	154
Politician Age	43.62	10.01	25	76	154
Politician Wealth	0.84	0.67	0	2	154
N. terms as politician	0.44	0.71	0	3	154
NRM	0.77	0.42	0	1	154
Margin Of Victory	0.33	0.28	0	1	154
Constituency Size	6441.47	4053.4	935	19688	116
Desire leave politics	0.16	0.37	0	1	154
Hold leadership position	0.20	0.40	0	1	154
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Politician Education level	2.07	0.91	1	3	120
Below secondary	0.38	0.49	0	1	120
Secondary	0.17	0.37	0	1	120
Post-secondary	0.45	0.5	0	1	120
Politician Age	45.41	9.09	26	67	120
Politician Wealth	0.51	0.62	0	2	120
N. terms as politician	0.54	0.79	0	3	120
NRM	0.83	0.38	0	1	120
Margin Of Victory	0.35	0.3	0.01	1	120
Constituency Size	10365.89	6207.86	1090	48787	81
Desire leave politics	0.14	0.35	0	1	120
Hold leadership position	0.14	0.35	0	1	120

Table A.18: Politician covariates – correlation table - Complete Sample

Variables	Educ (categorical)	Below secondary dummy	Secondary dummy	Post-secondary dummy	Age	Wealth	N. terms politician	NRM	Margin Victory	Size Constituency	Desire leave politics	Leadership
Educ (categorical)	1.000											
Below secondary dummy	-0.911	1.000										
Secondary dummy	-0.156	-0.266	1.000									
Post-secondary dummy	0.923	-0.689	-0.506	1.000								
Age	-0.208	0.198	0.014	-0.184	1.000							
Wealth	0.210	-0.160	-0.108	0.219	0.038	1.000						
N. terms politician	-0.016	-0.005	0.050	-0.031	0.350	0.015	1.000					
NRM	-0.071	0.082	-0.030	-0.054	0.151	0.058	0.100	1.000				
Margin Victory	-0.023	0.045	-0.055	-0.003	0.125	0.073	0.092	0.240	1.000			
Size Constituency	-0.088	0.078	0.019	-0.084	-0.024	0.108	-0.017	-0.029	0.003	1.000		
Desire leave politics	-0.000	-0.018	0.048	-0.017	0.304	0.142	0.224	0.093	0.111	-0.039	1.000	
Leadership	0.119	-0.105	-0.029	0.112	-0.006	0.062	-0.014	0.009	0.022	-0.056	0.012	1.000

Note: Individual Level Politician Covariates Correlation Matrix

place between June and August 2015 (concurrent with the endline councilor survey). Survey respondents came from the same 20 districts, with between

Table A.19: Politician covariates – correlation table- Sample 25 districts

Variables	Educ (categorical)	Below secondary dummy	Secondary dummy	Post-secondary dummy	Age	Wealth	N. terms politician	NRM	Margin Victory	Size Constituency	Desire leave politics	Leadership
Educ (categorical)	1.000											
Below secondary dummy	-0.925	1.000										
Secondary dummy	-0.168	-0.220	1.000									
Post-secondary dummy	0.941	-0.740	-0.493	1.000								
Age	-0.221	0.205	0.034	-0.206	1.000							
Welath	0.219	-0.195	-0.056	0.212	0.106	1.000						
N. terms politician	-0.057	0.023	0.088	-0.081	0.273	0.090	1.000					
NRM	-0.105	0.145	-0.104	-0.057	0.203	0.177	0.111	1.000				
Margin Victory	0.005	0.007	-0.031	0.015	0.204	0.136	0.126	0.296	1.000			
Size Constituency	-0.100	0.077	0.056	-0.108	0.044	0.042	-0.035	-0.047	-0.025	1.000		
Desire leave politics	0.014	-0.033	0.050	-0.004	0.294	0.148	0.226	0.090	0.112	-0.035	1.000	
Leadership	0.022	0.024	-0.119	0.060	0.017	0.022	0.061	-0.028	-0.156	0.012	0.017	1.000

Note: Individual Level Politician Covariates Correlation Matrix

three and five from each district. The target population were district officers at health, water, education and chief administration offices. Technocrats were contacted and personal appointments made with the district officers. As in all our surveys, standard consent was confirmed prior to administering the survey instrument.

Each councilor was rated on four criteria by each bureaucrat (Ugandan English — technocrat) surveyed within their district (3-5 individuals).[23] Specifically, bureaucrats rated each councilor on the following four performance dimensions using a five-point scale:

1. The number of times a legislator has personally visited or called the technocrat office in the last six months,
2. How knowledgeable the district legislator is about standards, rules, and procedures for resource allocation,
3. The quality of the legislator's monitoring of public service delivery,
4. The level of effort the legislator puts into improving public service delivery to ensure standards are met or exceeded in their constituency.

To aggregate this information into a single measure of councilor performance, each councilor's score was averaged over the ratings they received from different technocrats working in their district, these scores were then

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[23] *This handout is a list of all the LC5 councilors in the district. We would like you to rank them across 4 indicators. 1 indicates not active at all, while 5 indicates the most active a councilor could possibly be in an ideal world. Please circle the ranking for each councilor. This information is confidential — it will be combined with the answers of over 100 other civil servants in the country and the data will not be shared with anyone. Further, It is personal opinion therefore there is no right or wrong answer. If you don't know you can mark IDK. Enum: After explaining the form please read the first question and wait for the respondent to answer for all councilors before reading the next question.*

standardized within districts[24] to yield, for each question, a measure of each councilor's perceived performance by the technocrats within their district. These scores for each question were then averaged to produce a single index for councilor performance. Thus, the score of a councilor is in comparison to the other councilors working within their district.

Since the four performance measures are highly correlated with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.90, we further averaged councilors' ratings on these dimensions across surveyed technocrats, creating a single summary index.

Table A.22: Summary statistics: Technocrats Evaluations

Regular Councilors	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Index Technocrat Assessment	0.04	0.6	-2.15	1.32	485
RS-Women Councilors	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Index Technocrat Assessment	-0.21	0.64	-1.78	1.32	331

Appendix A.9. Network data

As part of the survey conducted in 2015, we collected information on councilors' professional and personal ties that allowed us to construct 50 independent 'whole" networks. Ties were elicited using a simple name generator technique (Knoke and Yang, 2008). Each surveyed politician was asked to name up to five co-politicians in three meaningful categories of relationships: professional ties (advice) and personal ties (friends). We present below the network elicitation questions verbatim. Armed with these data, we then calculate for each politician, several core centrality measures, as explain in the main text. In Table A.24, we present the descriptive statistics of the network centrality measures.

- **Professional:** *Many councilors seek advice from other councilors on how to vote, procedural questions, and issues that come up in committee among other topics. Think of the people you ask for advice to carry out your duties as an LC5 councilor.Please list up to a maximum of 5 people you would be most likely to approach for advice on work related issues.*

- **Personal:** *Which of your fellow councilors you would consider a close friend? By close friend, we mean someone who you trust, cares about*

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[24]That is to say, subtracting the district mean score, and dividing by the district standard deviation.

your well-being, and who you'd be comfortable looking after your kids. Please list up to 5 of your closest friends.

Additionally, Figure A.8 and A.9 illustrates the professional and personal network structure, respectively, in which the dots represent the politicians and the lines the unidirectional relationship by defining a tie between i and j if at least one tie exists between them. Figures A.10 and A.11 depict scatterplots with a lowess regression showing the relationship between professional and personal networks from term start to term end. To do so, we first transform each measure to a within district ranking of centrality.

Table A.23: Summary statistics: Network Data

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Degree Professional	0.4	0.19	0.05	1	488
Degree Personal	0.28	0.15	0	0.86	488
InDegree Professional	0.28	0.21	0	1	488
InDegree Personal	0.17	0.13	0	0.86	488
Betweenness Professional	0.05	0.06	0	0.57	488
Betweenness Personal	0.05	0.05	0	0.33	488
Eigenvector Professional	0.61	0.23	0.07	1	488
Eigenvector Personal	0.55	0.24	0	1	488
Closeness Professional	0.62	0.1	0.35	1	488
Closeness Personal	0.5	0.12	0.04	0.88	488
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Degree Professional	0.36	0.17	0.06	1	332
Degree Personal	0.32	0.16	0	0.92	332
InDegree Professional	0.19	0.19	0	0.92	332
InDegree Personal	0.21	0.15	0	0.92	332
Betweenness Professional	0.03	0.04	0	0.33	332
Betweenness Personal	0.06	0.07	0	0.56	332
Eigenvector Professional	0.55	0.22	0.08	1	332
Eigenvector Personal	0.62	0.24	0	1	332
Closeness Professional	0.6	0.09	0.34	1	332
Closeness Personal	0.52	0.13	0.09	0.92	332

Appendix A.10. Knowledge Vignettes

Our end-term survey included a section (see Table A.27) designed to capture the knowledge of politicians on their legally defined job-duties, broken

Table A.24: Summary statistics: Network Data - Sample 25 districts

Regular Politicians	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Degree Professional	0.42	0.27	0.04	1.5	154
Degree Personal	0.44	0.25	0.03	1.71	154
Indegree Professional	0.22	0.13	0	0.71	154
Indegree Personal	0.23	0.14	0	0.86	154
Betweenness Professional	0.07	0.09	0	0.5	154
Betweenness Personal	0.06	0.08	0	0.6	154
Eigenvector Personal	0.53	0.24	0.05	1	154
Eigenvector Professional	0.51	0.25	0.01	1	154
Closeness Professional	0.31	0.24	0.03	1	154
Closeness Personal	0.34	0.19	0.03	1	154
RS-women Politicians	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
Degree Personal	0.4	0.24	0	1.43	120
Degree Professional	0.35	0.28	0	1.38	120
Indegree Professional	0.15	0.13	0	0.64	120
Indegree Personal	0.2	0.12	0	0.57	120
Betweenness Professional	0.04	0.06	0	0.32	120
Betweenness Personal	0.07	0.07	0	0.31	120
Eigenvector Personal	0.46	0.23	0	0.98	120
Eigenvector Professional	0.4	0.24	0	1	120
Closeness Professional	0.3	0.23	0.04	1	120
Closeness Personal	0.35	0.19	0.05	1	120

down by domain: Public Service Delivery, Procedures and Rules of District Council, Passing Bills and Motions and Budget Questions. The questions that capture knowledge of the Budget, were asked using a replication of the budget similar to the one shown in Figure A.12. Each correct answer received one point: the maximum knowledge score is therefore 17 points. In Table A.26, we present the descriptive statistics of politicians' knowledge by mandate.

Appendix B. Robustness Checks

Appendix B.1. Performance Gaps Across Job Duties

In this section we present robustness checks of the main results presented in the section of performance gaps across job duties. Table B.28 presents the results for plenary session meetings for the sample of 49 districts not weighted

49

Figure A.8: The professional network of the 50 legislatures.

Figure A.9: The personal network of the 50 legislatures.

Figure A.10: Correlation between Within-District Rankings of Professional Network at Baseline and at Endline for Baseline Counselors (by Gender)

Figure A.11: Correlation between Within-District Rankings of Personal Network at Baseline and at Endline for Baseline Counselors (by Gender)

Table A.25: Politicians' Knowledge in Job Duty Domains

Men Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Knowledge Total	9.82	1.97	4	17	488
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.51	1.22	0	6	488
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.83	0.8	1	5	488
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.46	0.61	0	3	488
Knowledge Budget	2.02	0.89	0	4	488
RS-Women Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Knowledge Total	8.93	2.1	3	15	332
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.28	1.19	0	7	332
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.6	0.89	1	5	332
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.35	0.67	0	3	332
Knowledge Budget	1.7	1.06	0	4	332

Table A.26: Politicians' Knowledge in Job Duty Domains - Sample 25 districts

Men Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Knowledge Total	9.9	2.01	5	17	154
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.6	1.29	0	6	154
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.82	0.82	1	5	154
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.47	0.57	0	3	154
Knowledge Budget	2.01	0.93	0	4	154
RS-Women Politicians					
Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Min.**	**Max.**	**N**
lightgray Knowledge Total	8.87	2.21	4	15	120
Knowledge Public Service Delivery	2.22	1.12	0	5	120
Knowledge Procedures/Rules District Council	3.58	0.94	1	5	120
Knowledge Passing Bills/Motions	1.38	0.65	0	3	120
Knowledge Budget	1.69	1.08	0	4	120

by the share of meetings the politician attended to in the legislative period (top panel) and the sample of 19 districts not weighted (middle panel) and weighted (bottom panel) by the share of meetings the politician attended to in the legislative period. Table B.29 presents the results for alternative operationalizations of the school grant outcome.

In Table B.30 we present the results of the differences by gender on co-

Table A.27: Example of Knowledge Questions

Knowledge Questions of Legally Defined Duties	
Public Service Delivery	
1	According to central government national standards, what is the maximum number of pupils one UPE school teacher is allowed to teach?
2	What is the government national standard for the number of pupils who can share one desk?
3	What is the government national standard for the number of school inspections to be carried out by LC5 politicians per term?
4	Let's imagine your district has 100 people. How many of them must live within 5km of a health facility according to the government's national standard for service provision?
5	Per person, what does the government mandate as the guaranteed daily water consumption in liters (or jerrycans) for rural people?
6	For rural people, what is the government standard for the maximum distance in kilometer(s) someone should walk to a water source?
7	By 2015, how many of these people must have service coverage for water according to the government?
Procedures and Rules District Council	
1	According to law, what percentage of politicians must be present at a district council meeting in order to transact business? This is also called "quorum".
2	According to law, in a district council meeting, can quorum be realized if the Chairperson or Vice- Chairperson is absent?
3	According to law, at least how often should committees meet?
4	Imagine you have a petition to bring forward to the district council. According to law, to whom would you present this petition before it is laid on the Table of the Clerk to Council?
5	According to law, is the Speaker allowed to participate in Council debate?
Passing Bills and Motions	
1	According to the Constitution of Uganda, in what instances can a bill passed by the district council supersede the Constitution of Uganda?
2	According to law, after a bill has been published, council debate must take place within how many days?
3	According to law, after bills are passed by LC5 governments, where are they sent for approval?
Budget Questions	
1	Question related to budget of Uganda Example District for the financial year 2013/2014
2	Question related to budget of Uganda Example District for the financial year 2013/2014

variates for the sample of politicians in 19 districts.

UGANDA BUDGET INFORMATION
Hotline: 0800 229 2229
Website: www.budget.go.ug

Uganda Example District
Sub-county / Division: Mubaga Subcounty
Financial Year: 2013/14
Reporting Period: 2013/14

Parish / Ward	Location	Plan	Status	Budget	Expenditure (Shs Million)					% Spent	Source of Funding
					Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total		
Responsible Institution: Mubaga Subcounty											
Sector: Health											
Mubaga S/C – Kobowa	Kobowa HC II	Shs 12.4 million was allocated to Kobowa HC III for the costs of providing basic healthcare services between July 2013 and June 2014	Shs 6.3 million were transferred to Kobowa HC III between July 2013 and December 2013 for the costs of providing basic healthcare services	12.40	5.70	0.60	N/A	N/A	6.30	51.1%	Conditional Grant to PHC - development
Responsible Institution: Mubaga Subcounty											
Sector: Education											
Mubaga S/C – Natoro	Natoro	Shs 1.45 million was allocated for supply of 50 3-seater desks to Natoro P/S in the year from July 2013 to June 2014	Shs 1.2 million was spent between July 2013 and December 2014 on Supply of 50 3-seater Desks to Natoro P/S and have been fully supplied.	1.45	0.0	1.20	N/A	N/A	1.20	82.8%	LGMSD (Former LGDP)

Parish / Ward	Location	Plan	Status	Budget	Expenditure (Shs Million)					% Spent	Source of Funding
					Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Total		
Responsible Institution: XXX District											
Sector: Construction											
Mubaga S/C – Gabia	Gabia Trading Center	Shs 19.8 million was allocated for Construction of Ecosan toilet at Gabia Trading center in the year from July 2013 to June 2014	Shs 17.8 million was spent between July 2013 and December 2013 on Construction of Ecosan toilet at Gabia Trading center and the work is complete	19.8	0.0	17.8	N/A	N/A	17.80	90.0%	Conditional Grant for Rural Water
Responsible Institution: XXX District											
Sector: Education											
Mubaga S/C – Bunega	Bunega P/S	Shs 5.3 million was allocated to Bunega P/S to fund costs of running the Primary School between July 2013 and June 2014	Shs 0.0 million were transferred to Bunega P/S between July 2013 and December 2013 to fund costs of running the Primary School	5.3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0	0.00%	Conditional Grant to Primary Education
Mubaga S/C – Matugo	Matugo P/S	Shs 14.1 million was allocated for Construction of 18 five stance latrines at various P/S: at Matugo P/S in the year from July 2013 to June 2014	Shs 0.0 million was spent between July 2013 and December 2013 on Construction of 18 five stance latrines at Matugo P/S and work has not started	14.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.0	0.00%	Conditional Grant to SFG

Figure A.12: Example of Budget Questions

Appendix B.2. Unrestricted Sample

Appendix C. Politician Perceptions Data

To understand whether politicians of both gender perceived favoritism by the leadership of the legislature, we asked politicians in our survey the

Table B.28: Legislative Duties Performance: Meeting Minutes.

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Plenary Session Minutes (not weighted by share of meetings attended) - 49 districts					
Total Actions	-0.266***	(0.084)	-0.517***	(0.055)	820
Index Actions	-0.394	(0.243)	-0.503***	(0.063)	820
Motions	-0.039	(0.133)	-0.263***	(0.056)	820
Bills	-0.184***	(0.033)	-0.158**	(0.064)	820
Presentations	-0.274***	(0.077)	-0.236***	(0.060)	820
Remarks	-0.352***	(0.072)	-0.598***	(0.055)	820
Plenary Session Minutes (not weighted by share of meetings attended) - 19 districts					
Total Actions	0.139	(0.126)	-0.569***	(0.110)	274
Motions	-0.307***	(0.069)	-0.254**	(0.110)	274
Bills	0.164	(0.173)	-0.246**	(0.117)	274
Presentations	-0.209**	(0.082)	-0.150	(0.132)	274
Remarks	0.517***	(0.160)	-0.706***	(0.105)	274
Plenary Session Minutes (weighted by share of meetings attended) - 19 districts					
Total Actions	-0.261	(0.159)	-0.550***	(0.105)	274
Motions	-0.226***	(0.072)	-0.216**	(0.099)	274
Bills	0.176	(0.176)	-0.229**	(0.109)	274
Presentations	-0.151	(0.093)	-0.177	(0.135)	274
Remarks	0.659***	(0.208)	-0.703***	(0.106)	274
Share meeting attended	-0.073	(0.110)	-0.032	(0.041)	274

OLS regression analyses with District Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level

Standardized outcome variable

Standard errors are in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table B.29: Politician Performance Alternative Operationalization School Grant by Gender

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
School grant applications					
Number of total applications (stand)	-0.370**	(0.179)	0.092	(0.120)	284
At least one app (stand)	0.240	(0.199)	0.035	(0.115)	284
Number of total applications	3.70***	(0.812)	1.75***	(0.637)	284
At least one app	0.84***	(0.083)	0.023	(0.044)	284

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level. Standardized outcome variables when indicated. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.

Table B.30: Gender Gaps in Politician Characteristics - Sample 19 districts

	Constant	SE	RS-Women Coefficient	SE	Observations
Background Characteristics					
Education level	2.871***	(0.143)	-0.506***	(0.098)	274
Below Sec	-0.378**	(0.171)	0.547***	(0.118)	274
Secondary	-0.454***	(0.046)	0.126	(0.119)	274
Post Secondary	0.974***	(0.144)	-0.552***	(0.113)	274
Age	-0.629***	(0.191)	0.119	(0.122)	274
Wealth	-0.222	(0.226)	-0.509***	(0.116)	274
N. of terms as politician	-0.317*	(0.171)	0.122	(0.123)	274
Desire leave politics	-0.368***	(0.047)	-0.094	(0.124)	274
Political Factors					
NRM	-0303.	(0.299)	0.116	(0.128)	274
Margin of Victory 2011	-0.312**	(0.123)	0.045	(0.107)	274
Constituency size (numb Votes)	-0.793***	(0.133)	0.664***	(0.115)	197
Run Unopposed	-0.415***	(0.042)	0.139	(0.044)	274
Network Characteristics at TERM START					
In-degree					
Professional	-0.472***	(0.175)	-0.419***	(0.092)	274
Personal	-0.168	(0.129)	-0.257***	(0.079)	274
Eigenvector					
Professional	-0.132	(0.234)	-0.406***	(0.120)	274
Personal	-0.350***	(0.117)	-0.317***	(0.110)	274
Network Characteristics at TERM END					
In-degree					
Professional	0.098	(0.151)	-0.691***	(0.118)	274
Personal	-0.008	(0.200)	0.209*	(0.118)	274
Eigenvector					
Professional	0.476**	(0.212)	-0.486***	(0.115)	274
Personal	0.328	(0.225)	0.484***	(0.135)	274

For brevity, we report the information for each regression by row instead of by column. Regression includes district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

following question: *in some districts, council leadership favours male councilors. For example, male councilors may be called on to speak more often than female councilors. In other districts council leadership treats male and female councilors the same. With that in mind, the question is:* [ENUMERATOR: PLEASE HOLD UP 7 POINT SCALE] *On a scale of 1 to 7, to what extent in your district, does council leadership favor male or female councilors? 1 means council leadership favors RS-women completely and 7 means council leadership favors men completely.* We examine in Table C.37 whether there are gender differences in these perceptions. RS-women are

Table B.31: Balance Table Characteristics Restricted and Unrestricted Sample

| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
Variable	Unrestricted	Restricted	Difference
Education level	2.339	2.305	-0.123**
	(0.830)	(0.863)	(0.017)
Wealth	0.630	0.624	-0.019
	(0.638)	(0.660)	(0.640)
Margin of Victory 2011	0.336	0.356	0.073***
	(0.292)	(0.314)	(0.000)
Size Constituency (no. Votes)	4,968.020	5,002.145	124.101
	(2,518.144)	(2,616.112)	(0.428)
Held leadership position	0.138	0.182	0.159***
	(0.345)	(0.386)	(0.000)
Start Professional InD	0.208	0.189	-0.067***
	(0.145)	(0.132)	(0.000)
Start Personal InD	0.235	0.216	-0.070***
	(0.159)	(0.132)	(0.001)
Start Professional EV	0.470	0.460	-0.035
	(0.257)	(0.250)	(0.246)
Start Personal EV	0.519	0.502	-0.058*
	(0.255)	(0.239)	(0.064)
End Professional EV	0.561	0.585	0.086***
	(0.207)	(0.225)	(0.000)
End Personal EV	0.568	0.577	0.033***
	(0.225)	(0.246)	(0.009)
End Professional InD	0.218	0.242	0.089***
	(0.188)	(0.207)	(0.000)
End Personal InD	0.174	0.188	0.048***
	(0.124)	(0.138)	(0.000)
Observations	1,131	820	1,131

Table presenting the difference in means between the characteristics of councilors in the restricted and unrestricted sample. The analysis presented in the main paper uses the restricted sample. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

more likely to believe that men are favored, although the majority of both men and RS-women think leadership is equitable (a score of 4).

To understand what barriers politicians of both gender perceive there to be for RS-women's performance as politicians, we asked the following question: *There are many challenges that all councilors face to do their job well. However, we are trying to understand challenges that might be UNIQUE to WOMEN LC5 councillors in doing a good job as a councilor. Thinking about your experiences, what is the most important challenge unique to RS-women*

Table B.32: Politician Performance by Gender - Unrestricted sample

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Panel A: Plenary Session Minutes					
Total Actions (Summary Index)	-0.299***	(0.084)	-0.489***	(0.048)	996 (50 districts)
Motions	-0.075	(0.138)	-0.252***	(0.049)	996 (50 districts)
Bills	-0.180***	(0.031)	-0.177***	(0.058)	996 (50 districts)
Presentations	-0.280***	(0.067)	-0.175***	(0.060)	996 (50 districts)
Remarks	-0.371***	(0.065)	-0.571***	(0.049)	996 (50 districts)
Panel Ab: Plenary Session Minutes with attendance					
Total Actions (Summary Index)	-0.280***	(0.079)	-0.512***	(0.052)	915 (48 districts)
Motions	-0.054	(0.127)	-0.273***	(0.053)	915 (48 districts)
Bills	-0.175***	(0.031)	-0.169***	(0.061)	915 (48 districts)
Presentations	-0.278***	(0.064)	-0.184***	(0.063)	915 (48 districts)
Remarks	-0.358***	(0.064)	-0.584***	(0.052)	915 (48 districts)
Share meeting attended	-0.749*	(0.420)	-0.086	(0.058)	915 (48 districts)
Panel B: ACODE scorecard					
Total Score (Summary Index)	-0.305***	(0.086)	-0.314***	(0.059)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Legislative	0.397***	(0.057)	-0.485***	(0.051)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Meeting Electorate	-0.386***	(0.116)	-0.036	(0.053)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Monitoring	-0.398***	(0.070)	-0.220***	(0.070)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Lower Local Government	-0.151*	(0.087)	-0.140***	(0.049)	514 * 4 yrs (25 districts)
Panel C: School grant applications					
Apps/# schools	0.171	(0.221)	0.120	(0.114)	395 (20 districts)

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level. Standardized outcome variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. In Panel A, Session minutes are weighted by the share of meetings politician attended. In Panel B, we use four annual scorecards; the number of unique councilors is 514.

performing well, if any? After recording the politician's first reason, they were prompted by asking what the second most important challenge was. We coded one binary variable for each reason if it was mentioned either first or second by a politician: *constituency size* as a mention of constituency size or higher transport costs to serve larger consituency (52% RS-women, 38% men mention); *active discrimination* as active discrimination by council leadership, male councilors, or unwanted advances by male colleagues (sexual harassment) (21% RS-women, 6% men mention); *traditional societal/family gender role* as marriage and family responsibilities, disapproval from family, or motherhood issues (37% RS-women, 47% men mention); *low self esteem* as lack of self confidence (26% RS-women, 45% men mention); and *low qualifications* as lower education, lower social/economic status, or less experience (42% RS-women, 43% men mention).

Table B.33: Gender Gaps in Politician Characteristics - Unrestricted Sample

	Constant	SE	RS-Women Coefficient	SE	Observations
Background Characteristics					
Education level	2.694***	(0.159)	-0.635***	(0.045)	1131 (49 districts)
Below Sec	-0.503**	(0.198)	0.561***	(0.059)	1131 (49 districts)
Secondary	0.372	(0.314)	0.150**	(0.061)	1131 (49 districts)
Post Secondary	0.211	(0.239)	-0.451***	(0.057)	1131 (49 districts)
Age	-0.429**	(0.212)	0.041	(0.059)	1131 (49 districts)
Wealth	-0.112	(0.155)	-0.556***	(0.057)	1131 (49 districts)
Number of terms	0.116	(0.187)	0.085	(0.059)	1131 (49 districts)
Political Factors					
Desire leave politics	-0.353***	(0.058)	-0.090	(0.101)	386 (19 districts)
NRM	0.105	(0.178)	0.102*	(0.056)	1131 (49 districts)
Margin of Victory 2011	-0.405***	(0.121)	0.148***	(0.055)	1131 (49 districts)
Constituency Size (N. Voters)	-1.043***	(0.117)	0.753***	(0.044)	1131 (49 districts)
Run Unopposed	-0.384***	(0.054)	0.182***	(0.057)	1131 (49 districts)
Network Characteristics at TERM START					
In-degree					
Professional	-0.459*	(0.268)	-0.435***	(0.071)	381 (19 districts)
Personal	0.329	(0.240)	-0.222***	(0.068)	381 (19 districts)
Eigenvector					
Professional	0.219	(0.407)	-0.439***	(0.098)	381 (19 districts)
Personal	0.452**	(0.204)	-0.358***	(0.094)	381 (19 districts)
Network Characteristics at TERM END					
In-degree					
Professional	0.790***	(0.281)	-0.499***	(0.054)	1131 (49 districts)
Personal	0.690	(0.425)	0.237***	(0.054)	1131 (49 districts)
Eigenvector					
Professional	0.695***	(0.204)	-0.390***	(0.052)	1131 (49 districts)
Personal	0.014	(0.197)	0.173***	(0.058)	1131 (49 districts)

We report the information for each regression by row and not column. Regressions include district fixed effects as well as standardized variables to facilitate comparison. Standard errors are clustered at the politician level. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

We examine in Table C.38 whether there are statistically significant gender differences in perceptions of barriers to RS-women's performance. RS-women are significantly more likely to mention their constituency size and active discrimination. Men are more likely to say family gender roles and low self esteem. There is no difference in mentioning lower qualifications. These results indicate that RS-women perceive their barriers to be more structural, due to the different institutional aspect of the constituency size, as well as behavior of male colleagues, while men are more likely to cite cultural barriers and emotional flaws.

Appendix D. Gender, Knowledge, and Education

Table D.39 presents the results of the knowledge questions regressed in the dummy of RS-women politicians for the sample of 19 districts. Table D.40 presents the results of regressing the knowledge index on education.

Table B.34: Legislative Activities from Scorecard (top panel), Lower Local Government Participation (middle panel) and Monitoring Public Services (bottom panel) - Sample 19 districts. - Unrestricted

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Covariate coefficient	SE	Observations	% Change	Absolute Change
Legislative activities (scorecard component)									
None	0.373***	(-0.092)	-0.444***	(-0.059)	0	.	1456	.	.
Education	0.385***	(-0.095)	-0.359***	(-0.066)	0.115***	(-0.034)	1456	-19.1%	+0.08
Wealth	0.351***	(-0.098)	-0.424***	(-0.067)	0.026	(-0.035)	1456	-4.6%	+0.02
Margin of Victory	0.371***	(-0.096)	-0.445***	(-0.06)	0.022	(-0.036)	1456	+0.1%	0
Size Constituency	0.296***	(-0.098)	-0.536***	(-0.065)	0.114***	(-0.041)	1456	+20.7%	-0.09
Leadership Position	0.408***	(-0.092)	-0.435***	(-0.06)	0.06**	(-0.028)	1456	-2.1%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	0.34***	(-0.095)	-0.368***	(-0.061)	0.19***	(-0.04)	1456	-17.2%	+0.08
Start Personal InD	0.325***	(-0.105)	-0.401***	(-0.06)	0.2***	(-0.041)	1456	-9.7%	+0.04
Start Professional EV	0.382***	(-0.09)	-0.401***	(-0.06)	0.095***	(-0.033)	1456	-9.8%	+0.04
Start Personal EV	0.323***	(-0.1)	-0.396***	(-0.059)	0.137***	(-0.032)	1456	-11%	+0.05
End Professional InD	0.294***	(-0.096)	-0.378***	(-0.059)	0.187***	(-0.032)	1456	-15%	+0.07
End Personal InD	0.376***	(-0.095)	-0.452***	(-0.059)	0.033	(-0.03)	1456	+1.6%	-0.01
End Professional EV	0.224**	(-0.101)	-0.314***	(-0.059)	0.225***	(-0.031)	1456	-29.3%	+0.13
End Personal EV	0.353***	(-0.096)	-0.457***	(-0.059)	0.076**	(-0.034)	1456	+2.8%	-0.01
All	0.162	(-0.113)	-0.254***	(-0.072)	.	.	1456	-42.8%	+0.19
Lower Local Government participation (scorecard component)									
None	-0.17	(-0.154)	-0.106*	(-0.06)	0	.	1456	.	.
Education	-0.14	(0.158)	-0.134**	(0.067)	-0.029	(0.035)	1456	+26.3%	-0.03
Wealth	-0.14	(0.158)	-0.1	(0.061)	0.018	(0.034)	1456	-5.7%	+0.01
Margin of Victory	-0.133	(0.158)	-0.113*	(0.061)	0.008	(0.041)	1456	+7%	-0.01
Size Constituency	-0.257	(0.16)	-0.21***	(0.066)	0.13***	(0.037)	1456	+98.4%	-0.1
Leadership Position	-0.136	(0.165)	-0.097	(0.06)	0.058**	(0.029)	1456	-8.7%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	-0.176	(0.156)	-0.093	(0.063)	0.032	(0.05)	1456	-12%	+0.01
Start Personal InD	-0.174	(0.156)	-0.102*	(0.06)	0.017	(0.046)	1456	-3.5%	0
Start Professional EV	-0.166	(0.158)	-0.087	(0.059)	0.041	(0.032)	1456	-17.7%	+0.02
Start Personal EV	-0.18	(0.157)	-0.097	(0.06)	0.025	(0.035)	1456	-8.5%	+0.01
End Professional InD	-0.196	(0.15)	-0.052	(0.06)	0.177***	(0.034)	1456	-51.1%	+0.05
End Personal InD	-0.102	(0.154)	-0.131**	(0.062)	0.065**	(0.03)	1456	+23.6%	-0.03
End Professional EV	-0.214	(0.162)	-0.037	(0.063)	0.133***	(0.036)	1456	-65.5%	+0.07
End Personal EV	-0.14	(0.159)	-0.125**	(0.061)	0.062*	(0.035)	1456	+17.5%	-0.02
All	-0.261	(0.162)	-0.14*	(0.076)	.	.	1456	+32.4%	-0.03
Monitoring public services (scorecard component)									
None	0.357**	(0.171)	-0.183***	(0.068)	0	.	1456	.	.
Education	0.44**	(0.175)	-0.139*	(0.076)	0.078**	(0.039)	1456	-24.4%	+0.04
Wealth	0.387**	(0.18)	-0.129*	(0.07)	0.095**	(0.039)	1456	-29.8%	+0.05
Margin of Victory	0.423**	(0.172)	-0.195***	(0.068)	-0.032	(0.044)	1456	+6.3%	-0.01
Size Constituency	0.296	(0.18)	-0.257***	(0.076)	0.092*	(0.047)	1456	+40.2%	-0.07
Leadership	0.394**	(0.177)	-0.174**	(0.067)	0.061	(0.038)	1456	-5.3%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	0.336*	(0.181)	-0.134*	(0.07)	0.123**	(0.051)	1456	-27%	+0.05
Start Personal InD	0.319*	(0.176)	-0.149**	(0.067)	0.16***	(0.049)	1456	-18.8%	+0.03
Start Professional EV	0.368*	(0.187)	-0.135**	(0.068)	0.106***	(0.036)	1456	-26.5%	+0.05
Start Personal EV	0.323*	(0.18)	-0.15**	(0.068)	0.092**	(0.041)	1456	-18%	+0.03
End Professional InD	0.336**	(0.148)	-0.11*	(0.065)	0.247***	(0.038)	1456	-40%	+0.07
End Personal InD	0.475***	(0.171)	-0.225***	(0.067)	0.106***	(0.035)	1456	+23%	-0.04
End Professional EV	0.273*	(0.162)	-0.054	(0.067)	0.249***	(0.037)	1456	-70.8%	+0.13
End Personal EV	0.411**	(0.173)	-0.219***	(0.066)	0.121***	(0.042)	1456	+19.3%	-0.04
All	0.201	(0.177)	0.039	(0.084)	.	.	1456	-121.1%	+0.22

Table reports the information for each regression by row and not by column. Regression includes district and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table B.35: Legislative Activities Index from Meeting Minutes in 19 districts (top panel) and same in 49 districts (bottom panel). - Unrestricted

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Covariate coefficient	SE	Observations	% Change	Absolute Change
Legislative activities index (meeting minutes) - 19 districts									
None	0.147	(0.109)	-0.547***	(0.091)	0	.	340	.	.
Education	0.085	(0.117)	-0.462***	(0.099)	0.127**	(0.053)	340	-15.4%	+0.08
Wealth	0.165	(0.112)	-0.524***	(0.091)	0.041	(0.046)	340	-4.1%	+0.02
Margin of Victory	0.155	(0.114)	-0.552***	(0.093)	-0.054	(0.053)	340	+1.1%	-0.01
Size Constituency	0.232*	(0.131)	-0.617***	(0.119)	0.086	(0.065)	340	+12.9%	-0.07
Leadership	0.09	(0.106)	-0.532***	(0.09)	0.147***	(0.045)	340	-2.7%	+0.01
Start Professional InD	0.245**	(0.101)	-0.435***	(0.091)	0.243***	(0.077)	340	-20.4%	+0.11
Start Personal InD	0.17*	(0.098)	-0.489***	(0.091)	0.226***	(0.073)	340	-10.6%	+0.06
Start Professional EV	0.154	(0.105)	-0.457***	(0.09)	0.185***	(0.058)	340	-16.5%	+0.09
Start Personal EV	0.166	(0.11)	-0.516***	(0.093)	0.09*	(0.051)	340	-5.7%	+0.03
End Professional InD	0.108	(0.095)	-0.333***	(0.082)	0.339***	(0.07)	340	-39%	+0.21
End Personal InD	0.164	(0.113)	-0.565***	(0.096)	0.054	(0.055)	340	+3.4%	-0.02
End Professional EV	0.045	(0.107)	-0.444***	(0.086)	0.244***	(0.055)	340	-18.7%	+0.1
End Personal EV	0.168	(0.113)	-0.547***	(0.099)	-0.015	(0.049)	340	0%	0
All	0.177	(0.128)	-0.128	(0.116)	.	.	340	-76.5%	+0.42
Legislative activities index (meeting minutes) - 49 districts									
None	-0.299***	(-0.084)	-0.489***	(-0.048)	0	.	996	.	.
Education	-0.339***	(0.08)	-0.408***	(0.053)	0.123***	(0.026)	996	-16.6%	+0.08
Wealth	-0.282***	(0.085)	-0.477***	(0.049)	0.039	(0.025)	996	-2.6%	+0.01
Margin of Victory	-0.29***	(0.082)	-0.497***	(0.049)	-0.008	(0.029)	996	+1.6%	-0.01
Size Constituency	-0.302***	(0.09)	-0.487***	(0.058)	-0.003	(0.033)	996	-0.5%	0
Leadership	-0.375***	(0.107)	-0.466***	(0.048)	0.107***	(0.024)	996	-4.8%	+0.02
End Professional InD	-0.615***	(0.123)	-0.332***	(0.045)	0.307***	(0.031)	996	-32.1%	+0.16
End Personal InD	-0.378***	(0.105)	-0.524***	(0.049)	0.106***	(0.03)	996	+7.1%	-0.03
End Professional EV	-0.495***	(0.103)	-0.399***	(0.048)	0.243***	(0.029)	996	-18.5%	+0.09
End Personal EV	-0.291***	(0.082)	-0.509***	(0.049)	0.05*	(0.029)	996	+4%	-0.02
All	-0.685***	(0.134)	-0.203***	(0.057)	.	.	996	-58.6%	+0.29

Table reports the information for each regression by row and not by column. Regression includes district and year fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level. All the variables are standardized. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table B.36: Politician Performance - Unrestricted Sample

	Constant	SE	RS-Women coefficient	SE	Observations
Knowledge Questions					
Public Service Delivery	0.552	(0.396)	-0.188***	(0.064)	941 (49 districts)
Procedures/Rules District Council	0.315	(0.242)	-0.289***	(0.064)	941 (49 districts)
Passing Bills/Motions	0.007	(0.205)	-0.223***	(0.065)	941 (49 districts)
Knowledge Budget	-0.045	(0.314)	-0.357***	(0.066)	941 (49 districts)
Knowledge Total	0.437	(0.276)	-0.465***	(0.062)	941 (49 districts)

OLS regression analyses with District and year Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level. Standardized outcome variables. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$. Session minutes are weighted by the share of meetings politician attended

Table C.37: Perceptions of Gender Bias by Legislature Leadership

	(1)
	Leaders Favor Men
RS-women	0.131***
	(0.026)
Constant	1.006***
	(0.101)
Observations	942

OLS regression analyses. District Fixed Effects. Year Fixed Effects
Standard errors are in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table C.38: Perceptions of Barriers to RS-Women's Performance

	(1) Constituency Size	(2) Active Discrimination	(3) Societal/Family Gender Role	(4) Low Self Esteem	(5) Low Qualifications
RS-women	0.713***	1.610***	-0.477***	-0.970***	0.001
	(0.149)	(0.229)	(0.144)	(0.156)	(0.143)
Constant	-1.757***	-17.927	0.358	0.310	0.405
	(0.658)	(1191.030)	(0.526)	(0.537)	(0.531)
Observations	895	739	914	899	915

Logistic regression. District Fixed Effects. Standard errors in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table D.39: Knowledge of Job Duty Domains and Procedures - Sample 25 districts

	Constant	SE	RS-Women	SE	Observations
Knowledge Questions					
Public Service Delivery	0.322	(0.279)	-0.283**	(0.115)	274
Procedures/Rules District Council	0.472	(0.304)	-0.263**	(0.127)	274
Passing Bills/Motions	0.472***	(0.171)	-0.122	(0.117)	274
Knowledge Budget	0.016	(0.206)	-0.328***	(0.121)	274
Knowledge Total	0.534*	(0.279)	-0.465***	(0.120)	274

OLS regression with District Fixed Effects and cluster standard errors at politician level
Standardized outcome variable
Standard errors are in parentheses. $^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Table D.40: Knowledge and Education

	Knowledge Questions - Index			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Education level (categorical)	0.135***			
	(0.033)			
Below Secondary (dummy)		-0.123***		
		(0.033)		
Secondary (dummy)			-0.016	
			(0.034)	
Tertiary (dummy)				0.126***
				(0.035)
Constant	0.241	0.238	0.265	0.221
	(0.658)	(0.311)	(0.296)	(0.300)
Observations	820	820	820	820

Regression includes district fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the politician level.
All the variables are standardized. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

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